Merge pull request 'security: stop trusting the leftmost x-forwarded-for for rate limits and abuse quotas (FRE-371)' (#1) from agent-security-engineer/freno-dev:freno-dev/FRE-371-trusted-client-ip-clean into master

Reviewed-on: Mike/freno-dev#1

marketing/positioning.md

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ Every drafted asset draws its voice, claims, and constraints from this file. If
 artifact invents its own framing, fix the artifact or fix this file — never both
 silently diverging.
 
-**Reconciled 2026-10-29** against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322],
-[FRE-354]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
+**Reconciled 2026-10-29**, and again **2026-11-03** for the FRE-997 count
+correction, against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322], [FRE-354],
+[FRE-997]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
 launch route ([FRE-346] → [FRE-203] `plan-b`), and `The-Nook` master (app floor is
 **14.2**, not 14.0 — `freno-dev` `881190d`, site merge `134f41e`). The previous
 version of this file named an upstream `the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md` that
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ no longer exists; the verdicts below are the source of truth it was pointing at.
 [FRE-320]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-320
 [FRE-346]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-346
 [FRE-203]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-203
+[FRE-997]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-997
 
 ## The sentence
 
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ No agent authenticates, posts, upvotes, or DMs. No sock puppets, no self-mention
 without disclosure. `approved/` **is the only thing a human ever publishes from** —
 nothing posts itself.
 
-## Claims: status at 2026-10-29
+## Claims: status at 2026-11-03
 
 Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a row.
 
@@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a r
 | The hook and bridge are not a cloud service | **Verified code fact, held on disclosure** | [FRE-322] §2, wording corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`. Held until Sentry is gated/removed and `/privacy` + `/faq` land. Never widen to "The Nook", never "nothing but your Mac". |
 | Fan, thermal and charge control | **No claim verdict yet — do not lead with it** | Backed by `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext), but no CTO sentence exists for it. Documentary, not launch. |
 | One-time purchase, no subscription | **Publishable fact, price not a launch asset** | $10, held at $10. No dated rise, no discount framing, no pricing copy. |
-| Agent coverage numbers ("thirteen agents", "8 agents", "all your agents") | **Excluded — verdict B, count removed** | [FRE-359] verdict B (2026-10-29): the page's 13 rows are the registry's first 13 of 18, so no number is publishable and `every` / `all` / `the agents The Nook supports` are banned. Removed from `agents.tsx`, the landing island section and the marquee. [FRE-322] §1 matrix for the sets. |
+| Agent coverage numbers ("eighteen agents", "18 agents") | **Publishable at 18** | [FRE-997]: the /agents table now lists every row of `AgentSpec.all` and `agents.test.ts` asserts equality with the 18-name registry in registry order, so the landing bullet, the marquee chip and the /agents copy say 18. No other number is publishable. |
 | macOS 14.2 or later | **Publishable fact** | The app cannot start below 14.2 (`freno-dev` `881190d`, site `134f41e`). "macOS 14+" is false and was fixed on the site. |
 | Remote agents over SSH, one click to install | **Held** | [FRE-315] §1, [FRE-320], [FRE-323]. Needs a verified one-click install plus a recording. |
 | "Nothing leaves your Mac", "no telemetry", "local-only", "no account" | **False today — banned** | Sentry unconditional, licence check with hardware fingerprint ([FRE-322] §2.4). |
@@ -144,8 +146,9 @@ Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a r
 
 ## Voice
 
-- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — but no coverage
-  counts (see the excluded row above).
+- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — the only count
+  that ships is eighteen, and it is the registry's own size (see the coverage row
+  above).
 - The notch is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
 - Never apologize for being a utility. The utility is the point.
 - Banned phrasings: competitor names (see rule 1), "AI-powered", "revolutionary",

src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx

@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
         title="Your whole fleet, in one pixel strip"
         body="Every session, every agent, one square each. The pill never wraps, never grows — an arriving question flashes the fire and swaps the slot, then hands the notch back."
         bullets={[
-          "Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, Cursor and more",
+          "18 agents: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, and more",
           "Custom agents: your own coding agent can wire itself in from the published contract",
           "Slot rankings — you choose which data earns the notch",
           "You don't need a notch — external displays get the same island, floating top-center"

src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx

@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ function LayoutMock() {
 /* ── Marquee ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
 
 const CHIPS_A = [
-  "Agents wired in",
+  "18 agents",
   "Custom agents",
   "Six chiptunes",
   "Focus-aware slots",

src/routes/api/the-nook/report.test.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
 
 const sentEmails: { to: string; subject: string; html: string }[] = [];
 const tokenAnswers: { allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number }[] = [];
+/** Every rate-limit key the route derived, in order. */
+const rateKeys: string[] = [];
 
 mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
   default: async (to: string, subject: string, html: string) => {
@@ -19,7 +21,10 @@ mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
 }));
 
 mock.module("~/server/bug-report-rate-limit", () => ({
-  takeBugReportToken: () => tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true }
+  takeBugReportToken: (key: string) => {
+    rateKeys.push(key);
+    return tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true };
+  }
 }));
 
 const { POST } = await import("./report");
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     sentEmails.length = 0;
     tokenAnswers.length = 0;
+    rateKeys.length = 0;
   });
 
   it("emails the owner a report containing the snapshot, escaped", async () => {
@@ -133,10 +139,49 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
 
   it("still succeeds when no fingerprint header exists", async () => {
     const res = await POST(
-      request(validPayload, { "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1" })
+      request(validPayload, {
+        "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
+        "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
+      })
     );
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
     expect(sentEmails).toHaveLength(1);
+    // The quota key is the Cloudflare-recorded client, not a header hop the
+    // sender chose.
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
+  });
+
+  it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not mint a fresh quota key", async () => {
+    // FRE-371: the old read keyed on the leftmost hop, which the sender
+    // controls outright — one scripted loop with a rotating header had
+    // unlimited reports. With the same Cloudflare-recorded client and a
+    // different spoofed prefix per request, the key must be stable.
+    for (const spoof of ["1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", "3.3.3.3"]) {
+      const res = await POST(
+        request(validPayload, {
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
+          "x-forwarded-for": `${spoof}, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1`
+        })
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    }
+
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual([
+      "203.0.113.9",
+      "203.0.113.9",
+      "203.0.113.9"
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("keys on the rightmost-minus-one hop when Cloudflare's header is absent", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      request(validPayload, {
+        "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
+      })
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // Never the leftmost (sender-chosen) hop.
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
   });
 
   it("delivers the landing page's beta request with only the email", async () => {

src/routes/api/the-nook/report.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { z } from "zod";
 import sendEmail from "~/server/email";
 import { CONTACT_RECIPIENT_EMAIL } from "~/lib/contact-config";
 import { takeBugReportToken } from "~/server/bug-report-rate-limit";
+import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
 import { json, error } from "./_lib";
 
 /**
@@ -103,10 +104,9 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
   )
     .trim()
     .toLowerCase();
-  const forwarded = event.request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
-  const rateKey =
-    fingerprint ||
-    (forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : "unknown");
+  // FRE-371: the IP fallback must be the spoof-resistant read — a rotating
+  // leftmost x-forwarded-for used to mint unlimited report quota.
+  const rateKey = fingerprint || resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
   const token = takeBugReportToken(rateKey);
   if (!token.allowed) {
     return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "Too many reports" }), {

src/routes/nook/agents.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Regression test for the /agents roster (NOOK-336) and its coverage wording
- * (FRE-359).
+ * Regression test for the /agents roster and its coverage count.
  *
  * The page mirrors the app's registry, `AgentSpec.all` in
  * the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift. When Muse joined
@@ -9,11 +8,11 @@
  * them. The registry lives in another repo, so the expected roster is
  * restated here; when an agent is added there, add it here and on the page.
  *
- * FRE-359 verdict B: the page no longer states a count or claims coverage
- * ("all thirteen", "every coding agent The Nook supports"). The page still
- * lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows — the table is hand-mirrored and its
- * regeneration is its own ticket — so the roster check here is a subset
- * check in registry order, not an equality check.
+ * FRE-997 restored the count. The page said thirteen while the registry held
+ * eighteen, so the count was dropped rather than corrected (FRE-359 verdict B);
+ * now that all eighteen rows are on the page, the roster check is an equality
+ * check again and the page states eighteen. A subset check would let a shipped
+ * agent go missing behind a passing suite, which is the NOOK-336 failure.
  *
  * STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as the downloads regressions.
  */
@@ -48,51 +47,23 @@ const REGISTRY = [
   "Amp"
 ];
 
-const NUMBER_WORDS = ["twelve", "thirteen", "fourteen", "fifteen", "sixteen", "seventeen", "eighteen"];
-
 const entries = [...SOURCE.matchAll(/^\s{4}name: "([^"]+)",$/gm)].map((m) => m[1]);
 
-/** The page's rows are a subset of the registry, in registry order. */
-function subsetInOrder(page: string[], registry: string[]): boolean {
-  let cursor = 0;
-  for (const name of page) {
-    const at = registry.indexOf(name, cursor);
-    if (at === -1) return false;
-    cursor = at + 1;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-describe("Nook /agents roster (NOOK-336)", () => {
-  it("lists only registry agents, in registry order", () => {
-    expect(entries.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-    expect(subsetInOrder(entries, REGISTRY)).toBe(true);
+describe("Nook /agents roster", () => {
+  it("lists every registry agent, once, in registry order", () => {
+    expect(entries).toEqual(REGISTRY);
   });
 
-  it("lists each agent at most once", () => {
-    expect(new Set(entries).size).toBe(entries.length);
-  });
-});
-
-describe("Nook /agents coverage wording (FRE-359)", () => {
-  it("states no agent count anywhere on the page", () => {
-    for (const word of NUMBER_WORDS) {
-      expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(word);
-    }
-    // A bare numeral count ("13 agents", "The 13") is just as precise and just
-    // as unverified; the page must not state one in any form.
-    expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b\d{1,2} agents\b/);
-    expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\ball \d{1,2}\b/);
-  });
-
-  it("makes no completeness claim over the agent set", () => {
-    for (const banned of [
-      "every coding agent",
-      "the agents the nook supports",
-      "agents the nook supports",
-      "supported agents"
-    ]) {
-      expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(banned);
-    }
+  it("states the registry's size", () => {
+    expect(entries.length).toBe(18);
+    expect(COPY).toContain("all eighteen");
+    expect(COPY).toContain("The 18 agents");
+    expect(COPY).toContain("eighteen coding agents");
+  });
+
+  it("carries no stale count", () => {
+    expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("thirteen");
+    expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b13 agents\b/);
+    expect(COPY).not.toContain("all thirteen");
   });
 });

src/routes/nook/agents.tsx

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 /**
- * `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — the agent roster and each row's event
- * coverage. It states no agent count and claims no completeness over the
- * registry (FRE-359 verdict B).
+ * `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — all eighteen agents in the registry and
+ * each row's event coverage.
  *
  * The registry below mirrors `AgentSpec.all` in the app
- * (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentSpec.swift) and each agent's
- * installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
+ * (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift) and each
+ * agent's installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
  * (plugins/*), normalized onto the shared event vocabulary
  * (~/Code/the-nook/docs/agent-interface.md). Copy follows
  * marketing/positioning.md: category nouns, honest scoping, no unverifiable
@@ -261,6 +260,92 @@ const AGENTS: AgentEntry[] = [
     ],
     gating:
       "Tool calls can be allowed or denied from a card; permission prompts stay with the agent"
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Kimi",
+    wiring: "Hook rules in its TOML config, one per event",
+    events: [
+      "SessionStart",
+      "SessionEnd",
+      "UserPromptSubmit",
+      "AgentStart",
+      "PreToolUse",
+      "PermissionRequest",
+      "PermissionResolved",
+      "PostToolUse",
+      "PostToolUseFailure",
+      "Stop",
+      "SessionError",
+      "SubagentStart",
+      "SubagentStop",
+      "PreCompact",
+      "Notification"
+    ],
+    gating:
+      "Observation — every event appears as a card; its PreToolUse fires before its own permission check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
+  },
+  {
+    name: "GitHub Copilot CLI",
+    wiring: "One hook file of ours in its hooks directory",
+    events: [
+      "SessionStart",
+      "SessionEnd",
+      "UserPromptSubmit",
+      "PreToolUse",
+      "PermissionRequest",
+      "PostToolUse",
+      "PostToolUseFailure",
+      "Stop",
+      "SubagentStart",
+      "SubagentStop",
+      "ErrorOccurred",
+      "PreCompact",
+      "Notification"
+    ],
+    gating:
+      "Observation — every event appears as a card; its permission request runs before its own policy check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Crush",
+    wiring:
+      "One entry in its JSONC config, the only event it documents",
+    events: ["PreToolUse"],
+    gating:
+      "Observation — tool calls appear as cards; its own permission prompts decide"
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Cursor",
+    wiring:
+      "Hook entries in its hooks.json, merged with your own. No permission hook, on purpose",
+    events: [
+      "SessionStart",
+      "SessionEnd",
+      "UserPromptSubmit",
+      "PostToolUse",
+      "PostToolUseFailure",
+      "Stop",
+      "SessionError",
+      "AfterAgentResponse",
+      "SubagentStop",
+      "PreCompact"
+    ],
+    gating:
+      "Observation — a permission hook that stays silent blocks the action here, so Cursor keeps its own prompting"
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Amp",
+    wiring: "In-process extension package",
+    events: [
+      "SessionStart",
+      "SessionEnd",
+      "UserPromptSubmit",
+      "PreToolUse",
+      "PostToolUse",
+      "Stop",
+      "SessionError"
+    ],
+    gating:
+      "Observation — its plugin API has no permission-wait event, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
   }
 ];
 
@@ -284,19 +369,19 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
     <>
       <EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
       <PageHead
-        title="Agent coverage"
-        description="The coding agents The Nook connects to, with the events each hook reports and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
-        ogTitle="The coding agents The Nook connects to, and what each hook sees"
+        title="Supported agents"
+        description="Every coding agent The Nook supports — all eighteen, with each hook's exact event coverage and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
+        ogTitle="The 18 agents The Nook supports, and what each hook sees"
       />
       <SubdomainHeader />
       <main class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
         <h1 class="text-text mb-3 text-3xl font-bold tracking-tight sm:text-4xl">
-          Agent coverage
+          Supported agents
         </h1>
         <p class="text-subtext0 mb-2 max-w-2xl text-lg">
-          The Nook watches coding agents in one place — your menu bar and notch
-          show sessions that are running, thinking, or blocked, and a card can
-          answer a permission prompt without leaving your keyboard.
+          The Nook watches eighteen coding agents in one place — your menu bar and
+          notch show every session that is running, thinking, or blocked, and a
+          card answers permission prompts without leaving your keyboard.
         </p>
         <p class="text-subtext1 mb-10 max-w-2xl text-sm">
           Each agent reports its own set of events. "Allow / Deny from a card"

src/routes/nook/remote-claims.test.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@
  * credential. FRE-359 verdict B removed the coverage count for the same
  * reason: the /agents table lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows.
  *
+ * FRE-997 corrects the second half without touching the first. The count was
+ * stale, not unverifiable: `AgentSpec.all` holds eighteen, /agents now lists
+ * all eighteen and `agents.test.ts` asserts that roster as an equality again.
+ * So the two completeness phrasings FRE-359 banned ("every coding agent",
+ * "Supported agents") no longer rest on a 13-of-18 gap — the ban existed
+ * because the page claimed the set and listed two thirds of it. They are out
+ * of `BANNED_COVERAGE` on this branch for that reason alone; the stale counts
+ * stay banned, and every FRE-323 remote sentence stays banned, because this
+ * branch still carries the FRE-323 site state.
+ *
  * The copy was not thrown away — it is parked in
  * `marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` with the restore gate, and this test asserts
  * it is still there so nobody deletes the parked story as stale. It goes back
@@ -55,13 +65,15 @@ const BANNED_REMOTE_CLAIMS = [
   "this Mac or remote machines"
 ];
 
-/** FRE-359 verdict B: no count, no coverage claim, in any form. */
+/** FRE-359 verdict B: no stale count, in any form.
+ *
+ * "every coding agent" and "Supported agents" left this list with FRE-997:
+ * the page now lists all eighteen registry rows and `agents.test.ts` asserts
+ * that equality, so the completeness claim is backed rather than incomplete. */
 const BANNED_COVERAGE = [
   "all thirteen",
   "thirteen coding agents",
-  "13 agents",
-  "every coding agent",
-  "Supported agents"
+  "13 agents"
 ];
 
 /** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
@@ -98,9 +110,9 @@ describe("remote claims stay off the site (FRE-323)", () => {
   });
 });
 
-describe("agent coverage count stays off the page (FRE-359 verdict B)", () => {
+describe("the agent count is corrected, not dropped (FRE-997)", () => {
   for (const file of AUDITED) {
-    it(`${file} states no coverage count`, () => {
+    it(`${file} states no stale count`, () => {
       const copy = copyOf(file);
       for (const phrase of BANNED_COVERAGE) {
         expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
@@ -108,7 +120,7 @@ describe("agent coverage count stays off the page (FRE-359 verdict B)", () => {
     });
   }
 
-  it("/agents titles the table Agent coverage", () => {
-    expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Agent coverage");
+  it("/agents states the registry's size", () => {
+    expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Supported agents");
   });
 });

src/routes/smarter-remote/privacy.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/**
+ * A Smarter Remote privacy policy — `freno.me/smarter-remote/privacy`.
+ *
+ * Linked from the iOS app's paywall (App Review 3.1.2). Reflects what the app
+ * actually does: TV control stays on the local network, pairing data stays on
+ * the phone, purchases go through Apple and RevenueCat, and sharing is a QR
+ * code passed between phones.
+ */
+import { A } from "@solidjs/router";
+import { PageHead } from "~/components/PageHead";
+import { EdgeCacheHeaders } from "~/components/EdgeCacheHeaders";
+
+export default function SmarterRemotePrivacyPolicy() {
+  return (
+    <>
+      <EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
+      <PageHead
+        title="A Smarter Remote Privacy Policy"
+        description="Privacy policy for A Smarter Remote, a universal TV remote app that works over your local Wi-Fi network."
+      />
+      <div class="bg-base">
+        <div class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
+          <div class="py-4 text-xl">A Smarter Remote&apos;s Privacy Policy</div>
+          <div class="py-2">Last Updated: November 2, 2026</div>
+          <div class="py-2">
+            Welcome to A Smarter Remote (&apos;We&apos;, &apos;Us&apos;,
+            &apos;Our&apos;). The app controls your TVs over your own Wi-Fi
+            network. It has no accounts, no ads, and no analytics. This policy
+            explains the little data it does handle.
+          </div>
+          <ol>
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> Data We Collect
+              </div>
+              <div class="pl-4">
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(a) Your TVs:</div> The app finds TVs on
+                  your local network and stores their names, network addresses,
+                  and platform on your phone. Pairing codes and tokens are kept
+                  in your phone&apos;s Keychain. This data is sent only to the
+                  TV itself, over your local network. It never reaches us.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(b) Purchases:</div> Payments are handled
+                  by Apple. We use RevenueCat to check whether you own A Smarter
+                  Remote Pro. RevenueCat receives an anonymous app user ID, your
+                  purchase and subscription history, and basic device and app
+                  details such as OS version, app version, and region. It does
+                  not receive your name, email, or payment details.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(c) Voice input:</div> If you use voice
+                  search, your speech is converted to text by Apple&apos;s
+                  speech recognition. Apple may process it on its servers. The
+                  resulting text is sent only to your TV.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(d) Sharing:</div> If you share a TV with
+                  someone, its name, address, and platform are put into a QR
+                  code on your screen for them to scan. It goes from one phone
+                  to the other and does not pass through our servers.
+                </div>
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">2.</span> How We Use It
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                Data about your TVs is used only to control them. Purchase
+                records are used only to unlock Pro. We do not use any of it for
+                advertising, and we do not sell it.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">3.</span> Local Network Access
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                iOS asks for permission before the app can use your local
+                network. The app needs it to find and control your TVs. If you
+                decline, the app cannot reach your TVs. You can change this in
+                Settings &gt; Privacy &amp; Security &gt; Local Network.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">4.</span> Deleting Your Data
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                Removing a TV in the app deletes its stored details and
+                credentials from your phone. Deleting the app removes all of
+                them. Subscriptions are managed and cancelled in your App Store
+                account settings.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">5.</span> Children&apos;s Privacy
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                The app does not knowingly collect personal information from
+                anyone, including children under 13.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">6.</span> Changes to the Privacy Policy
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                We may update this policy periodically. Any changes are posted on
+                this page, so please review it from time to time.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">7.</span> Contact Us
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                If you have any questions about this policy, you can contact us{" "}
+                <A href="/contact" class="text-blue hover-underline-animation">
+                  here
+                </A>
+                .
+              </div>
+            </div>
+          </ol>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </>
+  );
+}

src/routes/smarter-remote/terms.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/**
+ * A Smarter Remote terms of use — `freno.me/smarter-remote/terms`.
+ *
+ * Linked from the iOS app's paywall (App Review 3.1.2). Builds on Apple's
+ * standard EULA and adds the Pro subscription and lifetime purchase terms.
+ */
+import { A } from "@solidjs/router";
+import { PageHead } from "~/components/PageHead";
+import { EdgeCacheHeaders } from "~/components/EdgeCacheHeaders";
+
+export default function SmarterRemoteTerms() {
+  return (
+    <>
+      <EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
+      <PageHead
+        title="A Smarter Remote Terms of Use"
+        description="Terms of use for A Smarter Remote and its Pro subscription."
+      />
+      <div class="bg-base">
+        <div class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
+          <div class="py-4 text-xl">A Smarter Remote&apos;s Terms of Use</div>
+          <div class="py-2">Last Updated: November 2, 2026</div>
+          <div class="py-2">
+            These terms cover your use of the A Smarter Remote app (&apos;the
+            App&apos;). By using the App you agree to them. The App is licensed
+            to you under Apple&apos;s{" "}
+            <a
+              href="https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/dev/stdeula/"
+              target="_blank"
+              rel="noopener noreferrer"
+              class="text-blue hover-underline-animation"
+            >
+              Licensed Application End User License Agreement
+            </a>
+            , and the terms below add to it.
+          </div>
+          <ol>
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> A Smarter Remote Pro
+              </div>
+              <div class="pl-4">
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(a) What it includes:</div> The free App
+                  controls one TV. Pro removes that limit and unlocks the
+                  features marked Pro in the App.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(b) Yearly subscription:</div> Payment is
+                  charged to your Apple account when you confirm the purchase,
+                  or when any free trial ends. The subscription renews
+                  automatically at the same price unless you cancel at least 24
+                  hours before the end of the current period. Your account is
+                  charged for renewal within 24 hours before the period ends.
+                  Any unused part of a free trial is forfeited when you buy a
+                  subscription.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(c) Lifetime purchase:</div> A one-time
+                  payment that unlocks Pro with no recurring charge.
+                </div>
+                <div class="pb-2">
+                  <div class="-ml-6">(d) Managing and refunds:</div> You can
+                  manage or cancel a subscription in your App Store account
+                  settings. Refunds are handled by Apple under its policies.
+                  Restore Purchases in the App re-unlocks Pro on another device
+                  signed in to the same Apple account.
+                </div>
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">2.</span> Your TVs
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                The App controls TVs through the network features their makers
+                provide. Which features work depends on your TV&apos;s model and
+                software, which can change without notice. We do not guarantee
+                that every feature works on every TV. Only control TVs you own
+                or have permission to use.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">3.</span> No Warranty
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                The App is provided &apos;as is&apos;, without warranties of any
+                kind, to the extent the law allows. To the extent the law allows,
+                we are not liable for indirect or consequential damages arising
+                from your use of the App.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">4.</span> Privacy
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                How the App handles data is described in the{" "}
+                <A
+                  href="/smarter-remote/privacy"
+                  class="text-blue hover-underline-animation"
+                >
+                  Privacy Policy
+                </A>
+                .
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">5.</span> Changes to These Terms
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                We may update these terms periodically. Any changes are posted on
+                this page. Continuing to use the App after a change means you
+                accept the new terms.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div class="py-2">
+              <div class="pb-2 text-lg">
+                <span class="-ml-4 pr-2">6.</span> Contact Us
+              </div>
+              <div class="pb-2 pl-4">
+                If you have any questions about these terms, you can contact us{" "}
+                <A href="/contact" class="text-blue hover-underline-animation">
+                  here
+                </A>
+                .
+              </div>
+            </div>
+          </ol>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </>
+  );
+}

src/server/security.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { getCookie, setCookie } from "vinxi/http";
 import type { H3Event } from "vinxi/http";
 import { t } from "~/server/api/utils";
 import { logAuditEvent } from "~/server/audit";
+import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
 import { env } from "~/env/server";
 import {
   AUTH_CONFIG,
@@ -328,39 +329,15 @@ async function cleanupExpiredRateLimits(): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 /**
- * Get client IP address from request headers.
- * Only trusts X-Forwarded-For outside of local development (set by the Vercel
- * edge network in production; trusted in tests so the header-parsing path is
- * exercised). In local development, uses the socket address to prevent header
- * spoofing.
+ * Get client IP address for a security decision (rate limiting, audit).
+ *
+ * Thin alias over `resolveTrustedClientIp` (./trusted-client-ip), which owns
+ * the trust order: the previous leftmost `x-forwarded-for` read was
+ * client-spoofable in our append-only proxy topology, and `x-real-ip` was
+ * read unconditionally — both fixed there (FRE-371).
  */
 export function getClientIP(event: H3Event): string {
-  // In production on Vercel, X-Forwarded-For is set by the edge network
-  // and cannot be spoofed by clients. In dev, ignore it.
-  if (env.NODE_ENV !== "development") {
-    const forwarded = getHeaderValue(event, "x-forwarded-for");
-    if (forwarded) {
-      return forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
-    }
-    const realIP = getHeaderValue(event, "x-real-ip");
-    if (realIP) {
-      return realIP;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Fallback: try socket remote address
-  try {
-    const nodeReq = event.node.req;
-    if (nodeReq?.socket?.remoteAddress) {
-      const addr = nodeReq.socket.remoteAddress;
-      // Clean up IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses
-      return addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "");
-    }
-  } catch {
-    // socket access failed
-  }
-
-  return "unknown";
+  return resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
 }
 
 /**

src/server/security/rate-limit.test.ts

@@ -150,29 +150,100 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
   });
 
   describe("getClientIP", () => {
-    it("should extract IP from x-forwarded-for header", () => {
+    // FRE-371: the read is spoof-resistant now. In the pinned topology
+    // (client → Cloudflare → origin proxy → app) both proxies APPEND, so
+    // x-forwarded-for arrives as `<spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and the
+    // leftmost hop is whatever the sender typed. Trust order:
+    // cf-connecting-ip, then x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, then the
+    // socket peer — never the leftmost hop, never x-real-ip.
+
+    it("takes x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, never the leftmost hop", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
-        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1" }
+        headers: {
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
+        }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
       expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.1");
     });
 
-    it("should extract IP from x-real-ip header", () => {
+    it("prefers cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge)", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: {
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
+        }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    });
+
+    it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not change the resolved client", () => {
+      // The spoof the old read fell for: same Cloudflare-recorded client,
+      // different sender-chosen prefix per request. The key must be stable,
+      // or each rotation mints a fresh rate-limit bucket.
+      const first = getClientIP(
+        createMockEvent({
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      );
+      const second = getClientIP(
+        createMockEvent({
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "2.2.2.2, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      );
+
+      expect(first).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+      expect(second).toBe(first);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores x-real-ip entirely (client-settable in this topology)", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
         headers: { "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2" }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
-      expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.2");
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
     });
 
-    it("should prefer x-forwarded-for over x-real-ip", () => {
+    it("ignores a client-supplied single-hop x-forwarded-for with no trusted proxy above it", () => {
+      // One hop only = the sender's own invention; discounting the trusted
+      // hop leaves nothing to believe.
       const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
+    });
+
+    it("a non-loopback socket peer is the client and beats every header", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
         headers: {
-          "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1",
-          "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2"
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6",
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1",
+          "x-real-ip": "6.6.6.6"
+        }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("198.51.100.23");
+    });
+
+    it("a loopback socket peer lets the forwarded headers speak", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+        headers: {
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
         }
       });
 
@@ -198,13 +269,23 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
     it("should handle IPv6 addresses", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
         headers: {
-          "x-forwarded-for": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334"
+          "x-forwarded-for":
+            "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334, 10.0.0.1"
         }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
       expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
     });
+
+    it("rejects a candidate hop that is not an address", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "not-an-ip, 10.0.0.1" }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
+    });
   });
 
   describe("rateLimitLogin", () => {

src/server/security/test-utils.ts

@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
   cookies?: Record<string, string>;
   method?: string;
   url?: string;
+  /** Socket peer the server observed; omit for a peer-less synthetic event. */
+  remoteAddress?: string;
 }): H3Event {
   const {
     headers = {},
     cookies = {},
     method = "POST",
-    url = "http://localhost:3000/"
+    url = "http://localhost:3000/",
+    remoteAddress
   } = options;
 
   // Build the cookie header string from the cookies object only
@@ -49,7 +52,10 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
     headers: headersObj,
     node: {
       req: {
-        headers: allHeaders
+        headers: allHeaders,
+        ...(remoteAddress
+          ? { socket: { remoteAddress } }
+          : {})
       },
       res: {
         cookies: {}

src/server/trusted-client-ip.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
+
+import {
+  resolveTrustedClientIp,
+  isIpAddress,
+  isLoopbackAddress,
+  UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP,
+  type ClientIpEventLike
+} from "./trusted-client-ip";
+
+/**
+ * Unit coverage for the security-path client-IP read (FRE-371). The caller
+ * suites (rate-limit.test.ts, report.test.ts) pin the behaviour through
+ * getClientIP and the route; this file pins the helper's own edges: the peer
+ * forms a real socket can present, the APIEvent wrapper, and failing closed.
+ */
+function event(opts: {
+  headers?: Record<string, string>;
+  remoteAddress?: string;
+  wrapped?: boolean;
+}): ClientIpEventLike {
+  const inner: ClientIpEventLike = {
+    ...(opts.remoteAddress
+      ? { node: { req: { socket: { remoteAddress: opts.remoteAddress } } } }
+      : {}),
+    request: { headers: new Headers(opts.headers ?? {}) }
+  };
+  // An APIEvent wraps its H3Event as `nativeEvent` (routes/api/* shape).
+  return opts.wrapped ? { nativeEvent: inner } : inner;
+}
+
+describe("resolveTrustedClientIp", () => {
+  it("trust order: non-loopback peer, then cf-connecting-ip, then rightmost-minus-one x-forwarded-for", () => {
+    // Peer wins.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("198.51.100.23");
+
+    // Loopback peer → Cloudflare's record.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+
+    // No CF header → the hop below the trusted proxy.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("reads the wrapped H3Event of an APIEvent-shaped input", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          wrapped: true,
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("never returns a truncated address", () => {
+    // The full /128 is the bucket key; a truncated one would pool attackers
+    // with their neighbours.
+    const ip = resolveTrustedClientIp(
+      event({
+        remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+        headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334" }
+      })
+    );
+    expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed to the stricter unknown key", () => {
+    // One hop = the sender's own invention; a non-address hop; nothing at all.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-ip" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+    expect(resolveTrustedClientIp(event({}))).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+  });
+
+  it("recognises the loopback forms a real peer presents", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          // IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback from a node socket.
+          remoteAddress: "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "::1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    // A non-loopback peer that merely looks odd is still the client.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "::ffff:203.0.113.7",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("never believes x-real-ip", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "x-real-ip": "203.0.113.7" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("address helpers", () => {
+  it("isIpAddress", () => {
+    expect(isIpAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("not-an-ip")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress("256.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.255.0.3")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::2")).toBe(false);
+    // Unparseable input is not loopback — fails closed.
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("garbage")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

src/server/trusted-client-ip.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/**
+ * The client address, resolved for security decisions (FRE-371).
+ *
+ * This is the ONLY client-IP read allowed to feed a security decision — rate
+ * limiting, abuse quotas, account lockout, audit trails. It exists separately
+ * from `request-client.ts`'s `resolveClientIp` (the analytics read) on
+ * purpose:
+ *
+ *   - `resolveClientIp` carries a standing rule (FRE-369 review, 1d9287a):
+ *     it never feeds a security decision. Its blast radius is a poisoned
+ *     analytics row; ours is granting or denying access.
+ *   - Rate limiting needs the UN-truncated address; the analytics module only
+ *     ever hands out truncated prefixes.
+ *   - `request-client.ts` ships on FRE-366's branch, which is under review;
+ *     a security fix must not merge-depend on an analytics diff.
+ *
+ * The address-parsing primitives below are therefore a deliberate port of the
+ * reviewed ones, not an import. If the two ever drift, this file's version is
+ * the one security paths follow.
+ *
+ * WHY the old read was spoofable: `security.ts`'s `getClientIP` took the
+ * LEFTMOST `x-forwarded-for` hop, believing the header "cannot be spoofed".
+ * In the pinned topology — client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy →
+ * app — both proxies *append*, so the header arrives as
+ * `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the
+ * leftmost hop is exactly the one the sender chose. Rotating
+ * `X-Forwarded-For: <random>` per request minted a fresh rate-limit bucket
+ * and unlimited bug-report quota. `x-real-ip` was read unconditionally too;
+ * nothing in this topology overwrites it, so it is equally client text and is
+ * no longer read at all.
+ *
+ * Trust order (matches the convention FRE-366 landed after its security
+ * review, re-derived here for security stakes):
+ *
+ *   1. The direct socket peer, when it is a real routable address: it IS the
+ *      client (dev, direct hit), and any forwarded header from it is the
+ *      client describing itself — ignored.
+ *   2. `cf-connecting-ip` — reachable only when the peer is the loopback
+ *      origin proxy (or unreadable, e.g. a synthetic event in tests).
+ *      Cloudflare *overwrites* this header at the edge, so a client-supplied
+ *      value never survives. Must parse as an address.
+ *   3. `x-forwarded-for` counted from the RIGHT: drop the rightmost hop (the
+ *      Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the hop
+ *      before it. Never the leftmost. Must parse as an address.
+ *   4. "unknown" — callers give unknown-IP keys stricter shared limits, so
+ *      an unresolvable client fails toward a tighter bucket, never a looser
+ *      one.
+ *
+ * Deploy-side precondition this code cannot verify (same as the analytics
+ * read): the origin must be reachable only through Cloudflare and the
+ * same-host proxy. If the app is directly internet-reachable, a client can
+ * set every header read here and no in-app read can recover the truth.
+ */
+
+/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
+const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
+const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
+
+/**
+ * Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
+ * taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
+ * because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
+ * raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
+ */
+const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
+
+/** Returned when no trustworthy address exists. Callers rate-limit it harder. */
+export const UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP = "unknown";
+
+/**
+ * The shapes this module reads: an H3Event (`security.ts` callers) or a
+ * SolidStart APIEvent (`routes/api/*`), which wraps its H3Event as
+ * `nativeEvent`. Every field is optional because test doubles are minimal;
+ * anything unreadable simply falls through to the next trust step.
+ */
+export interface ClientIpEventLike {
+  request?: { headers?: unknown };
+  headers?: unknown;
+  node?: {
+    req?: {
+      headers?: Record<string, unknown>;
+      socket?: { remoteAddress?: string };
+    };
+  };
+  nativeEvent?: ClientIpEventLike;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The client address for a security decision, per the trust order above.
+ * Never truncated: rate-limit buckets are per-address, and truncating would
+ * let an attacker share a bucket with the innocents behind their /24.
+ */
+export function resolveTrustedClientIp(event: ClientIpEventLike): string {
+  // An APIEvent's socket and (authoritative) headers live on the wrapped
+  // H3Event; a bare APIEvent-shaped double without one is read as-is.
+  const source = event.nativeEvent ?? event;
+
+  const peer = directPeer(source);
+  if (peer && isIpAddress(peer) && !isLoopbackAddress(peer)) return peer;
+
+  // The peer is the loopback origin proxy (or unreadable): forwarded headers
+  // may be believed, in the order above.
+  const connecting = cleanHop(headerValue(source, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
+  if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
+
+  const hops = (headerValue(source, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
+    .split(",")
+    .map(cleanHop)
+    .filter(Boolean);
+  const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
+  if (index >= 0 && isIpAddress(hops[index])) return hops[index]!;
+
+  return UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP;
+}
+
+/** The socket peer, IPv6-mapped IPv4 flattened (`::ffff:1.2.3.4` → `1.2.3.4`). */
+function directPeer(event: ClientIpEventLike): string | null {
+  try {
+    const addr = event.node?.req?.socket?.remoteAddress;
+    return addr ? addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "") : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Header read tolerant of every event shape in play: Fetch-style
+ * `request.headers.get`, an h3 `event.headers` (Headers or plain object), and
+ * the raw node request headers. Header names are case-insensitive per HTTP;
+ * the plain-object fallbacks lowercase to match how node and the test doubles
+ * store them.
+ */
+function headerValue(event: ClientIpEventLike, name: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const fromHeaders = (h: unknown): string | null => {
+      if (!h) return null;
+      if (typeof (h as Headers).get === "function") {
+        return (h as Headers).get(name) ?? null;
+      }
+      if (typeof h === "object") {
+        const record = h as Record<string, unknown>;
+        const value = record[name] ?? record[name.toLowerCase()];
+        return typeof value === "string" ? value : null;
+      }
+      return null;
+    };
+
+    return (
+      fromHeaders(event.request?.headers) ??
+      fromHeaders(event.headers) ??
+      fromHeaders(event.node?.req?.headers)
+    );
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
+  return (value ?? "").trim();
+}
+
+// ── Addresses: parse and validate ───────────────────────────────────────────
+// Ported from the reviewed `request-client.ts` (FRE-366 @ 1d9287a); see the
+// header comment for why this is a copy and not an import.
+
+/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
+export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
+ *
+ * Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
+ * `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
+ * recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
+ * closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
+ * believed (a non-loopback peer short-circuits before headers are read).
+ */
+export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
+  const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
+  if (!bytes) return false;
+  if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
+
+  // IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
+  const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
+  if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
+  const tail = bytes[15]!;
+  return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
+}
+
+function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
+  const parts = value.split(".");
+  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
+  return parts.every(
+    (part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
+  );
+}
+
+/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
+function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
+  const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
+  if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
+  if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
+
+  const halves = raw.split("::");
+  if (halves.length > 2) return null;
+  const compressed = halves.length === 2;
+
+  const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
+  const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
+  if (!head || !tail) return null;
+
+  const total = head.length + tail.length;
+  if (compressed) {
+    if (total > 8) return null;
+    return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
+  }
+  if (total !== 8) return null;
+  return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
+}
+
+/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
+function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
+  if (side === "") return [];
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  for (const part of side.split(":")) {
+    if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
+      out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
+    } else if (isIpv4(part)) {
+      const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
+      out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
+    } else {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function split16(group: number): number[] {
+  return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
+}
+
+/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
+function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
+  const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
+  const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
+  if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
+  return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
+}