2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ad509d2303 nessa: list /terms in the sitemap (FRE-1670)
Ports the sitemap entry from the FRE-194 change on the Gitea line, which
this branch is cut from GitHub master and therefore did not inherit.
2026-11-09 20:31:55 +00:00
ff8ed53496 FRE-1670: publish /terms and the support address on the Nessa site
nessa.freno.me/terms was a live 404 although AppSettings.termsOfServiceURL
links it from Settings > Legal and the paywall. The document existed only on
an unmerged branch and had no host-dispatch route, so it could not serve on
the subdomain. Carry the Terms of Use page, add the /terms dispatcher, and
publish nessa-support@freno.me on terms, privacy, contact and deletion.

- src/routes/terms.tsx: host-aware dispatch for nessa; other sites 404.
- src/routes/nessa/terms.tsx: the Terms page; its contact section names the
  support address.
- privacy: add the controller clause and the support address.
- contact/deletion: show the support address; deletion also accepts a
  request by email.
- subdomain-dispatch.test.ts: list directories before filtering to .tsx
  files. The old predicate only ever received file names, so it asserted
  over an empty list and missed the missing /terms dispatch.
- support-contact.test.ts: guard that every contact route renders the one
  address the app shows.

App side unchanged: termsOfServiceURL stays https://nessa.freno.me/terms.

(cherry picked from commit 71bb9ec5df)
2026-11-09 20:31:30 +00:00
41 changed files with 187 additions and 3401 deletions

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@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
# The deploy line (FRE-1695)
Written 2026-11-09 by the CTO. Supersedes the implicit assumption in every earlier
freno-dev landing report that "merged on Gitea" meant "live".
## The defect
Production `freno.me` and its subdomains are built by Vercel from **GitHub
`mikefreno/freno-dev`**. Agents merge into **Gitea `Mike/freno-dev`**. The two
masters diverged at merge-base `dd368d2`:
| Line | Head at filing | Ahead of merge-base |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gitea `Mike/freno-dev` master | `a8ce226b` (2026-11-09 16:16Z) | 12 commits — FRE-371, FRE-366, FRE-202, FRE-997, FRE-1670 |
| GitHub `mikefreno/freno-dev` master | `4e412ede` (2026-11-09 15:40Z) | 2 commits — NOOK-1037, NOOK-1038 |
Every Gitea merge since `dd368d2` was undeployed, including the FRE-371
client-IP fix and the whole Nessa `/terms` page. Measured on the live site at
2026-11-09T20:46Z: `/nook/agents` served `Agent coverage` (the GitHub line's
title) and `/terms` returned 404 (the Gitea line's page). No agent run can push
to GitHub — `/paperclip/.git-credentials` holds `git.freno.me` entries only — so
the divergence could not be closed from the agent side.
## Decision
**Gitea `Mike/freno-dev` is the canonical repository. GitHub
`mikefreno/freno-dev` is a mirror, and it is the tree Vercel builds.**
One line, one direction: Gitea master → GitHub master → Vercel → live.
### Why this shape and not the alternatives
- **Vercel cannot build from Gitea.** Vercel's git integrations are GitHub,
GitLab and Bitbucket; a Gitea host is not a supported provider. So "point
Vercel at the repo agents push to" is not a setting that exists. Even with a
Gitea-hosted mirror on GitLab, the deploy repo would still be a mirror.
- **Agents can only push to Gitea.** The per-agent credential is Gitea-only
(`git.freno.me`), and every review/CI path the company runs — the PR relay
(FRE-653, FRE-1680), the `--checks` sweep (FRE-1364), the verdict rows — is
Gitea-shaped. Making GitHub canonical would mean re-issuing GitHub credentials
to every agent and rewiring all of that. Keeping Gitea canonical keeps the
authoring side exactly as it is.
- **Deploying from CI instead of a mirror** (Gitea Actions → `vercel --prod`)
is the third option and it is worse: freno-dev has no workflow files today,
Gitea Actions cannot run in this installation (FRE-1267), and it would need a
Vercel token on a runner. A mirror needs one credential, in one place, and no
new CI.
### Reconcile first, then mirror
The mirror must fast-forward. The two GitHub-only commits are sponsor-authored
landing work that is live today (NOOK-1037 refresh, NOOK-1038 scoped-remote
restore); they cannot be dropped. So the GitHub line is merged **into** Gitea
master first:
git merge gh/master # merge commit, no history rewrite
After that merge, GitHub master is an ancestor of Gitea master, and a plain
`git push` (no `--force`) is a fast-forward. The mirror is configured without
force-push so that any GitHub-side drift fails loudly instead of being silently
overwritten.
Two conflicts were resolved in the merge, both copy contracts:
1. `src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx` — took NOOK-1038's refreshed
island bullets and kept FRE-997's `18 agents` bullet (the roster on /agents
lists all eighteen; `agents.test.ts` asserts equality).
2. `src/routes/nook/remote-claims.test.ts` — one file holding both contracts.
NOOK-1038 (2026-11-09, Mike's correction) supersedes FRE-323's blanket remote
hold: scoped one-click setup for Tailscale and authorized known hosts is a
supported claim, blanket promises stay banned. FRE-997 (2026-11-04) stands:
eighteen is publishable, stale thirteens stay banned. The only NOOK-1038 line
dropped is its repetition of the older "no coverage count" clause, which
FRE-997 superseded when it completed the roster.
## How a merge becomes a deploy
1. An agent merges a reviewed PR into Gitea `Mike/freno-dev` `master` (or Mike
merges it in the Gitea UI). Nothing else changes for the engineer.
2. A **Gitea push mirror** on `Mike/freno-dev` pushes `master` to
`https://github.com/mikefreno/freno-dev.git` with sync-on-commit enabled.
3. Vercel sees the GitHub push and builds production from GitHub `master`.
4. `scripts/verify-deploy.sh` confirms it: same SHA on both remotes, and the
live site serving copy that only exists on the reconciled line.
**Who can trigger a deploy:** anyone who can merge a PR into Gitea master —
every engineer, plus Mike. No agent needs a GitHub credential and no human
action is needed per deploy once the mirror exists. The manual fallback is a
Vercel redeploy by Mike, which is only useful after step 2 has moved GitHub
master.
**Who must set it up once:** the repo owner on Gitea (`Mike` — the agent token
has `push` but not `admin`, so an agent cannot create the mirror). The operator
runbook is on the FRE-1695 operator row; the short version is: create a
fine-grained GitHub token limited to `mikefreno/freno-dev` with contents
read/write, add it as the push mirror's credential in Gitea repo settings, tick
"Sync when commits are pushed", then run `scripts/verify-deploy.sh`.
Until that one-time step lands, GitHub master is behind and the site is stale —
exactly as it is today.
## Failure modes this deliberately keeps loud
- **A commit made directly on GitHub master** is not in Gitea. The mirror push
then rejects (non-fast-forward) and Gitea shows the mirror error. Do not commit
to GitHub `master`; land it in Gitea and let it mirror.
- **A merge that is only a Gitea merge** is not live until the mirror runs. Check
`scripts/verify-deploy.sh` before calling a site change published.
- **The first mirrored deploy switches on a cron that deletes production
rows.** `vercel.json` carries two crons. `/api/the-nook/lifecycle`
(13:00 UTC) is already on the tree Vercel builds today, so it runs.
`/api/analytics-retention` (12:00 UTC, added in `1d9287a`, FRE-369) is
only on Gitea master: the first deploy that follows the mirror starts
calling it, and the next 12:00 UTC runs
`DELETE FROM VisitorAnalytics WHERE created_at < datetime('now','-365 days')`
against the production database. Not staged, not reversible — whatever is
older than the window
is gone the first time it fires. The window is
`ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS`, and unset, non-positive, or over 730 each
resolve to the 365-day default (`src/server/analytics-retention.ts`).
365 is the conservative end — picked so that switching the schedule on is
not itself a data-loss event — but conservative still means *over a year
old gets deleted*. Set the window in Vercel **before** the first mirrored
deploy if 365 is not what you want. The cron call is authorized with
`Authorization: Bearer <ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET ?? CRON_SECRET>`
(`src/routes/api/analytics-retention.ts`), and the endpoint fails closed:
with no secret configured every call is a 401, so a missing secret is a
table that quietly stops being pruned, never an unauthenticated bulk
delete. Vercel supplies `CRON_SECRET` to its own crons and production
already runs the 13:00 job, so assume the secret is there and it runs.
- **The FRE-371 fix's actual exploitability in production** depends on how the
edge sets `x-forwarded-for`/`cf-connecting-ip`. That is measured and gated by
the Security Engineer, not assumed here.
## Verifying
scripts/verify-deploy.sh
It is read-only and needs no credentials — that is what makes it safe to run
from an agent run as well as by the operator, and it is why the checks stay
read-only. It checks both remotes' master SHA, that `https://freno.me/`
answers a direct 200, the live Nook/Nessa copy, and (when the commit is
present locally) that `2fd2a4a` is an ancestor of the deployed commit.
The root probe is there because every other check can stay green while the
root deploy is broken. It is status-only, and it deliberately does not probe
`https://freno.me/terms`: `SITEMAP_ROUTES.main` in
`src/lib/sitemap-routes.ts` has no `/terms` — Terms of Use is a Nessa
surface (`nessa.freno.me/terms`), so a 404 on the root domain's `/terms` is
the design, not a defect.

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@@ -22,12 +22,3 @@ a human reviews and moves it to `approved/` → the human publishes from `approv
under their own account → the artifact (or a pointer) lands in `posted/`.
Nothing in `drafts/` or `pending/` is ever publishable, by anyone, by any means.
## The weekly read
`bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts` (or `bun run metrics:weekly`)
rewrites `metrics/weekly.md` from the live databases: the staged funnel, the
campaign breakdown (`getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`' grouping), and the one
stage that moved. It needs `TURSO_DB_URL`, `TURSO_DB_TOKEN`, `NOOK_DB_URL` and
`NOOK_DB_TOKEN` — no other production secret. The file is generated; never
hand-edit it. The numbers are engineering's; the interpretation is the CMO's.

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@@ -1,43 +1,4 @@
# Weekly funnel snapshot
Window: **2026-10-22 18:05:00 → 2026-10-29 18:05:00 UTC** (7 days). Previous: 2026-10-15 18:05:00 → 2026-10-22 18:05:00 UTC.
Generated by `bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts`; regenerated weekly, never hand-edited. The analysis is the CMO's.
## Funnel
| Stage | This week | Last week | Change |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| visit (nook.freno.me page views) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| download click | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DMG served | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| trial started | 2 | 0 | +2 |
| checkout started (Stripe session) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| purchase (licence issued) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| activation | 0 | 0 | 0 |
## Campaigns
Top 10 by volume, untagged excluded — the same grouping `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns` returns.
| Source | Medium | Campaign | Rows |
|---|---|---|---:|
| x | — | — | 1 |
1 of 291 rows in the window carry campaign tags; the rest are untagged and therefore unattributed.
## The one thing that moved
**trial started: 0 → 2 (+2).**
## Before acting on these numbers
- **291 of 291 rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation.** They carry no host, and their recorded address is the production proxy's loopback (127.0.0.1 / ::1) — the writers then recorded the direct peer, not the visitor. They are excluded from every host-scoped stage above (visits, and the download click/served split), and "unique visitors" over them still collapses to one host. Rows recorded since carry the site they addressed and the visitor's address truncated to a prefix (/24, or /56 for IPv6 — the FRE-369 privacy floor), so "unique visitors" counts networks, not machines.
- **Download rows are automation-heavy.** Of this window's 137 download rows, 0 are clicks and 0 are served files; the remaining 137 predate the click/served stage label and cannot be split, so they count in neither stage. 112 of all 137 are not browser user agents (curl, Sparkle, link-preview crawlers).
- **No conversion rate before the cohort matures.** Trial→paid belongs to the mature Day 28–35 read (FRE-197); a ratio from a partial cohort is not a metric.
## Sources
- `VisitorAnalytics` (freno.me Turso DB) — visits, downloads, campaigns.
- `trials`, `licenses`, `activations` (the-nook Turso DB) — the paid funnel.
- Generated 2026-10-29T18:05:00Z.
Generated weekly from the analytics DB + `trials`/`licenses`/`activations`.
Format: the funnel numbers, what moved, and the one thing worth acting on.

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@@ -4,9 +4,8 @@ Every drafted asset draws its voice, claims, and constraints from this file. If
artifact invents its own framing, fix the artifact or fix this file — never both
silently diverging.
**Reconciled 2026-10-29**, and again **2026-11-03** for the FRE-997 count
correction, against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322], [FRE-354],
[FRE-997]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
**Reconciled 2026-10-29** against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322],
[FRE-354]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
launch route ([FRE-346] → [FRE-203] `plan-b`), and `The-Nook` master (app floor is
**14.2**, not 14.0 — `freno-dev` `881190d`, site merge `134f41e`). The previous
version of this file named an upstream `the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md` that
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ no longer exists; the verdicts below are the source of truth it was pointing at.
[FRE-320]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-320
[FRE-346]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-346
[FRE-203]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-203
[FRE-997]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-997
## The sentence
@@ -129,7 +127,7 @@ No agent authenticates, posts, upvotes, or DMs. No sock puppets, no self-mention
without disclosure. `approved/` **is the only thing a human ever publishes from** —
nothing posts itself.
## Claims: status at 2026-11-03
## Claims: status at 2026-10-29
Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a row.
@@ -140,7 +138,7 @@ Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a r
| The hook and bridge are not a cloud service | **Verified code fact, held on disclosure** | [FRE-322] §2, wording corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`. Held until Sentry is gated/removed and `/privacy` + `/faq` land. Never widen to "The Nook", never "nothing but your Mac". |
| Fan, thermal and charge control | **No claim verdict yet — do not lead with it** | Backed by `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext), but no CTO sentence exists for it. Documentary, not launch. |
| One-time purchase, no subscription | **Publishable fact, price not a launch asset** | $10, held at $10. No dated rise, no discount framing, no pricing copy. |
| Agent coverage numbers ("eighteen agents", "18 agents") | **Publishable at 18** | [FRE-997]: the /agents table now lists every row of `AgentSpec.all` and `agents.test.ts` asserts equality with the 18-name registry in registry order, so the landing bullet, the marquee chip and the /agents copy say 18. No other number is publishable. |
| Agent coverage numbers ("thirteen agents", "8 agents", "all your agents") | **Excluded — verdict B, count removed** | [FRE-359] verdict B (2026-10-29): the page's 13 rows are the registry's first 13 of 18, so no number is publishable and `every` / `all` / `the agents The Nook supports` are banned. Removed from `agents.tsx`, the landing island section and the marquee. [FRE-322] §1 matrix for the sets. |
| macOS 14.2 or later | **Publishable fact** | The app cannot start below 14.2 (`freno-dev` `881190d`, site `134f41e`). "macOS 14+" is false and was fixed on the site. |
| One-click remote setup for Tailscale and authorized known hosts | **Approved by Mike — NOOK-1038** | [gpt-6.1-sol] Restores the scoped flow: host discovery, `RemoteHostsController.setUp`, `RemoteMirror.apply`, and host-labelled sessions. Supersedes the blanket FRE-323 hold, not the requirement for SSH authorization. |
| "Nothing leaves your Mac", "no telemetry", "local-only", "no account" | **False today — banned** | Sentry unconditional, licence check with hardware fingerprint ([FRE-322] §2.4). |
@@ -148,9 +146,8 @@ Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a r
## Voice
- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — the only count
that ships is eighteen, and it is the registry's own size (see the coverage row
above).
- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — but no coverage
counts (see the excluded row above).
- The notch is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
- Never apologize for being a utility. The utility is the point.
- Banned phrasings: competitor names (see rule 1), "AI-powered", "revolutionary",

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@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
"test:coverage": "bun test --coverage",
"perf": "bun run scripts/perf-test.ts",
"perf:compare": "bun run scripts/perf-compare.ts",
"metrics:weekly": "bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts",
"nook:grant": "NODE_ENV=production bun --env-file=.env scripts/grant-nook-license.ts"
},
"dependencies": {

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@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Live probe for the freno-dev deploy path (FRE-1695). Read-only; no credentials.
#
# Proves, in one run:
# 1. Gitea master and GitHub master are the same commit (the mirror converged).
# 2. The root domain answers on its own terms: https://freno.me/ returns a direct 200,
# so a broken root deploy cannot read as green while the subdomains look fine.
# 3. The live site serves copy that only exists on the reconciled line:
# NOOK-1038's scoped remote claim (GitHub-only before the merge) *and*
# FRE-997's "Supported agents" (Gitea-only before the merge). Both at once
# can only come from the merge commit.
# 4. The served tree therefore contains FRE-371 (`2fd2a4a`), which is an
# ancestor of that merge — checked locally when the commit is in the object
# store, so run this from a freno-dev checkout.
#
# Usage: scripts/verify-deploy.sh [expected-gitea-sha]
set -uo pipefail
GITEA_REMOTE="${GITEA_REMOTE:-https://git.freno.me/Mike/freno-dev.git}"
GITHUB_REMOTE="${GITHUB_REMOTE:-https://github.com/mikefreno/freno-dev.git}"
ROOT_HOST="${ROOT_HOST:-https://freno.me}"
NOOK_HOST="${NOOK_HOST:-https://nook.freno.me}"
NESSA_HOST="${NESSA_HOST:-https://nessa.freno.me}"
fail=0
ok() { printf 'ok %s\n' "$1"; }
bad() { printf 'FAIL %s\n' "$1"; fail=1; }
echo "== remotes =="
gitea_sha=$(git ls-remote "$GITEA_REMOTE" refs/heads/master | cut -f1)
github_sha=$(git ls-remote "$GITHUB_REMOTE" refs/heads/master | cut -f1)
printf 'gitea master %s\ngithub master %s\n' "${gitea_sha:-<none>}" "${github_sha:-<none>}"
[ -n "$gitea_sha" ] && ok "gitea master readable" || bad "gitea master unreadable"
if [ -n "$gitea_sha" ] && [ "$gitea_sha" = "$github_sha" ]; then
ok "github master is the same commit (mirror converged)"
else
bad "github master differs from gitea master — the mirror has not run"
fi
if [ -n "${1:-}" ]; then
if [ "$1" = "$gitea_sha" ]; then ok "gitea master is the expected commit $1"
else bad "gitea master is $gitea_sha, expected $1"; fi
fi
echo
echo "== live copy =="
# The root is every other surface's entry point and deploys from the same tree, so it is
# probed first. No -L: a redirect away from 200 is the failure we want to see, not a pass.
root_code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$ROOT_HOST/" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$root_code" = "200" ]; then
ok "$ROOT_HOST/ serves 200"
elif [ -z "$root_code" ] || [ "$root_code" = "000" ]; then
bad "$ROOT_HOST/ gave no response, expected 200"
else
bad "$ROOT_HOST/ returned $root_code, expected 200 (green subdomains do not cover the root)"
fi
page=$(curl -sS "$NOOK_HOST/" 2>/dev/null)
case "$page" in
*"One-click setup for Tailscale and authorized known hosts"*)
ok "nook landing carries NOOK-1038's scoped remote claim" ;;
*) bad "nook landing is missing NOOK-1038's scoped remote claim" ;;
esac
agents=$(curl -sS "$NOOK_HOST/agents" 2>/dev/null)
case "$agents" in
*"Supported agents"*) ok "nook /agents carries FRE-997's restored coverage title" ;;
*) bad "nook /agents still serves the pre-FRE-997 title" ;;
esac
terms_code=$(curl -sS -o /tmp/verify-deploy-terms.$$ -w '%{http_code}' "$NESSA_HOST/terms" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$terms_code" = "200" ] && grep -q 'nessa-support@freno.me' /tmp/verify-deploy-terms.$$; then
ok "nessa /terms is published and names the support address (FRE-1670)"
else
bad "nessa /terms returned $terms_code without the support address (FRE-1670 undeployed)"
fi
rm -f /tmp/verify-deploy-terms.$$
echo
echo "== ancestry =="
for commit in 2fd2a4a 7fde259; do
if git cat-file -e "${commit}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
if git merge-base --is-ancestor "$commit" "$gitea_sha" 2>/dev/null; then
ok "$commit is an ancestor of gitea master"
else
bad "$commit is NOT an ancestor of gitea master"
fi
else
printf 'skip %s not in this clone; run from a freno-dev checkout to check ancestry\n' "$commit"
fi
done
echo
if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "PASS — the deploy follows gitea master and the served tree contains FRE-371."
else
echo "FAIL — see the lines above."
fi
exit "$fail"

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@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
import { createClient } from "@libsql/client/web";
import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
import {
ensureAnalyticsSchema,
getWeeklyReport,
renderWeeklyMarkdown,
type Connections
} from "~/server/weekly-metrics";
/**
* Write `marketing/metrics/weekly.md` from the live analytics and licence DBs.
*
* bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts
* bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts --days 14 --now 2026-11-05T09:00:00Z
*
* Required environment (all four; the analytics token also opens the licence
* DB, which is why the weekly job can run from a checkout that has no Stripe
* or Apple secrets):
*
* TURSO_DB_URL / TURSO_DB_TOKEN freno.me DB — VisitorAnalytics
* NOOK_DB_URL / NOOK_DB_TOKEN the-nook DB — trials, licenses, activations
*
* This script deliberately does not import `~/env/server`: that schema demands
* every production secret, and the metrics job needs two databases and nothing
* else.
*
* The output path is anchored at the repo root, so running it from any cwd
* writes the same file.
*/
interface Options {
days: number;
now: Date;
out: string;
stdout: boolean;
}
function usage(): string {
return [
"Usage: bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts [options]",
"",
" --days N window length in days (default 7)",
" --now ISO end of the window (default: now)",
" --out PATH where to write (default: marketing/metrics/weekly.md)",
" --stdout print the report instead of writing a file"
].join("\n");
}
function parseArgs(argv: string[]): Options {
const repoRoot = resolve(import.meta.dir, "..");
const options: Options = {
days: 7,
now: new Date(),
out: resolve(repoRoot, "marketing/metrics/weekly.md"),
stdout: false
};
for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
const arg = argv[i]!;
const value = () => {
const next = argv[i + 1];
if (next === undefined) throw new Error(`${arg} needs a value\n\n${usage()}`);
i += 1;
return next;
};
switch (arg) {
case "--days": {
const days = Number(value());
if (!Number.isFinite(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(`--days must be a positive number\n\n${usage()}`);
}
options.days = days;
break;
}
case "--now": {
const now = new Date(value());
if (Number.isNaN(now.getTime())) {
throw new Error(`--now must be an ISO timestamp\n\n${usage()}`);
}
options.now = now;
break;
}
case "--out":
options.out = resolve(value());
break;
case "--stdout":
options.stdout = true;
break;
case "-h":
case "--help":
console.log(usage());
process.exit(0);
default:
throw new Error(`Unknown argument ${arg}\n\n${usage()}`);
}
}
return options;
}
function requiredEnv(name: string): string {
const value = process.env[name];
if (!value || value.trim() === "") {
throw new Error(
`${name} is not set. The weekly job needs TURSO_DB_URL, TURSO_DB_TOKEN, ` +
`NOOK_DB_URL and NOOK_DB_TOKEN — run it as ` +
`\`bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts\` with those four in .env.`
);
}
return value;
}
function connect(url: string, token: string) {
return createClient({ url, authToken: token });
}
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const options = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
const connections: Connections = {
analytics: connect(requiredEnv("TURSO_DB_URL"), requiredEnv("TURSO_DB_TOKEN")),
nook: connect(requiredEnv("NOOK_DB_URL"), requiredEnv("NOOK_DB_TOKEN"))
};
// The app migrates the table on boot, but this job must not depend on a
// deploy having happened: add any missing post-hoc columns (stage, host)
// through the same idempotent bootstrap path first.
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(connections.analytics);
const report = await getWeeklyReport(connections, {
days: options.days,
now: options.now
});
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
if (options.stdout) {
process.stdout.write(markdown);
return;
}
await mkdir(dirname(options.out), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(options.out, markdown, "utf8");
const f = report.counts;
console.log(
`wrote ${options.out}\n` +
`window ${report.window.start} → ${report.window.end}\n` +
`visit ${f.visit}, download click ${f.downloadClick}, DMG served ${f.dmgServed}, ` +
`trial ${f.trial}, checkout ${f.checkout}, purchase ${f.purchase}, activation ${f.activation}\n` +
`mover: ${report.mover ? `${report.mover.label} ${report.mover.before} → ${report.mover.now}` : "none"}`
);
}
main().catch((error) => {
console.error(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
process.exit(1);
});

View File

@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
title="See which agents need your attention"
body="Each square represents an agent session. Its color shows whether the agent is working, finished, or waiting for you. Questions appear in the island so you can respond without switching windows."
bullets={[
"18 agents: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, and more",
"Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, Cursor and more",
"Connect custom agents using the published integration contract",
"Choose which information appears in the compact view",
"Works on displays without a notch, centered at the top of the screen"

View File

@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ function LayoutMock() {
/* ── Marquee ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
const CHIPS_A = [
"18 agents",
"Agents wired in",
"Custom agents",
"Six chiptunes",
"Focus-aware slots",

View File

@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ export interface VisitorAnalytics {
ttfb?: number | null;
dom_load?: number | null;
load_complete?: number | null;
stage?: string | null;
host?: string | null;
created_at: string;
}

6
src/env/server.ts vendored
View File

@@ -69,12 +69,6 @@ const serverEnvSchema = z.object({
// Bearer secret for the daily lifecycle-email cron. Falls back to
// Vercel's CRON_SECRET; unset + no CRON_SECRET = the endpoint denies all.
NOOK_LIFECYCLE_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional(),
// Daily VisitorAnalytics retention cron (/api/analytics-retention). Same
// shape: falls back to CRON_SECRET, and unset denies every request.
ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional(),
// How long a VisitorAnalytics row lives. Unset (or unusable) = 365 days;
// see src/server/analytics-retention.ts before shortening it.
ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS: z.string().optional(),
CRON_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional()
});

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { env } from "~/env/server";
import { ConnectionFactory } from "~/server/db-connections";
import { runRetentionCron } from "~/server/analytics-retention";
/**
* GET /api/analytics-retention — daily Vercel cron.
*
* Deletes `VisitorAnalytics` rows older than the retention window, so visitor
* data has a bound instead of accumulating forever (FRE-369, finding Q4 — the
* table's only cleaner used to be a manual admin call, and since FRE-366 the
* rows carry a truncated but still real client address).
*
* Window: `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS`, defaulting to 365 when unset or unusable
* (see `~/server/analytics-retention` for why the default is conservative
* rather than the reviewer's 90).
*
* Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` where the secret is
* `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET` or Vercel's `CRON_SECRET`. An unconfigured secret
* denies every request — an unauthenticated trigger of a bulk delete is the one
* outcome this endpoint must never have.
*/
export async function GET(event: APIEvent) {
const result = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: event.request.headers.get("authorization"),
secret: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET ?? env.CRON_SECRET,
configuredDays: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
conn: ConnectionFactory()
});
return new Response(JSON.stringify(result.body), {
status: result.status,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
});
}

View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export async function GET(event: APIEvent) {
console.log(`✓ Serving ${filename} (${body.length} bytes)`);
await trackDownload(event, assetKeys[asset]!, "served");
await trackDownload(event, assetKeys[asset]!);
// SAFETY: `transformToByteArray` yields `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>`, which the
// DOM lib's `BufferSource` (ArrayBuffer-backed) does not accept, though undici

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { env } from "~/env/server";
import { TURNSTILE_CONFIG } from "~/config";
import { verifyTurnstileToken } from "~/server/fetch-utils";
import { json, error } from "./_lib";
import { trackRequest } from "~/server/track-download";
/**
* POST /api/the-nook/checkout
@@ -13,14 +12,6 @@ import { trackRequest } from "~/server/track-download";
* session for the one-time $10 The Nook license. Returns the hosted
* checkout URL for the client to redirect to.
*
* Analytics: a created session is the funnel's "checkout started" stage
* (FRE-366). Until then the only trace was the client-side /checkout page
* view — a page, not a started checkout. Recorded through the shared
* `trackRequest` writer (referrer, campaign tags, country, real client
* address, host) under this route's own path, best-effort: a failed
* analytics write never blocks a checkout, and an attempt Turnstile or
* Stripe rejects is correctly not a started checkout.
*
* Uses raw `fetch` (Node 24 / Vercel Node functions have global fetch) — no
* `stripe` npm dependency added.
*/
@@ -76,14 +67,5 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent) {
if (!data.url) {
return error("Stripe returned no checkout URL", 502);
}
// The session exists: that is "checkout started". Awaited so the row is
// flushed before the response — a buffered write is not guaranteed to
// survive the response on serverless.
await trackRequest(event, {
path: "/api/the-nook/checkout",
method: "POST"
});
return json({ checkoutUrl: data.url });
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
import { truncateIpAddress } from "~/server/request-client";
// The route's contracts:
// 1. Every click is recorded through the shared analytics buffer with the
@@ -56,13 +55,9 @@ mock.module("~/server/analytics", () => ({
flushAnalytics: async () => {
flushCalls += 1;
},
// Mirrors the real enrichment contract: deviceType is derived from the UA,
// and the address is cut to its prefix by the FRE-369 privacy floor. The
// real `enrichAnalyticsEntry` does both, so the mirror has to apply the same
// truncation — otherwise this file would prove the door stores a full address.
// Mirrors the real enrichment contract: deviceType is derived from the UA.
enrichAnalyticsEntry: (entry: Entry) => ({
...entry,
ipAddress: truncateIpAddress(entry.ipAddress as string | null),
deviceType: String(entry.userAgent ?? "").includes("Macintosh")
? "desktop"
: null
@@ -118,10 +113,6 @@ describe("GET /api/the-nook/download", () => {
expect(logged[0]).toMatchObject({
path: "/api/downloads/thenook",
method: "GET",
// The door is the click half of the split; the file route writes
// "served". And the row names the site it came from (FRE-366).
stage: "click",
host: "nook.freno.me",
referrer: "https://nook.freno.me/"
});
// Flushed within the request, not left to the batch timer.
@@ -146,16 +137,9 @@ describe("GET /api/the-nook/download", () => {
expect(logged[2]!.country).toBe("JP");
});
it("records the forwarded visitor below the trusted edge, truncated", async () => {
// Client → Cloudflare → origin proxy: the sender's spoof is first, the real
// client second, the edge last. And the stored value is the /24, never the
// address itself (FRE-369).
await GET(
request({
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
);
expect(logged[0]!.ipAddress).toBe("203.0.113.0");
it("falls back to the forwarded address when no request IP is available", async () => {
await GET(request({ "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.1" }));
expect(logged[0]!.ipAddress).toBe("198.51.100.9");
});
it("still logs the click when the appcast cannot be read", async () => {

View File

@@ -13,10 +13,8 @@ import { resolveLatestDownload } from "./_download";
* Why a redirect and not a direct S3 link: the appcast route and the DMG
* route never logged anything, so step 2 of the funnel (download click →
* DMG served) was invisible. Every click now lands one row in
* VisitorAnalytics under `/api/downloads/thenook` with `stage = "click"`,
* distinct from the `stage = "served"` row the file route writes when the
* DMG is actually streamed — the split FRE-366 added, alongside the clicks
* and served files of every other product — see `~/server/track-download`.
* VisitorAnalytics under `/api/downloads/thenook`, alongside the clicks and
* served files of every other product — see `~/server/track-download`.
*
* Referrer, campaign tags, edge country (with `?c=` override) and user agent
* are read by `trackDownload`, which is shared with the other download doors.
@@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ import { resolveLatestDownload } from "./_download";
export async function GET(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
// Recorded before resolving: a click that dies at resolution is exactly the
// failure the funnel needs to show.
await trackDownload(event, "thenook", "click");
await trackDownload(event, "thenook");
let target: string | null = null;
try {

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
const sentEmails: { to: string; subject: string; html: string }[] = [];
const tokenAnswers: { allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number }[] = [];
/** Every rate-limit key the route derived, in order. */
const rateKeys: string[] = [];
mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
default: async (to: string, subject: string, html: string) => {
@@ -21,10 +19,7 @@ mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
}));
mock.module("~/server/bug-report-rate-limit", () => ({
takeBugReportToken: (key: string) => {
rateKeys.push(key);
return tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true };
}
takeBugReportToken: () => tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true }
}));
const { POST } = await import("./report");
@@ -77,7 +72,6 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
sentEmails.length = 0;
tokenAnswers.length = 0;
rateKeys.length = 0;
});
it("emails the owner a report containing the snapshot, escaped", async () => {
@@ -139,49 +133,10 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
it("still succeeds when no fingerprint header exists", async () => {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
request(validPayload, { "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1" })
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(sentEmails).toHaveLength(1);
// The quota key is the Cloudflare-recorded client, not a header hop the
// sender chose.
expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
});
it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not mint a fresh quota key", async () => {
// FRE-371: the old read keyed on the leftmost hop, which the sender
// controls outright — one scripted loop with a rotating header had
// unlimited reports. With the same Cloudflare-recorded client and a
// different spoofed prefix per request, the key must be stable.
for (const spoof of ["1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", "3.3.3.3"]) {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
"x-forwarded-for": `${spoof}, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1`
})
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
expect(rateKeys).toEqual([
"203.0.113.9",
"203.0.113.9",
"203.0.113.9"
]);
});
it("keys on the rightmost-minus-one hop when Cloudflare's header is absent", async () => {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Never the leftmost (sender-chosen) hop.
expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
});
it("delivers the landing page's beta request with only the email", async () => {

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { z } from "zod";
import sendEmail from "~/server/email";
import { CONTACT_RECIPIENT_EMAIL } from "~/lib/contact-config";
import { takeBugReportToken } from "~/server/bug-report-rate-limit";
import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
import { json, error } from "./_lib";
/**
@@ -104,9 +103,10 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
)
.trim()
.toLowerCase();
// FRE-371: the IP fallback must be the spoof-resistant read — a rotating
// leftmost x-forwarded-for used to mint unlimited report quota.
const rateKey = fingerprint || resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
const forwarded = event.request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
const rateKey =
fingerprint ||
(forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : "unknown");
const token = takeBugReportToken(rateKey);
if (!token.allowed) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "Too many reports" }), {

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/**
* Regression test for the /agents roster and its coverage count.
* Regression test for the /agents roster (NOOK-336) and its coverage wording
* (FRE-359).
*
* The page mirrors the app's registry, `AgentSpec.all` in
* the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift. When Muse joined
@@ -8,11 +9,11 @@
* them. The registry lives in another repo, so the expected roster is
* restated here; when an agent is added there, add it here and on the page.
*
* FRE-997 restored the count. The page said thirteen while the registry held
* eighteen, so the count was dropped rather than corrected (FRE-359 verdict B);
* now that all eighteen rows are on the page, the roster check is an equality
* check again and the page states eighteen. A subset check would let a shipped
* agent go missing behind a passing suite, which is the NOOK-336 failure.
* FRE-359 verdict B: the page no longer states a count or claims coverage
* ("all thirteen", "every coding agent The Nook supports"). The page still
* lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows — the table is hand-mirrored and its
* regeneration is its own ticket — so the roster check here is a subset
* check in registry order, not an equality check.
*
* STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as the downloads regressions.
*/
@@ -47,23 +48,51 @@ const REGISTRY = [
"Amp"
];
const NUMBER_WORDS = ["twelve", "thirteen", "fourteen", "fifteen", "sixteen", "seventeen", "eighteen"];
const entries = [...SOURCE.matchAll(/^\s{4}name: "([^"]+)",$/gm)].map((m) => m[1]);
describe("Nook /agents roster", () => {
it("lists every registry agent, once, in registry order", () => {
expect(entries).toEqual(REGISTRY);
/** The page's rows are a subset of the registry, in registry order. */
function subsetInOrder(page: string[], registry: string[]): boolean {
let cursor = 0;
for (const name of page) {
const at = registry.indexOf(name, cursor);
if (at === -1) return false;
cursor = at + 1;
}
return true;
}
describe("Nook /agents roster (NOOK-336)", () => {
it("lists only registry agents, in registry order", () => {
expect(entries.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(subsetInOrder(entries, REGISTRY)).toBe(true);
});
it("states the registry's size", () => {
expect(entries.length).toBe(18);
expect(COPY).toContain("all eighteen");
expect(COPY).toContain("The 18 agents");
expect(COPY).toContain("eighteen coding agents");
});
it("carries no stale count", () => {
expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("thirteen");
expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b13 agents\b/);
expect(COPY).not.toContain("all thirteen");
it("lists each agent at most once", () => {
expect(new Set(entries).size).toBe(entries.length);
});
});
describe("Nook /agents coverage wording (FRE-359)", () => {
it("states no agent count anywhere on the page", () => {
for (const word of NUMBER_WORDS) {
expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(word);
}
// A bare numeral count ("13 agents", "The 13") is just as precise and just
// as unverified; the page must not state one in any form.
expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b\d{1,2} agents\b/);
expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\ball \d{1,2}\b/);
});
it("makes no completeness claim over the agent set", () => {
for (const banned of [
"every coding agent",
"the agents the nook supports",
"agents the nook supports",
"supported agents"
]) {
expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(banned);
}
});
});

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
/**
* `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — all eighteen agents in the registry and
* each row's event coverage.
* `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — the agent roster and each row's event
* coverage. It states no agent count and claims no completeness over the
* registry (FRE-359 verdict B).
*
* The registry below mirrors `AgentSpec.all` in the app
* (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift) and each
* agent's installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
* (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentSpec.swift) and each agent's
* installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
* (plugins/*), normalized onto the shared event vocabulary
* (~/Code/the-nook/docs/agent-interface.md). Copy follows
* marketing/positioning.md: category nouns, honest scoping, no unverifiable
@@ -260,92 +261,6 @@ const AGENTS: AgentEntry[] = [
],
gating:
"Tool calls can be allowed or denied from a card; permission prompts stay with the agent"
},
{
name: "Kimi",
wiring: "Hook rules in its TOML config, one per event",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"AgentStart",
"PreToolUse",
"PermissionRequest",
"PermissionResolved",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SessionError",
"SubagentStart",
"SubagentStop",
"PreCompact",
"Notification"
],
gating:
"Observation — every event appears as a card; its PreToolUse fires before its own permission check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "GitHub Copilot CLI",
wiring: "One hook file of ours in its hooks directory",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PreToolUse",
"PermissionRequest",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SubagentStart",
"SubagentStop",
"ErrorOccurred",
"PreCompact",
"Notification"
],
gating:
"Observation — every event appears as a card; its permission request runs before its own policy check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "Crush",
wiring:
"One entry in its JSONC config, the only event it documents",
events: ["PreToolUse"],
gating:
"Observation — tool calls appear as cards; its own permission prompts decide"
},
{
name: "Cursor",
wiring:
"Hook entries in its hooks.json, merged with your own. No permission hook, on purpose",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SessionError",
"AfterAgentResponse",
"SubagentStop",
"PreCompact"
],
gating:
"Observation — a permission hook that stays silent blocks the action here, so Cursor keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "Amp",
wiring: "In-process extension package",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PreToolUse",
"PostToolUse",
"Stop",
"SessionError"
],
gating:
"Observation — its plugin API has no permission-wait event, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
}
];
@@ -369,19 +284,19 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
<>
<EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
<PageHead
title="Supported agents"
description="Every coding agent The Nook supports — all eighteen, with each hook's exact event coverage and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
ogTitle="The 18 agents The Nook supports, and what each hook sees"
title="Agent coverage"
description="The coding agents The Nook connects to, with the events each hook reports and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
ogTitle="The coding agents The Nook connects to, and what each hook sees"
/>
<SubdomainHeader />
<main class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
<h1 class="text-text mb-3 text-3xl font-bold tracking-tight sm:text-4xl">
Supported agents
Agent coverage
</h1>
<p class="text-subtext0 mb-2 max-w-2xl text-lg">
The Nook watches eighteen coding agents in one place — your menu bar and
notch show every session that is running, thinking, or blocked, and a
card answers permission prompts without leaving your keyboard.
The Nook watches coding agents in one place — your menu bar and notch
show sessions that are running, thinking, or blocked, and a card can
answer a permission prompt without leaving your keyboard.
</p>
<p class="text-subtext1 mb-10 max-w-2xl text-sm">
Each agent reports its own set of events. "Allow / Deny from a card"

View File

@@ -1,26 +1,9 @@
/**
* Two page contracts live in this file, and they are reconciled on purpose.
*
* NOOK-1038 (2026-11-09, Mike's correction) supersedes FRE-323's blanket remote
* hold: one-click setup is a supported scoped claim for Tailscale peers and
* authorized known hosts, so the Remote cards and the setup demo belong on the
* page. Blanket authorization promises stay out.
*
* FRE-997 (2026-11-04) restored the agent count. The page listed thirteen of the
* registry's eighteen rows, so FRE-359 verdict B dropped the count instead of
* correcting it; FRE-997 put all eighteen rows on /agents and made the roster an
* equality check again (`agents.test.ts`), so the count is publishable at 18 and
* the stale counts stay banned.
*
* The two lines met in the FRE-1695 reconciliation (Gitea was 12 commits ahead,
* GitHub 2). NOOK-1038's file repeated FRE-359's older "no coverage count"
* clause; that clause is superseded by FRE-997's landed correction and is the
* one line dropped here. Everything else from NOOK-1038 is taken verbatim, and
* `marketing/positioning.md` records both decisions side by side (coverage row:
* publishable at 18; remote row: approved, scoped). See `docs/deploy-source.md`.
*
* STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as `agents.test.ts` and
* `downloads.test.ts` (SolidJS does not render under `bun:test`).
* NOOK-1038 restores remote marketing for Tailscale and authorized known hosts,
* per Mike's correction. FRE-323's blanket removal is no longer the contract;
* one-click setup is a supported scoped claim, not a promise for any SSH box.
* FRE-359's separate decision against agent coverage counts is unchanged.
* Static source audit, like agents.test.ts; browser checks cover rendered layout.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -36,7 +19,6 @@ const AUDITED = [
"src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx"
];
/** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
function copyOf(file: string): string {
return readFileSync(join(ROOT, file), "utf8")
.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "")
@@ -49,7 +31,9 @@ describe("remote marketing reflects the supported setup (NOOK-1038)", () => {
// The hero spans two columns; four regular cards fill the other slots.
expect(collage.match(/<CollageCell\b/g)).toHaveLength(4);
expect(collage).toContain('kicker="Remote"');
expect(collage).toContain("One-click setup for Tailscale and authorized known hosts");
expect(collage).toContain(
"One-click setup for Tailscale and authorized known hosts"
);
expect(collage).toContain('host="build-box"');
expect(collage).toContain('host="gpu-rig"');
});
@@ -58,7 +42,9 @@ describe("remote marketing reflects the supported setup (NOOK-1038)", () => {
const breakdowns = copyOf("src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx");
expect(breakdowns).toContain('kicker="Remote"');
expect(breakdowns).toContain('title="Set up remote agents in one click"');
expect(breakdowns).toContain("Tailscale peer or an authorized host from your SSH config");
expect(breakdowns).toContain(
"Tailscale peer or an authorized host from your SSH config"
);
expect(breakdowns).toContain("<RemoteHostDemo />");
});
@@ -77,7 +63,7 @@ describe("remote marketing reflects the supported setup (NOOK-1038)", () => {
});
for (const file of AUDITED) {
it(`${file} makes no blanket authorization promise`, () => {
it(`${file} makes no blanket authorization or agent-coverage promise`, () => {
const copy = copyOf(file).toLowerCase();
for (const phrase of [
"Any SSH box",
@@ -104,22 +90,22 @@ describe("remote marketing reflects the supported setup (NOOK-1038)", () => {
});
});
describe("the agent count is corrected, not dropped (FRE-997)", () => {
/** FRE-359 verdict B, minus the phrasings FRE-997 re-grounded in the full roster. */
const BANNED_COVERAGE = ["all thirteen", "thirteen coding agents", "13 agents"];
describe("agent coverage count stays off the page (FRE-359 verdict B)", () => {
for (const file of AUDITED) {
it(`${file} states no stale count`, () => {
const copy = copyOf(file).toLowerCase();
for (const phrase of BANNED_COVERAGE) expect(copy).not.toContain(phrase);
it(`${file} states no coverage count`, () => {
const copy = copyOf(file);
for (const phrase of [
"all thirteen",
"thirteen coding agents",
"13 agents",
"every coding agent",
"Supported agents"
])
expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
});
}
it("/agents states the registry's size", () => {
expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Supported agents");
});
it("the landing copy states the count the roster actually has", () => {
expect(copyOf("src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx")).toContain("18 agents");
it("/agents titles the table Agent coverage", () => {
expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Agent coverage");
});
});

View File

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
import { VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL } from "./analytics-schema";
import {
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
isAuthorizedCron,
pruneVisitorAnalytics,
resolveRetentionDays,
runRetentionCron
} from "./analytics-retention";
// Why a real in-memory SQLite database: retention is a `DELETE` whose whole
// job is a date comparison. A stub returning a canned count would pass with a
// window that is off by a unit, inverted, or — the failure this file exists for
// — never applied at all. Same reasoning as the backfill and schema suites, and
// nothing is module-mocked here on purpose: bun's `mock.module` is process-wide.
let db: Database;
const conn = {
async execute(query: { sql: string; args?: unknown[] }) {
const statement = db.query(query.sql);
const args = (query.args ?? []) as never[];
// `DELETE … RETURNING id` answers with rows, which is how the prune counts
// what it removed; bun:sqlite exposes those through `.all()`.
if (
/^\s*(select|pragma|with)\b/i.test(query.sql) ||
/\breturning\b/i.test(query.sql)
) {
return { rows: statement.all(...args) as unknown[], rowsAffected: 0 };
}
return {
rows: [] as unknown[],
rowsAffected: statement.run(...args).changes
};
}
};
function insert(id: string, createdAt: string) {
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES (?, '/x', 'GET', ?)`,
[id, createdAt]
);
}
function rowCount(): number {
return (db.query(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics`).get() as {
n: number;
}).n;
}
beforeEach(() => {
db = new Database(":memory:");
db.run(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL);
});
describe("resolveRetentionDays", () => {
it("takes a usable configured window", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays("90")).toBe(90);
expect(resolveRetentionDays(30)).toBe(30);
});
it("falls back to the default when the value is missing or nonsense", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays(undefined)).toBe(
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS
);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("0")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("-5")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("1.5")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("all")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
});
it("refuses a window so long it means 'never prune'", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays(String(MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS + 1))).toBe(
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS
);
});
});
describe("pruneVisitorAnalytics", () => {
it("deletes only rows older than the window", async () => {
insert("young", "2020-01-01 00:00:00");
insert("old", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
// A row exactly at `now - 365 days` boundary in the other direction: the
// comparison is `<`, so the recent one survives.
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-10 days') WHERE id = 'young'`
);
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-400 days') WHERE id = 'old'`
);
const deleted = await pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 365);
expect(deleted).toBe(1);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("deletes nothing when every row is inside the window", async () => {
insert("a", "x");
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-1 day') WHERE id = 'a'`
);
expect(await pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 365)).toBe(0);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("refuses a window it was not given a number for", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 0)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, -30)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, NaN)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
// "0" is not a window either — and must not delete the table.
await expect(
pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, "0" as unknown as number)
).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("passes the window as a parameter, not as interpolated SQL", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
const injected = "365); DROP TABLE VisitorAnalytics; --" as unknown as number;
// Truncating a non-numeric string yields NaN, which the guard refuses — so
// the statement never runs and the table is still there.
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, injected)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
});
describe("isAuthorizedCron", () => {
it("matches the bearer secret and nothing else", () => {
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer sekrit", "sekrit")).toBe(true);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("bearer SEKRIT".toLowerCase(), "sekrit")).toBe(true);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer nope", "sekrit")).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron(null, "sekrit")).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer sekrit", null)).toBe(false);
});
it("denies everything when no secret is configured (fail closed)", () => {
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer ", undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron(undefined, "")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("runRetentionCron", () => {
it("denies an unauthenticated trigger before touching the table", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: null,
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("prunes on its window and reports what it removed", async () => {
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES ('old','/x','GET',datetime('now','-400 days'))`
);
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES ('new','/x','GET',datetime('now','-1 day'))`
);
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: "Bearer sekrit",
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ success: true, days: 365, deleted: 1 });
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("says it failed rather than reporting a quiet zero", async () => {
db.close(); // the table is gone: the prune's statement must now throw
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: "Bearer sekrit",
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(500);
expect(res.body.days).toBe(365);
expect(res.body.deleted).toBeUndefined();
});
});

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
/**
* Scheduled retention for `VisitorAnalytics` (FRE-369, finding Q4).
*
* The table used to grow without bound: `cleanupOldAnalytics` existed but was
* reachable only as a manual tRPC call, and once FRE-366 started recording a
* real client address instead of the proxy's loopback, "unbounded" meant
* unbounded personal data in a hosted third-party database. Two halves answer
* that — the write-time prefix in `./request-client`, and this: a bound on how
* long any row exists at all.
*
* The default (365 days) is deliberately conservative so enabling the schedule
* is not itself a destructive event: it deletes nothing on its first run
* against a database whose history starts inside the window, and it bounds
* growth from then on. Tighten it to the reviewer's suggested 90 by setting
* `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS=90` — that first run *will* delete months of
* history that the /analytics dashboard and the weekly report read, which is an
* operational decision, not one this file should make silently.
*/
/** Kept when `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS` is unset or unusable. */
export const DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS = 365;
/** Anything longer is a misconfiguration, not a policy (≈ 2 years). */
export const MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS = 730;
/**
* The slice of a connection this module needs — the same shape
* `weekly-metrics.ts` pins as `MetricsConn`, so a libsql client satisfies it
* without a cast (and the in-memory SQLite test adapter satisfies it too).
*/
export interface AnalyticsConn {
execute(query: {
sql: string;
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
args?: any[];
}): Promise<{ rows: unknown[]; rowsAffected?: number }>;
}
/**
* The retention window to enforce: a positive integer at most
* {@link MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS}, else the default. Accepts the env
* string form and a number, because both callers hand over a different shape.
*/
export function resolveRetentionDays(
configured: string | number | undefined | null
): number {
const days = typeof configured === "number" ? configured : Number(configured);
if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days <= 0) return DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS;
if (days > MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS) return DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS;
return days;
}
/**
* Delete analytics rows older than `olderThanDays` and report how many went.
*
* The window is a SQL parameter, not interpolated text: `cleanupOldAnalytics`
* used to splice the number into the statement, which only ever sat behind a
* `z.number()` input on the tRPC side — one unvalidated caller away from
* injection. A non-integer is refused here rather than passed on, so neither
* path can delete on a window the code did not check.
*/
export async function pruneVisitorAnalytics(
conn: AnalyticsConn,
olderThanDays: number
): Promise<number> {
const days = Math.trunc(Number(olderThanDays));
if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(
`Refusing to prune VisitorAnalytics on a non-positive window: ${olderThanDays}`
);
}
const result = await conn.execute({
sql: `DELETE FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at < datetime('now', ?)
RETURNING id`,
args: [`-${days} days`]
});
// Counted from `RETURNING id` rather than `rowsAffected`, keeping the contract
// `cleanupOldAnalytics` had: the caller is told how many rows actually went.
return result.rows.length;
}
/** Whether a cron may run: Bearer match, and an unset secret denies everything. */
export function isAuthorizedCron(
authorization: string | null | undefined,
secret: string | undefined | null
): boolean {
if (!secret) return false;
const provided = (authorization ?? "").replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, "").trim();
return Boolean(provided) && provided === secret;
}
export interface RetentionOutcome {
status: number;
body: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/**
* The whole cron decision, away from the route: authorise, resolve the window,
* prune. Returns the status and body the route should send, so the behaviour is
* testable without a database or an environment.
*
* Fail closed on auth (an unauthenticated trigger deleting real history is the
* worst thing this endpoint can do), and 500 rather than a silent zero on a
* failed prune — a retention job that quietly stopped pruning is exactly the
* state that created this issue.
*/
export async function runRetentionCron(options: {
authorization: string | null | undefined;
secret: string | undefined | null;
configuredDays: string | number | undefined | null;
conn: AnalyticsConn;
}): Promise<RetentionOutcome> {
if (!isAuthorizedCron(options.authorization, options.secret)) {
return { status: 401, body: { error: "Unauthorized" } };
}
const days = resolveRetentionDays(options.configuredDays);
try {
const deleted = await pruneVisitorAnalytics(options.conn, days);
return { status: 200, body: { success: true, days, deleted } };
} catch (error) {
console.error("Analytics retention job failed:", error);
return { status: 500, body: { error: "Analytics retention job failed", days } };
}
}

View File

@@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ const sampleArgs = [
2, // inp
3, // ttfb
4, // dom_load
5, // load_complete
"click", // stage
"nook.freno.me" // host
5 // load_complete
];
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
}
// The reverse direction matters too: a column the code writes but the
// DDL omits is the failure this whole file exists to catch.
expect(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.length).toBe(25);
expect(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.length).toBe(23);
});
it("has one placeholder per inserted column", () => {
@@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
const row = db
.prepare(
`SELECT path, country, utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, stage, host
`SELECT path, country, utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign
FROM VisitorAnalytics`
)
.get() as Record<string, unknown>;
@@ -95,9 +93,7 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
country: "GB",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch",
stage: "click",
host: "nook.freno.me"
utm_campaign: "launch"
});
});

View File

@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL = `
utm_source TEXT,
utm_medium TEXT,
utm_campaign TEXT,
stage TEXT,
host TEXT,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES User(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
)
`;
@@ -81,18 +79,6 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS = [
{
name: "utm_campaign",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN utm_campaign TEXT`
},
{
// Which funnel stage a download row is: "click" (a door) or "served"
// (the file route). Null on every non-download row (FRE-366).
name: "stage",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN stage TEXT`
},
{
// The Host the client addressed, e.g. "nook.freno.me" — the site
// dimension the table never had (FRE-366).
name: "host",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN host TEXT`
}
];
@@ -124,9 +110,7 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS = [
"inp",
"ttfb",
"dom_load",
"load_complete",
"stage",
"host"
"load_complete"
] as const;
/**

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INDEXES,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT
} from "./analytics-schema";
import { truncateIpAddress } from "./request-client";
import { pruneVisitorAnalytics } from "./analytics-retention";
/**
* Idempotent schema bootstrap, mirroring `nook.ts`. The table had no DDL in
@@ -66,10 +64,6 @@ export interface AnalyticsEntry {
ttfb?: number | null;
domLoad?: number | null;
loadComplete?: number | null;
/** Funnel stage for download rows ("click" | "served"); null elsewhere. */
stage?: string | null;
/** Host the client addressed, e.g. "nook.freno.me" — the site dimension. */
host?: string | null;
}
/**
@@ -130,9 +124,7 @@ async function flushAnalyticsBuffer(): Promise<void> {
entry.inp || null,
entry.ttfb || null,
entry.domLoad || null,
entry.loadComplete || null,
entry.stage || null,
entry.host || null
entry.loadComplete || null
]
});
}
@@ -266,8 +258,6 @@ export async function queryAnalytics(
utm_medium: row.utm_medium as string | null,
utm_campaign: row.utm_campaign as string | null,
duration_ms: row.duration_ms as number | null,
stage: row.stage as string | null,
host: row.host as string | null,
created_at: row.created_at as string
}));
}
@@ -319,10 +309,6 @@ export async function getAnalyticsSummary(days: number = 30): Promise<{
});
const totalApiCalls = (totalApiCallsResult.rows[0]?.count as number) || 0;
// Since the FRE-369 privacy floor, `ip_address` holds a truncated prefix
// (/24 for v4, /56 for v6), so this counts distinct prefixes — households and
// mobile exits, not machines. It was never accurate before that either: every
// row held the proxy's loopback, so the count was 1.
const uniqueVisitorsResult = await conn.execute({
sql: `SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as count FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE ip_address IS NOT NULL
@@ -634,15 +620,19 @@ export async function getPerformanceStats(days: number = 30): Promise<{
};
}
/**
* Delete visitor analytics older than `olderThanDays`. Reachable from tRPC
* (admin) and from the daily retention cron (`/api/analytics/retention`);
* the SQL and the input rules live in `./analytics-retention`.
*/
export async function cleanupOldAnalytics(
olderThanDays: number
): Promise<number> {
return pruneVisitorAnalytics(ConnectionFactory(), olderThanDays);
const conn = ConnectionFactory();
const result = await conn.execute({
sql: `DELETE FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at < datetime('now', '-${olderThanDays} days')
RETURNING id`,
args: []
});
return result.rows.length;
}
function parseUserAgent(userAgent?: string): {
@@ -677,16 +667,6 @@ function parseUserAgent(userAgent?: string): {
return { deviceType, browser, os };
}
/**
* Fill in what the writer did not supply, and apply the privacy floor.
*
* Every analytics entry — page views, tRPC context, downloads, checkout —
* passes through here, which is why the truncation lives here and not at the
* call sites: a future writer cannot forget it, and no caller can persist a
* full client address by accident (FRE-369, finding Q4). The audit log
* (`./audit.ts`) is a separate, pre-existing surface with its own stakes and is
* deliberately untouched by this change.
*/
export function enrichAnalyticsEntry(entry: AnalyticsEntry): AnalyticsEntry {
const { deviceType, browser, os } = parseUserAgent(
entry.userAgent || undefined
@@ -694,7 +674,6 @@ export function enrichAnalyticsEntry(entry: AnalyticsEntry): AnalyticsEntry {
return {
...entry,
ipAddress: truncateIpAddress(entry.ipAddress),
deviceType: entry.deviceType || deviceType,
browser: entry.browser || browser,
os: entry.os || os

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
} from "~/server/analytics";
import { ConnectionFactory } from "~/server/database";
import { v4 as uuid } from "uuid";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { parseUtm } from "~/server/utm";
import { VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT } from "~/server/analytics-schema";
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
getHeader(req.headers, "referer") ||
getHeader(req.headers, "referrer") ||
getHeader(ctx.event.request?.headers, "referer");
const ipAddress = resolveClientIp(ctx.event) || undefined;
const host = requestHost(ctx.event) || undefined;
const ipAddress = getRequestIP(ctx.event.nativeEvent) || undefined;
const enriched = enrichAnalyticsEntry({
userId: ctx.userId,
path: input.path,
@@ -107,7 +106,6 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
userAgent,
referrer,
ipAddress,
host,
// The client beacon sends `pathname + search`, so the page URL's
// own query string is the campaign source; the referrer fills any
// gap (e.g. clicks that arrive on a clean path).
@@ -147,9 +145,7 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
enriched.inp || null,
enriched.ttfb || null,
enriched.domLoad || null,
enriched.loadComplete || null,
enriched.stage || null,
enriched.host || null
enriched.loadComplete || null
]
});

View File

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export const downloadsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
// exactly the event the funnel needs to show. Unknown asset names are
// skipped rather than recorded as a download that never happened.
if (assets[input.asset_name] || latestAssets[input.asset_name]) {
await trackDownload(ctx.event, input.asset_name, "click");
await trackDownload(ctx.event, input.asset_name);
}
const bucket = env.VITE_DOWNLOAD_BUCKET_STRING;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { logVisit, enrichAnalyticsEntry } from "~/server/analytics";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { getAuthPayloadFromEvent } from "~/server/auth";
export type Context = {
@@ -51,11 +51,7 @@ async function createContextInner(event: APIEvent): Promise<Context> {
getHeader(req.headers, "referer") ||
getHeader(req.headers, "referrer") ||
getHeader(event.request?.headers, "referer");
// Behind the production proxy the direct peer is loopback, so the real
// client address comes from the forwarded header the proxy sets — see
// `~/server/request-client` for the trust boundary (FRE-366).
const ipAddress = resolveClientIp(event) || undefined;
const host = requestHost(event) || undefined;
const ipAddress = getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent) || undefined;
// Don't log the performance logging endpoint itself to avoid circular tracking
if (!path.includes("analytics.logPerformance")) {
@@ -66,8 +62,7 @@ async function createContextInner(event: APIEvent): Promise<Context> {
method,
userAgent,
referrer,
ipAddress,
host
ipAddress
})
);
}

View File

@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, mock } from "bun:test";
// The trust boundary of FRE-366, as corrected by the FRE-369 security review.
// Two things must stay true here:
// 1. The address we record is the visitor, not whoever typed a header first.
// Cloudflare and the origin proxy both *append* to x-forwarded-for, so the
// leftmost hop is the client's own invention — `cf-connecting-ip` (which
// Cloudflare overwrites) comes first, then the hop below the trusted edge.
// 2. What reaches the database is a prefix, never a full address
// (`truncateIpAddress`), because a visitor row is not worth a precise
// location.
// A regression on (1) re-records whatever an attacker claims; on (2) it stores
// personal data we promised not to.
let directIp: string | null = null;
mock.module("vinxi/http", () => ({
getRequestIP: () => directIp
}));
const {
resolveClientIp,
isLoopbackAddress,
isIpAddress,
truncateIpAddress,
normaliseHost,
requestHost
} = await import("./request-client");
function event(
headers: Record<string, string> = {},
url = "https://nook.freno.me/downloads"
) {
return {
request: new Request(url, { headers }),
nativeEvent: {}
} as never;
}
beforeEach(() => {
directIp = null;
});
describe("resolveClientIp", () => {
it("prefers Cloudflare's connecting address over any forwarded header", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("takes the hop below the trusted edge — never the leftmost one", () => {
// client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy: the sender's spoof is
// first, the real client second, the edge last.
directIp = "::1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("refuses a single-hop forwarded header: nothing above it to discount", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(event({ "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9" }))
).toBe("127.0.0.1");
});
it("ignores a forwarded header from a real peer — it is spoofable", () => {
directIp = "203.0.113.7";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "198.51.100.9",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("ignores a header value that is not an address", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-address",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(event({ "cf-connecting-ip": "evil.example.com" }))
).toBe("127.0.0.1");
});
it("keeps the loopback peer when the proxy set nothing usable", () => {
directIp = "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
expect(resolveClientIp(event())).toBe("::ffff:127.0.0.1");
});
it("records nothing rather than inventing an address", () => {
expect(resolveClientIp(event())).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
it("covers the v4 range and every spelling of v6 loopback", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.53")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.9.9.9")).toBe(true);
});
it("is not loopback for a real peer, or for text it cannot parse", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("10.0.0.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("localhost")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.53")).toBe(false); // not a complete address
expect(isLoopbackAddress("")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("isIpAddress", () => {
it("accepts a dotted quad and an IPv6 literal", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("198.51.100.9")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:198.51.100.9")).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects anything a proxy could not have meant", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("999.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("1.2.3")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8:::1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("evil.example.com")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("truncateIpAddress", () => {
it("cuts IPv4 to its /24", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("198.51.100.9")).toBe("198.51.100.0");
expect(truncateIpAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe("127.0.0.0");
});
it("cuts IPv6 to its /56, uncompressed and stable", () => {
expect(
truncateIpAddress("2001:db8:85a3:1234:5678:9abc:defa:1234")
).toBe("2001:db8:85a3:1200:0:0:0:0");
// The compressed spelling of the same address truncates to the same string,
// so `COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address)` cannot be split by how a proxy rendered it.
expect(truncateIpAddress("2001:db8:85a3:1234::")).toBe(
"2001:db8:85a3:1200:0:0:0:0"
);
expect(truncateIpAddress("::1")).toBe("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0");
});
it("treats an IPv4-mapped v6 address as the v4 it is", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("::ffff:198.51.100.9")).toBe("198.51.100.0");
});
it("drops what it cannot parse rather than storing it", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("203.0.113.999")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress("<script>alert(1)</script>")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress("")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress(null)).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress(undefined)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("normaliseHost", () => {
it("lowercases and strips the port so the weekly host scope can match", () => {
expect(normaliseHost("Nook.Freno.ME:443")).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(normaliseHost("nook.freno.me.")).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(normaliseHost("[::1]:3000")).toBe("::1");
expect(normaliseHost(" ")).toBeNull();
expect(normaliseHost(null)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("requestHost", () => {
it("reads the host the client addressed from the request URL", () => {
expect(requestHost(event())).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(requestHost(event({}, "https://freno.me/"))).toBe("freno.me");
});
it("normalises a host that carries a port", () => {
expect(requestHost(event({}, "https://nook.freno.me:443/downloads"))).toBe(
"nook.freno.me"
);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { hostFromEventLike } from "./site-context-server";
/**
* The client address and the site a request addressed, for the analytics
* writers (FRE-366).
*
* Until this existed every writer called `getRequestIP` and only looked at
* `x-forwarded-for` when it returned null — so behind the production proxy the
* recorded address was the proxy itself, and all 12,035 addressed rows in
* VisitorAnalytics carried 127.0.0.1 / ::1.
*
* STANDING RULE (FRE-369, the security review of that change): nothing here is
* a security signal. The address is a *best guess at a visitor*, not an
* authenticated identity — do not import it into auth, rate limiting, abuse
* control, fraud checks, or anything that grants or denies access. A caller
* that needs a security decision must re-derive trust for its own stakes; the
* blast radius of a wrong answer here is a poisoned analytics row, and that is
* the only reason the shortcuts below are acceptable.
*
* Trust boundary, stated plainly: `x-forwarded-for` is client-controlled text.
* It is believed only when the direct peer is a loopback address — the
* production shape, where a same-host proxy (nginx/caddy) terminates TLS and
* sets the header itself. Anywhere else the direct peer IS the client (dev,
* direct hit) and a forwarded header from it is ignored as spoofable.
*
* Which hop is the visitor (FRE-369 finding Q1): the request arrives as
* `client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy → app`, and both proxies
* *append*. So `x-forwarded-for` reaches us as
* `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the leftmost
* hop is exactly the one the sender chose — the original FRE-366 read took it
* and was wrong. Order of preference:
*
* 1. `cf-connecting-ip` — Cloudflare *overwrites* this header, so a
* client-supplied value never survives the edge. Authoritative.
* 2. `x-forwarded-for`, counted from the right: drop the rightmost hop (the
* Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the one
* before it. Never the leftmost.
* 3. the direct peer, as before.
*
* h3's own `getRequestIP(event, { xForwardedFor: true })` also takes the
* leftmost hop, so it is not a fix for this and must not be swapped in.
*
* Residual caveat, deliberately not papered over: step 2 assumes the pinned
* topology (one trusted proxy above us, i.e. Cloudflare). Behind a *single*
* forwarding proxy that does not set `cf-connecting-ip`, a client that sent its
* own `x-forwarded-for` sits at the hop we read. That is why the value is only
* ever stored truncated (see `truncateIpAddress`) and why it stays out of every
* security path. Deploy-side precondition this repo cannot verify: the origin
* must be reachable only from Cloudflare (origin firewall / authenticated
* origin pull). If it is directly reachable, an attacker can set every header
* in this file and no read here can recover the truth.
*/
/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
/**
* Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
* taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
* because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
* raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
*/
const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
function header(event: APIEvent, name: string): string | null {
try {
return event.request?.headers?.get?.(name) ?? null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* The visitor's address, resolved through the trust boundary above.
*
* Never store the result of this directly: `enrichAnalyticsEntry` runs every
* analytics entry through {@link truncateIpAddress} so a full address cannot
* reach the database even from a writer that forgets. Callers that need the
* un-truncated value must justify it in review.
*/
export function resolveClientIp(event: APIEvent): string | null {
const direct = getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent);
// A real peer is its own client: believed, and no forwarded header from it
// is (it would be the peer lying about who it is).
if (direct && !isLoopbackAddress(direct)) return direct;
// 1. Cloudflare's own record of the connecting address.
const connecting = cleanHop(header(event, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
// 2. Rightmost-minus-the-trusted-hop, never leftmost.
const hops = (header(event, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
.split(",")
.map(cleanHop)
.filter(Boolean);
const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
if (index >= 0) {
const candidate = hops[index]!;
if (isIpAddress(candidate)) return candidate;
}
// 3. Nothing trustworthy: record what we actually saw, even though it is the
// proxy. `readTraffic` reports these rows rather than hiding them.
return direct ?? null;
}
function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
return (value ?? "").trim();
}
/**
* Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
*
* Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
* `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
* recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
* closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
* believed.
*/
export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
if (!bytes) return false;
if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
// IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
const tail = bytes[15]!;
return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
}
// ── Addresses: parse, validate, truncate ────────────────────────────────────
/**
* The privacy floor the security review required before this ships (FRE-369,
* finding Q4): VisitorAnalytics must never hold a full client address. IPv4 is
* cut to /24, IPv6 to /56 — the prefix that identifies a household and that a
* rotating "privacy" IPv6 address does not actually change. Funnel stages count
* rows, and `uniqueVisitors` survives as a count of distinct prefixes, so
* nothing measured here needs the last octet.
*
* An address that does not parse is dropped rather than stored: an unparseable
* string is client text we cannot reason about, and keeping it would smuggle
* the very granularity this function exists to remove.
*/
export function truncateIpAddress(ip: string | null | undefined): string | null {
const value = cleanHop(ip);
if (!value) return null;
const bytes = addressBytes(value);
if (!bytes) return null;
const mapped = bytes.length === 16 ? ipv4FromBytes(bytes) : null;
if (bytes.length === 4 || mapped) {
const octets = (mapped ?? value).split(".").map(Number) as number[];
return `${octets[0]}.${octets[1]}.${octets[2]}.0`;
}
// /56 = keep the first 7 bytes, zero the rest. Rendered uncompressed and
// lowercase so one client always truncates to one stored string.
const kept = bytes.map((_, i) => (i >= 7 ? 0 : _));
const groups: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
groups.push((((kept[i]! << 8) | kept[i + 1]!) >>> 0).toString(16));
}
return groups.join(":");
}
/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
}
function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
const parts = value.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
return parts.every(
(part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
);
}
/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
const halves = raw.split("::");
if (halves.length > 2) return null;
const compressed = halves.length === 2;
const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
if (!head || !tail) return null;
const total = head.length + tail.length;
if (compressed) {
if (total > 8) return null;
return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
if (total !== 8) return null;
return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
if (side === "") return [];
const out: number[] = [];
for (const part of side.split(":")) {
if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
} else if (isIpv4(part)) {
const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
} else {
return null;
}
}
return out;
}
function split16(group: number): number[] {
return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
}
/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
}
/**
* The site the request addressed — the `Host` the client asked for, normalised
* to `nook.freno.me`. Recorded on every analytics row so a weekly read can
* scope to one site; without it `/` on nook.freno.me is the same row as `/` on
* freno.me. Thin alias over the site-context extractor so the analytics writers
* share one host-parsing implementation with routing.
*
* Normalised (lowercased, port stripped) because the weekly read scopes with
* `host = ?`: `nook.freno.me:443` or `Nook.Freno.ME` would otherwise store a
* value that silently never matches the scope (FRE-369, finding Q3 — no
* injection risk, but a correctness one worth fixing at write time).
*/
export function requestHost(event: APIEvent): string | null {
return normaliseHost(hostFromEventLike(event)) ?? normaliseHost(urlHost(event));
}
function urlHost(event: APIEvent): string | null {
// `host` is a forbidden header and some server shapes drop it from
// `event.request.headers`; the request URL is absolute on the server and
// carries the same host the client addressed.
try {
const url = event.request?.url;
return url ? new URL(url).host || null : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Lowercase, drop the port and any trailing dot; null when nothing is left. */
export function normaliseHost(host: string | null | undefined): string | null {
const raw = cleanHop(host).toLowerCase();
if (!raw) return null;
// A bracketed IPv6 literal keeps its brackets' contents (`[::1]:3000` →
// `::1`); anything else drops a trailing `:port`.
const closing = raw.indexOf("]");
const withoutPort = raw.startsWith("[")
? closing > 0
? raw.slice(1, closing)
: raw.slice(1)
: raw.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
const trimmed = withoutPort.replace(/\.$/, "");
return trimmed || null;
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { getCookie, setCookie } from "vinxi/http";
import type { H3Event } from "vinxi/http";
import { t } from "~/server/api/utils";
import { logAuditEvent } from "~/server/audit";
import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
import { env } from "~/env/server";
import {
AUTH_CONFIG,
@@ -329,15 +328,39 @@ async function cleanupExpiredRateLimits(): Promise<void> {
}
/**
* Get client IP address for a security decision (rate limiting, audit).
*
* Thin alias over `resolveTrustedClientIp` (./trusted-client-ip), which owns
* the trust order: the previous leftmost `x-forwarded-for` read was
* client-spoofable in our append-only proxy topology, and `x-real-ip` was
* read unconditionally — both fixed there (FRE-371).
* Get client IP address from request headers.
* Only trusts X-Forwarded-For outside of local development (set by the Vercel
* edge network in production; trusted in tests so the header-parsing path is
* exercised). In local development, uses the socket address to prevent header
* spoofing.
*/
export function getClientIP(event: H3Event): string {
return resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
// In production on Vercel, X-Forwarded-For is set by the edge network
// and cannot be spoofed by clients. In dev, ignore it.
if (env.NODE_ENV !== "development") {
const forwarded = getHeaderValue(event, "x-forwarded-for");
if (forwarded) {
return forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
}
const realIP = getHeaderValue(event, "x-real-ip");
if (realIP) {
return realIP;
}
}
// Fallback: try socket remote address
try {
const nodeReq = event.node.req;
if (nodeReq?.socket?.remoteAddress) {
const addr = nodeReq.socket.remoteAddress;
// Clean up IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses
return addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "");
}
} catch {
// socket access failed
}
return "unknown";
}
/**

View File

@@ -150,100 +150,29 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
});
describe("getClientIP", () => {
// FRE-371: the read is spoof-resistant now. In the pinned topology
// (client → Cloudflare → origin proxy → app) both proxies APPEND, so
// x-forwarded-for arrives as `<spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and the
// leftmost hop is whatever the sender typed. Trust order:
// cf-connecting-ip, then x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, then the
// socket peer — never the leftmost hop, never x-real-ip.
it("takes x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, never the leftmost hop", () => {
it("should extract IP from x-forwarded-for header", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
}
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.1");
});
it("prefers cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge)", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not change the resolved client", () => {
// The spoof the old read fell for: same Cloudflare-recorded client,
// different sender-chosen prefix per request. The key must be stable,
// or each rotation mints a fresh rate-limit bucket.
const first = getClientIP(
createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
);
const second = getClientIP(
createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "2.2.2.2, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
);
expect(first).toBe("203.0.113.7");
expect(second).toBe(first);
});
it("ignores x-real-ip entirely (client-settable in this topology)", () => {
it("should extract IP from x-real-ip header", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.2");
});
it("ignores a client-supplied single-hop x-forwarded-for with no trusted proxy above it", () => {
// One hop only = the sender's own invention; discounting the trusted
// hop leaves nothing to believe.
it("should prefer x-forwarded-for over x-real-ip", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
});
it("a non-loopback socket peer is the client and beats every header", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1",
"x-real-ip": "6.6.6.6"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("198.51.100.23");
});
it("a loopback socket peer lets the forwarded headers speak", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
"x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1",
"x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2"
}
});
@@ -269,23 +198,13 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
it("should handle IPv6 addresses", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for":
"2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334, 10.0.0.1"
"x-forwarded-for": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
});
it("rejects a candidate hop that is not an address", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "not-an-ip, 10.0.0.1" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
});
});
describe("rateLimitLogin", () => {

View File

@@ -14,15 +14,12 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
cookies?: Record<string, string>;
method?: string;
url?: string;
/** Socket peer the server observed; omit for a peer-less synthetic event. */
remoteAddress?: string;
}): H3Event {
const {
headers = {},
cookies = {},
method = "POST",
url = "http://localhost:3000/",
remoteAddress
url = "http://localhost:3000/"
} = options;
// Build the cookie header string from the cookies object only
@@ -52,10 +49,7 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
headers: headersObj,
node: {
req: {
headers: allHeaders,
...(remoteAddress
? { socket: { remoteAddress } }
: {})
headers: allHeaders
},
res: {
cookies: {}

View File

@@ -38,10 +38,9 @@ export interface ServerSiteEvent {
* the raw Node request via `event.nativeEvent.node.req.headers`. We try
* both so this works for API route handlers (`APIEvent`), the SSR document
* handler (`PageEvent`), and tRPC procedures operating on the underlying
* `H3Event`. Also used by the analytics writers to record the site dimension
* (`host` column) on every row (FRE-366).
* `H3Event`.
*/
export function hostFromEventLike(event: ServerSiteEvent | unknown): string | null {
function hostFromEventLike(event: ServerSiteEvent | unknown): string | null {
// 1) Web FetchEvent / APIEvent / PageEvent → standard `Request` headers.
try {
const req = (event as { request?: Request } | null)?.request;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import {
logVisit,
enrichAnalyticsEntry,
@@ -6,7 +7,6 @@ import {
} from "~/server/analytics";
import { parseUtm } from "~/server/utm";
import { downloadPath } from "~/lib/download-asset";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
/**
* Record one download event under the canonical path `/api/downloads/<asset>`.
@@ -15,75 +15,35 @@ import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
* label per asset to group on: the tRPC click proxy, the S3 file route that
* serves Sparkle updates, and the Nook door.
*
* The `stage` is what separates the doors within one asset label: "click"
* for a door the visitor chose (landing button, tRPC proxy), "served" for
* the file route that actually streams the DMG. Until FRE-366 both wrote the
* same unlabelled row, so "download click → DMG served" could not be split —
* one served click wrote two identical rows. `summariseDownloads()` and the
* /analytics downloads block still group on the path alone; the stage is a
* separate column precisely so that grouping cannot change.
*
* Best-effort by design — a failed analytics write must never block a
* download. Flushed rather than merely buffered: a download is low-volume and
* the 30s batch timer is not guaranteed to survive the response on serverless.
*/
export async function trackDownload(
event: APIEvent,
asset: string,
stage: DownloadStage
): Promise<void> {
await trackRequest(event, {
path: downloadPath(asset),
method: "GET",
stage
});
}
export type DownloadStage = "click" | "served";
export interface TrackedRequest {
path: string;
method: string;
/** Funnel stage label; only download rows carry one today. */
stage?: string | null;
}
/**
* Record one server-side request event with the shared visitor dimensions:
* referrer, campaign tags, edge country, real client address and host.
*
* This is the one writer every measured door goes through — download doors
* via `trackDownload`, the checkout door directly — so the dimensions can
* never drift between doors. Same best-effort, flushed-immediately contract
* as `trackDownload`.
*
* `event.request` is expected to be a Fetch `Request` (true for Vinxi route
* handlers and browser tRPC calls). A server-side `createCaller` hands over a
* Node request, whose headers have no `get` — that throw is swallowed below,
* so such an event is not recorded. No server-side caller downloads today.
* so such a click is not recorded. No server-side caller downloads today.
*/
export async function trackRequest(
export async function trackDownload(
event: APIEvent,
tracked: TrackedRequest
asset: string
): Promise<void> {
const { request } = event;
try {
const referrer =
request.headers.get("referer") ?? request.headers.get("referrer");
const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
await logVisit(
enrichAnalyticsEntry({
path: tracked.path,
method: tracked.method,
stage: tracked.stage ?? null,
path: downloadPath(asset),
method: "GET",
referrer,
userAgent: request.headers.get("user-agent"),
// Behind the production proxy the direct peer is loopback; the real
// client address comes from the forwarded header the proxy sets —
// see `~/server/request-client` for the trust boundary.
ipAddress: resolveClientIp(event),
host: requestHost(event),
ipAddress:
getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent) ??
(forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : null),
// The click carries its own tags when a campaign links straight at the
// door; otherwise the landing page's tags ride along in the referer.
...parseUtm(request.url, referrer),
@@ -96,6 +56,6 @@ export async function trackRequest(
);
await flushAnalytics();
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to log ${tracked.method} ${tracked.path}:`, error);
console.error(`Failed to log download of ${asset}:`, error);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import {
resolveTrustedClientIp,
isIpAddress,
isLoopbackAddress,
UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP,
type ClientIpEventLike
} from "./trusted-client-ip";
/**
* Unit coverage for the security-path client-IP read (FRE-371). The caller
* suites (rate-limit.test.ts, report.test.ts) pin the behaviour through
* getClientIP and the route; this file pins the helper's own edges: the peer
* forms a real socket can present, the APIEvent wrapper, and failing closed.
*/
function event(opts: {
headers?: Record<string, string>;
remoteAddress?: string;
wrapped?: boolean;
}): ClientIpEventLike {
const inner: ClientIpEventLike = {
...(opts.remoteAddress
? { node: { req: { socket: { remoteAddress: opts.remoteAddress } } } }
: {}),
request: { headers: new Headers(opts.headers ?? {}) }
};
// An APIEvent wraps its H3Event as `nativeEvent` (routes/api/* shape).
return opts.wrapped ? { nativeEvent: inner } : inner;
}
describe("resolveTrustedClientIp", () => {
it("trust order: non-loopback peer, then cf-connecting-ip, then rightmost-minus-one x-forwarded-for", () => {
// Peer wins.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
)
).toBe("198.51.100.23");
// Loopback peer → Cloudflare's record.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
// No CF header → the hop below the trusted proxy.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("reads the wrapped H3Event of an APIEvent-shaped input", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
wrapped: true,
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("never returns a truncated address", () => {
// The full /128 is the bucket key; a truncated one would pool attackers
// with their neighbours.
const ip = resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334" }
})
);
expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
});
it("fails closed to the stricter unknown key", () => {
// One hop = the sender's own invention; a non-address hop; nothing at all.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-ip" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
expect(resolveTrustedClientIp(event({}))).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
});
it("recognises the loopback forms a real peer presents", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
// IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback from a node socket.
remoteAddress: "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "::1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
// A non-loopback peer that merely looks odd is still the client.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "::ffff:203.0.113.7",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("never believes x-real-ip", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "x-real-ip": "203.0.113.7" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
});
});
describe("address helpers", () => {
it("isIpAddress", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("not-an-ip")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("256.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(undefined)).toBe(false);
});
it("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.255.0.3")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::2")).toBe(false);
// Unparseable input is not loopback — fails closed.
expect(isLoopbackAddress("garbage")).toBe(false);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
/**
* The client address, resolved for security decisions (FRE-371).
*
* This is the ONLY client-IP read allowed to feed a security decision — rate
* limiting, abuse quotas, account lockout, audit trails. It exists separately
* from `request-client.ts`'s `resolveClientIp` (the analytics read) on
* purpose:
*
* - `resolveClientIp` carries a standing rule (FRE-369 review, 1d9287a):
* it never feeds a security decision. Its blast radius is a poisoned
* analytics row; ours is granting or denying access.
* - Rate limiting needs the UN-truncated address; the analytics module only
* ever hands out truncated prefixes.
* - `request-client.ts` ships on FRE-366's branch, which is under review;
* a security fix must not merge-depend on an analytics diff.
*
* The address-parsing primitives below are therefore a deliberate port of the
* reviewed ones, not an import. If the two ever drift, this file's version is
* the one security paths follow.
*
* WHY the old read was spoofable: `security.ts`'s `getClientIP` took the
* LEFTMOST `x-forwarded-for` hop, believing the header "cannot be spoofed".
* In the pinned topology — client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy →
* app — both proxies *append*, so the header arrives as
* `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the
* leftmost hop is exactly the one the sender chose. Rotating
* `X-Forwarded-For: <random>` per request minted a fresh rate-limit bucket
* and unlimited bug-report quota. `x-real-ip` was read unconditionally too;
* nothing in this topology overwrites it, so it is equally client text and is
* no longer read at all.
*
* Trust order (matches the convention FRE-366 landed after its security
* review, re-derived here for security stakes):
*
* 1. The direct socket peer, when it is a real routable address: it IS the
* client (dev, direct hit), and any forwarded header from it is the
* client describing itself — ignored.
* 2. `cf-connecting-ip` — reachable only when the peer is the loopback
* origin proxy (or unreadable, e.g. a synthetic event in tests).
* Cloudflare *overwrites* this header at the edge, so a client-supplied
* value never survives. Must parse as an address.
* 3. `x-forwarded-for` counted from the RIGHT: drop the rightmost hop (the
* Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the hop
* before it. Never the leftmost. Must parse as an address.
* 4. "unknown" — callers give unknown-IP keys stricter shared limits, so
* an unresolvable client fails toward a tighter bucket, never a looser
* one.
*
* Deploy-side precondition this code cannot verify (same as the analytics
* read): the origin must be reachable only through Cloudflare and the
* same-host proxy. If the app is directly internet-reachable, a client can
* set every header read here and no in-app read can recover the truth.
*/
/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
/**
* Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
* taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
* because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
* raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
*/
const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
/** Returned when no trustworthy address exists. Callers rate-limit it harder. */
export const UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP = "unknown";
/**
* The shapes this module reads: an H3Event (`security.ts` callers) or a
* SolidStart APIEvent (`routes/api/*`), which wraps its H3Event as
* `nativeEvent`. Every field is optional because test doubles are minimal;
* anything unreadable simply falls through to the next trust step.
*/
export interface ClientIpEventLike {
request?: { headers?: unknown };
headers?: unknown;
node?: {
req?: {
headers?: Record<string, unknown>;
socket?: { remoteAddress?: string };
};
};
nativeEvent?: ClientIpEventLike;
}
/**
* The client address for a security decision, per the trust order above.
* Never truncated: rate-limit buckets are per-address, and truncating would
* let an attacker share a bucket with the innocents behind their /24.
*/
export function resolveTrustedClientIp(event: ClientIpEventLike): string {
// An APIEvent's socket and (authoritative) headers live on the wrapped
// H3Event; a bare APIEvent-shaped double without one is read as-is.
const source = event.nativeEvent ?? event;
const peer = directPeer(source);
if (peer && isIpAddress(peer) && !isLoopbackAddress(peer)) return peer;
// The peer is the loopback origin proxy (or unreadable): forwarded headers
// may be believed, in the order above.
const connecting = cleanHop(headerValue(source, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
const hops = (headerValue(source, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
.split(",")
.map(cleanHop)
.filter(Boolean);
const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
if (index >= 0 && isIpAddress(hops[index])) return hops[index]!;
return UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP;
}
/** The socket peer, IPv6-mapped IPv4 flattened (`::ffff:1.2.3.4` → `1.2.3.4`). */
function directPeer(event: ClientIpEventLike): string | null {
try {
const addr = event.node?.req?.socket?.remoteAddress;
return addr ? addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "") : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Header read tolerant of every event shape in play: Fetch-style
* `request.headers.get`, an h3 `event.headers` (Headers or plain object), and
* the raw node request headers. Header names are case-insensitive per HTTP;
* the plain-object fallbacks lowercase to match how node and the test doubles
* store them.
*/
function headerValue(event: ClientIpEventLike, name: string): string | null {
try {
const fromHeaders = (h: unknown): string | null => {
if (!h) return null;
if (typeof (h as Headers).get === "function") {
return (h as Headers).get(name) ?? null;
}
if (typeof h === "object") {
const record = h as Record<string, unknown>;
const value = record[name] ?? record[name.toLowerCase()];
return typeof value === "string" ? value : null;
}
return null;
};
return (
fromHeaders(event.request?.headers) ??
fromHeaders(event.headers) ??
fromHeaders(event.node?.req?.headers)
);
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
return (value ?? "").trim();
}
// ── Addresses: parse and validate ───────────────────────────────────────────
// Ported from the reviewed `request-client.ts` (FRE-366 @ 1d9287a); see the
// header comment for why this is a copy and not an import.
/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
}
/**
* Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
*
* Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
* `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
* recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
* closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
* believed (a non-loopback peer short-circuits before headers are read).
*/
export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
if (!bytes) return false;
if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
// IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
const tail = bytes[15]!;
return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
}
function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
const parts = value.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
return parts.every(
(part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
);
}
/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
const halves = raw.split("::");
if (halves.length > 2) return null;
const compressed = halves.length === 2;
const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
if (!head || !tail) return null;
const total = head.length + tail.length;
if (compressed) {
if (total > 8) return null;
return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
if (total !== 8) return null;
return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
if (side === "") return [];
const out: number[] = [];
for (const part of side.split(":")) {
if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
} else if (isIpv4(part)) {
const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
} else {
return null;
}
}
return out;
}
function split16(group: number): number[] {
return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
}
/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
}

View File

@@ -1,520 +0,0 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT
} from "./analytics-schema";
import {
NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH,
NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
NOOK_HOST,
ensureAnalyticsSchema,
getWeeklyReport,
pickMover,
readCampaigns,
readFunnel,
readTraffic,
renderWeeklyMarkdown,
windowsFor,
type Connections,
type FunnelCounts,
type MetricsConn
} from "./weekly-metrics";
// Same reasoning as the backfill suite: the queries run real SQL, so an
// in-memory SQLite shaped like production is the only honest stand-in. A stub
// that returned canned rows would pass with a column or a label the live table
// does not have.
const NOOK_DDL = [
`CREATE TABLE trials (
fingerprint TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
started_at TEXT NOT NULL,
email TEXT
)`,
`CREATE TABLE licenses (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
key TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
email TEXT NOT NULL,
stripe_session_id TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
)`,
`CREATE TABLE activations (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
license_id TEXT NOT NULL,
device_fingerprint TEXT NOT NULL,
device_name TEXT NOT NULL,
activated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
deactivated_at TEXT
)`
];
function adapter(db: Database): MetricsConn {
return {
async execute(query) {
const args = (query.args ?? []) as never[];
const statement = db.query(query.sql);
if (/^\s*(select|pragma|with)\b/i.test(query.sql)) {
return { rows: statement.all(...args) as unknown[], rowsAffected: 0 };
}
return {
rows: [] as unknown[],
rowsAffected: statement.run(...args).changes
};
}
};
}
let analyticsDb: Database;
let nookDb: Database;
let conns: Connections;
const NOW = new Date("2026-10-29T16:00:00Z");
// A row as the post-FRE-366 writers record it: real client address, the host
// it addressed, and a stage label where the row is a download.
const row = (
overrides: Record<string, unknown>
): Record<string, unknown> => ({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
user_id: null,
path: "/",
method: "GET",
referrer: null,
user_agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh)",
// What the writers store since the FRE-369 privacy floor: a /24 (or /56 for
// IPv6), never the address itself.
ip_address: "203.0.113.0",
country: "GB",
device_type: "desktop",
browser: "safari",
os: "macos",
utm_source: null,
utm_medium: null,
utm_campaign: null,
duration_ms: null,
fcp: null,
lcp: null,
cls: null,
fid: null,
inp: null,
ttfb: null,
dom_load: null,
load_complete: null,
stage: null,
host: NOOK_HOST,
...overrides
});
function insertAnalytics(overrides: Record<string, unknown>): void {
const values = row(overrides);
analyticsDb
.prepare(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT)
.run(...(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.map((column) => values[column]) as never[]));
// `created_at` is not in VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS (it defaults to now), so
// the window each row belongs to has to be set after the insert.
if (values.created_at) {
analyticsDb
.prepare(`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = ? WHERE id = ?`)
.run(values.created_at as string, values.id as string);
}
}
// Inside the current window for NOW - 7 days: 2026-10-22 16:00 → 2026-10-29 16:00.
const THIS_WEEK = "2026-10-27 10:00:00";
// Inside the previous window: 2026-10-15 16:00 → 2026-10-22 16:00.
const LAST_WEEK = "2026-10-18 10:00:00";
beforeEach(() => {
analyticsDb = new Database(":memory:");
analyticsDb.run(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL);
nookDb = new Database(":memory:");
for (const ddl of NOOK_DDL) nookDb.run(ddl);
conns = { analytics: adapter(analyticsDb), nook: adapter(nookDb) };
});
describe("windowsFor", () => {
it("puts the previous window directly before the current one", () => {
const windows = windowsFor(NOW, 7);
expect(windows.current).toEqual({
start: "2026-10-22 16:00:00",
end: "2026-10-29 16:00:00"
});
expect(windows.previous).toEqual({
start: "2026-10-15 16:00:00",
end: "2026-10-22 16:00:00"
});
});
});
describe("readFunnel", () => {
it("counts each stage by its own label inside its window", async () => {
// Page views on the Nook host count; other sites, API calls, legacy
// rows with no host, and the other window do not.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/downloads", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: "freno.me", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: null, created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/api/trpc/anything", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: LAST_WEEK });
// The old checkout proxy: a /checkout page view is a visit, not a
// started checkout.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/checkout", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// The download label splits by stage; a row with no stage predates the
// split and counts in neither.
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "click", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "served", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "served", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: null, created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// A created Stripe session, recorded by the checkout route itself.
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH,
method: "POST",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
// The licence DB stores ISO-8601 with milliseconds.
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-1", "2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z");
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-old", "2026-08-26T19:26:12.791Z");
nookDb
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO licenses (id, key, email, stripe_session_id, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`
)
.run("lic-1", "NOOK-1", "buyer@example.com", "cs_1", "2026-10-25T12:00:00.000Z");
nookDb
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO activations (id, license_id, device_fingerprint, device_name, activated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`
)
.run("act-1", "lic-1", "device-1", "Hermes", "2026-10-25T12:05:00.000Z");
const window = windowsFor(NOW, 7).current;
const funnel = await readFunnel(conns, window);
expect(funnel).toEqual({
visit: 3, // "/", "/downloads" and the "/checkout" page view on the Nook host
downloadClick: 1,
dmgServed: 2,
trial: 1,
checkout: 1,
purchase: 1,
activation: 1
});
});
it("reports zeros against an empty database", async () => {
const window = windowsFor(NOW, 7).current;
expect(await readFunnel(conns, window)).toEqual({
visit: 0,
downloadClick: 0,
dmgServed: 0,
trial: 0,
checkout: 0,
purchase: 0,
activation: 0
});
});
});
describe("readTraffic", () => {
it("separates legacy rows, live loopback and automation from clean traffic", async () => {
// Post-instrumentation rows: host set. Two of them still loopback — in the
// truncated shapes the privacy floor writes — which is the shape the report
// must flag as "the fix is not live".
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "click",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
ip_address: "127.0.0.0",
user_agent: "The Nook/0.13.4 Sparkle/2.9.6",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
ip_address: "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// Pre-instrumentation rows: no host, proxy's address — legacy, never
// counted as "the fix is not live".
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: null,
host: null,
ip_address: "127.0.0.1",
user_agent: "curl/8.7.1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
host: null,
ip_address: "::1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
const traffic = await readTraffic(conns, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(traffic).toEqual({
analyticsRows: 6,
hostRows: 4,
legacyRows: 2,
hostLoopbackRows: 2,
downloadRows: 3,
downloadClickRows: 1,
downloadServedRows: 1,
downloadUnstagedRows: 1,
downloadNonBrowserRows: 2
});
});
});
describe("readCampaigns", () => {
it("groups tagged rows, excludes untagged, and orders by volume", async () => {
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "r_macapps",
utm_campaign: "week2",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
const campaigns = await readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(campaigns).toEqual([
{ source: "hn", medium: "post", campaign: "launch", count: 2 },
{ source: "r_macapps", medium: null, campaign: "week2", count: 1 }
]);
});
it("caps the list at ten rows", async () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 12; i += 1) {
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: `source-${i}`,
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
}
const campaigns = await readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(campaigns.length).toBe(10);
});
});
describe("ensureAnalyticsSchema", () => {
it("adds the post-hoc columns to a table that predates them, idempotently", async () => {
// The table as production held it before any post-hoc column existed.
// (`created_at` is not in the insert column list — it defaults DB-side —
// so the simulated table has to name it explicitly.)
const oldDb = new Database(":memory:");
const withoutAdded = [
...VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.filter(
(c) => !VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS.some((a) => a.name === c)
),
"created_at"
];
oldDb.run(
`CREATE TABLE VisitorAnalytics (${withoutAdded.map((c) => `${c} TEXT`).join(", ")})`
);
const oldConn = adapter(oldDb);
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(oldConn);
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(oldConn); // a second run is a no-op
// The writers' full INSERT — stage and host included — now works.
const values = row({ stage: "click", path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH });
expect(() =>
oldDb
.prepare(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT)
.run(
...(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.map((c) => values[c]) as never[])
)
).not.toThrow();
oldDb
.prepare(`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = ? WHERE id = ?`)
.run(THIS_WEEK, values.id as string);
// And the funnel reads its stage split from the migrated table.
const funnel = await readFunnel(
{ analytics: oldConn, nook: conns.nook },
windowsFor(NOW, 7).current
);
expect(funnel.downloadClick).toBe(1);
});
});
describe("pickMover", () => {
const base: FunnelCounts = {
visit: 0,
downloadClick: 0,
dmgServed: 0,
trial: 0,
checkout: 0,
purchase: 0,
activation: 0
};
it("picks the stage with the largest absolute change", () => {
const mover = pickMover(
{ ...base, visit: 61, dmgServed: 156, trial: 2 },
{ ...base, visit: 56 }
);
expect(mover).toEqual({
key: "dmgServed",
label: "DMG served",
now: 156,
before: 0,
delta: 156
});
});
it("breaks ties toward the earlier stage", () => {
const mover = pickMover(
{ ...base, visit: 5, downloadClick: 5 },
{ ...base, visit: 0, downloadClick: 0 }
);
expect(mover?.key).toBe("visit");
});
it("returns null when nothing moved", () => {
expect(pickMover({ ...base, visit: 3 }, { ...base, visit: 3 })).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("getWeeklyReport / renderWeeklyMarkdown", () => {
it("renders seven distinct stages with no merged-label or proxy caveats", async () => {
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "click", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH, method: "POST", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-1", "2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z");
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"Window: **2026-10-22 16:00:00 → 2026-10-29 16:00:00 UTC** (7 days)"
);
expect(markdown).toContain(`| visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views) | 1 | 0 | +1 |`);
expect(markdown).toContain("| download click | 1 | 0 | +1 |");
expect(markdown).toContain("| DMG served | 2 | 0 | +2 |");
expect(markdown).toContain("| checkout started (Stripe session) | 1 | 0 | +1 |");
const order = [
`visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views)`,
"download click",
"DMG served",
"trial started",
"checkout started (Stripe session)",
"purchase (licence issued)",
"activation"
];
for (let i = 1; i < order.length; i += 1) {
expect(markdown.indexOf(order[i - 1]!)).toBeLessThan(
markdown.indexOf(order[i]!)
);
}
// The caveats this issue retired stay retired.
expect(markdown).not.toContain("one label");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("not recorded");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("no host dimension");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("†");
expect(report.mover?.key).toBe("dmgServed");
expect(markdown).toContain("**DMG served: 0 → 2 (+2).**");
});
it("states what pre-instrumentation rows cannot say, computed from the window", async () => {
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// Legacy rows: no host, proxy's address, no stage label.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: null, ip_address: "127.0.0.1", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: null,
host: null,
ip_address: "127.0.0.1",
user_agent: "curl/8.7.1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"2 of 3 rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation"
);
expect(markdown).toContain("predate the click/served stage label");
// Legacy loopback is not "the fix is not live".
expect(markdown).not.toContain("still carry a loopback address");
});
it("flags loopback only when rows recorded since the instrumentation carry it", async () => {
// Both spellings a live writer can produce: the raw proxy address, and the
// /24 the privacy floor stores instead of it.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", ip_address: "127.0.0.1", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", ip_address: "127.0.53.0", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"2 rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry a loopback address"
);
});
it("says nothing moved rather than inventing a winner", async () => {
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(report.mover).toBeNull();
expect(markdown).toContain("_Nothing moved: every stage held its previous-week value._");
expect(markdown).toContain("_No tagged traffic in the window._");
});
it("rejects a window that is not a positive number of days", async () => {
await expect(getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 0 })).rejects.toThrow(
"days must be a positive number"
);
});
});

View File

@@ -1,647 +0,0 @@
/**
* The weekly funnel reading: `marketing/metrics/weekly.md`'s data half.
*
* The funnel the marketing cluster agreed on is
*
* visit → download click → DMG served → trial started → checkout started
* → purchase → activation
*
* and this module reads it from the two live databases, plus the campaign
* dimension the /analytics page already exposes through
* `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`.
*
* Two properties matter more than the numbers:
*
* - It takes both connections as arguments. `~/server/analytics` imports the
* full server env (Stripe keys, Apple secret, licence key …); the weekly
* job only needs the two databases, and must be runnable from a checkout
* whose `.env` carries nothing else. The SQL here is the same shape as the
* analytics summaries, so the weekly read and the dashboard cannot drift
* into different label sets.
* - Every stage is measured by its own label. FRE-366 gave the funnel that:
* the download door and the DMG file route record distinct `stage` values
* (`click` / `served`), a created Stripe checkout session records its own
* row, and every row carries the real client address and the host it
* addressed, so the visit stage scopes to the Nook. Rows that predate
* that instrumentation are stated next to the numbers, never silently
* counted (see `renderWeeklyMarkdown`).
*
* No `~/env`, no `~/server/database`: the caller owns the connections, the
* tests own an in-memory SQLite, and the script owns the libsql clients.
*/
import { DOWNLOAD_PATH_PREFIX } from "~/lib/download-asset";
import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL
} from "~/server/analytics-schema";
/** The one asset key the Nook lands under — `downloadPath("thenook")`. */
export const NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH = `${DOWNLOAD_PATH_PREFIX}thenook`;
/** The host the visit stage scopes to. Recorded per row since FRE-366. */
export const NOOK_HOST = "nook.freno.me";
/** The path a created Stripe checkout session records (FRE-366). */
export const NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH = "/api/the-nook/checkout";
/** An `execute`-shaped connection: the libsql client and the test adapter both fit. */
export interface MetricsConn {
execute(query: {
sql: string;
args?: any[];
}): Promise<{ rows: unknown[]; rowsAffected?: number }>;
}
export interface Connections {
/** freno.me Turso DB — VisitorAnalytics. */
analytics: MetricsConn;
/** the-nook Turso DB — trials, licenses, activations. */
nook: MetricsConn;
}
export type StageKey =
| "visit"
| "downloadClick"
| "dmgServed"
| "trial"
| "checkout"
| "purchase"
| "activation";
export interface StageDef {
key: StageKey;
label: string;
}
/**
* The seven agreed stages, each with its own label in the data:
* `downloadClick` and `dmgServed` split what used to be one merged download
* label (the `stage` column, FRE-366), and `checkout` reads created Stripe
* sessions instead of the /checkout page-view proxy.
*/
export const STAGES: StageDef[] = [
{ key: "visit", label: `visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views)` },
{ key: "downloadClick", label: "download click" },
{ key: "dmgServed", label: "DMG served" },
{ key: "trial", label: "trial started" },
{ key: "checkout", label: "checkout started (Stripe session)" },
{ key: "purchase", label: "purchase (licence issued)" },
{ key: "activation", label: "activation" }
];
export interface FunnelCounts {
visit: number;
downloadClick: number;
dmgServed: number;
trial: number;
checkout: number;
purchase: number;
activation: number;
}
export interface CampaignRow {
source: string | null;
medium: string | null;
campaign: string | null;
count: number;
}
/** Traffic-shape facts the report has to state next to the funnel. */
export interface WindowTraffic {
analyticsRows: number;
/** Rows carrying a host — written since the FRE-366 instrumentation. */
hostRows: number;
/** Rows with no host — pre-FRE-366; their address is the proxy's loopback. */
legacyRows: number;
/** Post-instrumentation rows still recording loopback: the fix is not live. */
hostLoopbackRows: number;
downloadRows: number;
downloadClickRows: number;
downloadServedRows: number;
/** Download rows with no stage label — they predate FRE-366 and cannot be split. */
downloadUnstagedRows: number;
downloadNonBrowserRows: number;
}
export interface Mover {
key: StageKey;
label: string;
now: number;
before: number;
delta: number;
}
export interface WeeklyReport {
window: { start: string; end: string; days: number };
previous: { start: string; end: string };
counts: FunnelCounts;
previousCounts: FunnelCounts;
campaigns: CampaignRow[];
taggedRows: number;
traffic: WindowTraffic;
mover: Mover | null;
generatedAt: string;
}
/**
* A recorded address that is not a visitor, in every spelling the column can
* hold: the proxy the request came through (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, an IPv4-mapped
* form) *and* the prefixes the FRE-369 privacy floor writes instead of them
* (`127.0.0.0`, all-zero IPv6). Whole `127/8` because truncation keeps the first
* three octets, so `127.0.53.1` and `127.0.53.0` are the same non-visitor.
*/
const LOOPBACK_SQL = `(ip_address LIKE '127.%'
OR ip_address LIKE '::ffff:127.%'
OR ip_address IN ('::1', '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1', '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0'))`;
/** SQLite's `datetime()` string, UTC: `YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS`. */
export function sqlTime(date: Date): string {
return date.toISOString().slice(0, 19).replace("T", " ");
}
export interface Windows {
current: { start: string; end: string };
previous: { start: string; end: string };
}
/**
* The current window is `[now - days, now)` and the previous one sits directly
* before it, so a weekly read always compares like with like. Boundaries are
* passed as SQL parameters rather than `datetime('now', …)` so the file a run
* writes is reproducible and the two queries cannot straddle a second.
*/
export function windowsFor(now: Date, days: number): Windows {
const span = days * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const end = now;
const start = new Date(end.getTime() - span);
const previousEnd = start;
const previousStart = new Date(previousEnd.getTime() - span);
return {
current: { start: sqlTime(start), end: sqlTime(end) },
previous: { start: sqlTime(previousStart), end: sqlTime(previousEnd) }
};
}
function toNumber(value: unknown): number {
if (typeof value === "number") return value;
if (typeof value === "bigint") return Number(value);
if (typeof value === "string") return Number(value) || 0;
return 0;
}
async function scalar(
conn: MetricsConn,
sql: string,
args: any[]
): Promise<number> {
const result = await conn.execute({ sql, args });
const row = result.rows[0] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (!row) return 0;
return toNumber(Object.values(row)[0]);
}
/**
* Bring the analytics table up to the schema the readers expect, through the
* same idempotent bootstrap path the app server uses (`analytics.ts`): the
* DDL is a no-op against the live table and each post-hoc column is ALTERed
* in only when absent. The weekly job runs against databases the app may not
* have migrated yet — a fresh checkout, a restored backup, or production
* before the next deploy — and must render its seven stages regardless.
*/
export async function ensureAnalyticsSchema(conn: MetricsConn): Promise<void> {
await conn.execute({ sql: VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL });
const info = await conn.execute({
sql: `PRAGMA table_info(VisitorAnalytics)`
});
const present = new Set(info.rows.map((row) => String((row as any).name)));
for (const column of VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS) {
if (!present.has(column.name)) {
await conn.execute({ sql: column.ddl });
}
}
}
async function countInWindow(
conn: MetricsConn,
sql: string,
start: string,
end: string
): Promise<number> {
return scalar(conn, sql, [start, end]);
}
/** One window's funnel. Two databases, one call. */
export async function readFunnel(
conns: Connections,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<FunnelCounts> {
const { analytics, nook } = conns;
const { start, end } = window;
// Scoped to the Nook host (FRE-366): before the host column existed, a
// page view of `/` on nook.freno.me was the same row as freno.me's root.
// Pre-instrumentation rows carry no host and are excluded — the traffic
// section states how many.
const visit = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path NOT LIKE '/api/%'
AND host = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_HOST]
);
const downloadClick = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ? AND stage = 'click'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const dmgServed = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ? AND stage = 'served'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
// Created Stripe checkout sessions, recorded by the checkout route itself
// (FRE-366) — not the /checkout page view that used to proxy for them.
const checkout = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH]
);
// The licence DB stores ISO-8601 (`2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z`); the analytics
// DB stores `YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS`. `datetime()` normalises both sides so a
// boundary seconds apart cannot include or drop a row on string comparison.
const trial = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM trials
WHERE datetime(started_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(started_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
const purchase = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM licenses
WHERE datetime(created_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(created_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
const activation = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM activations
WHERE datetime(activated_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(activated_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
return {
visit,
downloadClick,
dmgServed,
trial,
checkout,
purchase,
activation
};
}
/**
* Traffic shape for one window: how much of it predates the FRE-366
* instrumentation (no host, proxy's address), whether rows recorded since
* still see loopback (which would mean the forwarded-header fix is not
* live), and how the download label splits. Without these facts the numbers
* read as demand, which they are not.
*/
export async function readTraffic(
conns: Connections,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<WindowTraffic> {
const { analytics } = conns;
const { start, end } = window;
const analyticsRows = await countInWindow(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?`,
start,
end
);
const hostRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NOT NULL`,
[start, end]
);
const legacyRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NULL`,
[start, end]
);
const hostLoopbackRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NOT NULL
AND ${LOOPBACK_SQL}`,
[start, end]
);
const downloadRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadClickRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage = 'click'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadServedRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage = 'served'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadUnstagedRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage IS NULL`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
// Anything whose UA is not a browser engine: curl, Sparkle's updater,
// link-preview crawlers. A real install click arrives as `Mozilla/5.0 …`.
const downloadNonBrowserRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ?
AND (user_agent IS NULL OR user_agent NOT LIKE 'Mozilla/%')`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
return {
analyticsRows,
hostRows,
legacyRows,
hostLoopbackRows,
downloadRows,
downloadClickRows,
downloadServedRows,
downloadUnstagedRows,
downloadNonBrowserRows
};
}
/**
* The campaign dimension, grouped exactly as `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`
* groups it: top 10 by volume, untagged rows excluded (the untagged bucket is
* a different question and would otherwise swallow the list).
*/
export async function readCampaigns(
analytics: MetricsConn,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<CampaignRow[]> {
const result = await analytics.execute({
sql: `SELECT utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, COUNT(*) AS count
FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND (utm_source IS NOT NULL OR utm_medium IS NOT NULL OR utm_campaign IS NOT NULL)
GROUP BY utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign
ORDER BY count DESC
LIMIT 10`,
args: [window.start, window.end]
});
return result.rows.map((raw) => {
const row = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
return {
source: (row.utm_source as string | null) ?? null,
medium: (row.utm_medium as string | null) ?? null,
campaign: (row.utm_campaign as string | null) ?? null,
count: toNumber(row.count)
};
});
}
/**
* "The one thing that moved": the stage with the largest absolute change
* against the previous window. Ties go to the earlier stage, so a week when
* nothing moved returns null rather than a made-up winner.
*/
export function pickMover(
current: FunnelCounts,
previous: FunnelCounts
): Mover | null {
let best: Mover | null = null;
for (const stage of STAGES) {
const delta = current[stage.key] - previous[stage.key];
if (delta === 0) continue;
if (!best || Math.abs(delta) > Math.abs(best.delta)) {
best = {
key: stage.key,
label: stage.label,
now: current[stage.key],
before: previous[stage.key],
delta
};
}
}
return best;
}
export interface ReportOptions {
/** End of the current window; defaults to the wall clock. */
now?: Date;
/** Window length in days; defaults to 7. */
days?: number;
}
/** Read everything `.md` needs, in one call. */
export async function getWeeklyReport(
conns: Connections,
options: ReportOptions = {}
): Promise<WeeklyReport> {
const days = options.days ?? 7;
if (!Number.isFinite(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(`days must be a positive number, got ${days}`);
}
const now = options.now ?? new Date();
const windows = windowsFor(now, days);
const [counts, previousCounts, traffic, campaigns] = await Promise.all([
readFunnel(conns, windows.current),
readFunnel(conns, windows.previous),
readTraffic(conns, windows.current),
readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windows.current)
]);
return {
window: { ...windows.current, days },
previous: windows.previous,
counts,
previousCounts,
campaigns,
taggedRows: campaigns.reduce((sum, row) => sum + row.count, 0),
traffic,
mover: pickMover(counts, previousCounts),
generatedAt: now.toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, "Z")
};
}
function cell(value: string | null): string {
return value === null || value === "" ? "—" : value;
}
function signed(value: number): string {
if (value === 0) return "0";
return value > 0 ? `+${value}` : `−${Math.abs(value)}`;
}
/**
* Render the weekly file. Interpretation lives in the CMO's read; this renderer
* only states what the data is, what moved, and what the numbers cannot say.
* The Gaps section is not boilerplate: each bullet is computed from the window
* it describes, so it empties itself if the underlying hole is ever fixed.
*/
export function renderWeeklyMarkdown(report: WeeklyReport): string {
const { counts, previousCounts, traffic } = report;
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push("# Weekly funnel snapshot");
lines.push("");
lines.push(
`Window: **${report.window.start} → ${report.window.end} UTC** (${report.window.days} days). ` +
`Previous: ${report.previous.start} → ${report.previous.end} UTC.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push(
"Generated by `bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts`; regenerated " +
"weekly, never hand-edited. The analysis is the CMO's."
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Funnel");
lines.push("");
lines.push("| Stage | This week | Last week | Change |");
lines.push("|---|---:|---:|---:|");
for (const stage of STAGES) {
const now = counts[stage.key];
const before = previousCounts[stage.key];
lines.push(`| ${stage.label} | ${now} | ${before} | ${signed(now - before)} |`);
}
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Campaigns");
lines.push("");
if (report.campaigns.length === 0) {
lines.push("_No tagged traffic in the window._");
} else {
lines.push(
"Top 10 by volume, untagged excluded — the same grouping " +
"`getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns` returns."
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("| Source | Medium | Campaign | Rows |");
lines.push("|---|---|---|---:|");
for (const row of report.campaigns) {
lines.push(
`| ${cell(row.source)} | ${cell(row.medium)} | ${cell(row.campaign)} | ${row.count} |`
);
}
}
lines.push("");
lines.push(
`${report.taggedRows} of ${traffic.analyticsRows} rows in the window carry ` +
`campaign tags; the rest are untagged and therefore unattributed.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## The one thing that moved");
lines.push("");
if (!report.mover) {
lines.push("_Nothing moved: every stage held its previous-week value._");
} else {
const mover = report.mover;
lines.push(
`**${mover.label}: ${mover.before} → ${mover.now} (${signed(mover.delta)}).**`
);
}
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Before acting on these numbers");
lines.push("");
if (traffic.legacyRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **${traffic.legacyRows} of ${traffic.analyticsRows} rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation.** ` +
`They carry no host, and their recorded address is the production proxy's loopback ` +
`(127.0.0.1 / ::1) — the writers then recorded the direct peer, not the visitor. ` +
`They are excluded from every host-scoped stage above (visits, and the download ` +
`click/served split), and "unique visitors" over them still collapses to one host. ` +
`Rows recorded since carry the site they addressed and the visitor's address ` +
`truncated to a prefix (/24, or /56 for IPv6 — the FRE-369 privacy floor), so ` +
`"unique visitors" counts networks, not machines.`
);
}
if (traffic.hostLoopbackRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **${traffic.hostLoopbackRows} rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry a ` +
`loopback address** — the forwarded-header fix is not taking effect in production ` +
`(no \`cf-connecting-ip\`, and no usable \`x-forwarded-for\` hop). Do not trust ` +
`per-channel reach until this is zero.`
);
}
if (traffic.downloadRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **Download rows are automation-heavy.** Of this window's ${traffic.downloadRows} ` +
`download rows, ${traffic.downloadClickRows} are clicks and ` +
`${traffic.downloadServedRows} are served files` +
(traffic.downloadUnstagedRows > 0
? `; the remaining ${traffic.downloadUnstagedRows} predate the click/served stage ` +
`label and cannot be split, so they count in neither stage`
: "") +
`. ${traffic.downloadNonBrowserRows} of all ${traffic.downloadRows} are not browser ` +
`user agents (curl, Sparkle, link-preview crawlers).`
);
}
lines.push(
`- **No conversion rate before the cohort matures.** Trial→paid belongs to the mature ` +
`Day 28–35 read (FRE-197); a ratio from a partial cohort is not a metric.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Sources");
lines.push("");
lines.push("- `VisitorAnalytics` (freno.me Turso DB) — visits, downloads, campaigns.");
lines.push("- `trials`, `licenses`, `activations` (the-nook Turso DB) — the paid funnel.");
lines.push(`- Generated ${report.generatedAt}.`);
lines.push("");
return lines.join("\n");
}

View File

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
}
],
"crons": [
{ "path": "/api/analytics-retention", "schedule": "0 12 * * *" },
{ "path": "/api/the-nook/lifecycle", "schedule": "0 13 * * *" }
]
}