18 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
a0e6ff1044 Merge pull request 'security: stop trusting the leftmost x-forwarded-for for rate limits and abuse quotas (FRE-371)' (#1) from agent-security-engineer/freno-dev:freno-dev/FRE-371-trusted-client-ip-clean into master
Reviewed-on: #1
2026-11-04 10:58:26 -05:00
6fd0f84806 Merge pull request 'analytics: make each weekly funnel stage separately measurable (FRE-366)' (#2) from agent-code-review/freno-dev:freno-dev/FRE-366-funnel-stages into master
Reviewed-on: #2
2026-11-04 10:58:19 -05:00
c7071b0e32 Merge pull request 'metrics: stand up the weekly funnel job (FRE-202)' (#3) from agent-cto/freno-dev:freno-dev/FRE-202-weekly-metrics into master
Reviewed-on: #3
2026-11-04 10:58:12 -05:00
7fde259e0b Merge pull request 'site: state the agent count as eighteen (FRE-997, count half)' (#5) from freno-dev/FRE-997-count-18 into master
Reviewed-on: #5
2026-11-04 10:57:54 -05:00
25ec84ceb4 site: state the agent count as eighteen (FRE-997, count half)
FRE-359 verdict B dropped the agent count instead of correcting it: the page
said thirteen while `AgentSpec.all` held eighteen, and the /agents table listed
13 of those rows. The count is a fact, not a claim, so this states it and makes
the table match the registry again.

- Landing island bullet and the marquee chip say 18 agents.
- /agents: title/description/ogTitle/H1 at eighteen, and the five missing rows
  are on the page — Kimi, GitHub Copilot CLI, Crush, Cursor, Amp — with events
  and gating taken from hook/setup.go, hook/normalize.go,
  hook/normalize_hosts.go, Sources/NookCore/Agents/HookConfigInstaller.swift
  and plugins/amp/index.ts. All five are Observe (kimi/copilot PreToolUse and
  PermissionRequest fire before the host's own check; Crush documents one
  event; a silent Cursor permission hook blocks; Amp's plugin API has no
  permission-wait event).
- agents.test.ts asserts the roster as an equality with the 18-name registry
  in registry order again, plus the count, instead of a subset check.
- remote-claims.test.ts keeps every FRE-323 remote removal guard and the parked
  copy, and drops only the two completeness bans the corrected count
  contradicts ("every coding agent", "Supported agents") — the ban existed
  because the page claimed the set and listed 13 of 18.
- positioning.md: the coverage row is publishable at 18.

This is the count/roster half of FRE-997 only. The remote-SSH restore is held
by the Chief of Staff against FRE-346 §3 and is not in this commit: no remote
tile, breakdown, demo, chip, /agents remote paragraph or drafts deletion here.

Gate: `bun test src/routes/nook` 18 pass / 0 fail; `bun run build` succeeds.
2026-11-04 00:21:35 +00:00
dd368d21e7 smarter-remote: publish the app's privacy policy and terms of use
A Smarter Remote's iOS paywall sells an auto-renewing subscription, and
App Review 3.1.2 requires it to link a privacy policy and terms of use.
No such pages existed. They now live on the main site at
/smarter-remote/privacy and /smarter-remote/terms, so no new subdomain
or DNS change is needed. The policy describes what the app actually
does: local-network control, pairing data kept on the phone, purchases
through Apple and RevenueCat, and QR sharing phone to phone.

Tests: bun test shows the same 52 pre-existing failures with and
without the pages; tsc reports nothing in the new files.

TVR-19

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 15:34:18 -05:00
2fd2a4a71a security: stop trusting the leftmost x-forwarded-for for rate limits and abuse quotas (FRE-371)
getClientIP (the rate-limit and audit key) took the LEFTMOST x-forwarded-for
hop and read x-real-ip unconditionally. In our topology — client → Cloudflare
→ same-host origin proxy → app — both proxies APPEND, so the leftmost hop is
whatever the sender typed: a rotating X-Forwarded-For minted a fresh rate-limit
bucket per request, and unlimited bug-report quota via the same pattern in
routes/api/the-nook/report.ts. x-real-ip is client-settable too; nothing in
the chain overwrites it. It is no longer read at all.

New trust order (src/server/trusted-client-ip.ts, resolveTrustedClientIp):

  1. a non-loopback socket peer IS the client — its headers are ignored;
  2. cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge; parsed as an
     address or rejected);
  3. x-forwarded-for counted from the RIGHT, discounting one hop for the
     Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended (the topology has
     exactly one trusted proxy below Cloudflare);
  4. "unknown" — callers key stricter shared limits on it, so resolution
     fails closed toward a tighter bucket, never a looser one.

Addresses are never truncated: a /24-truncated key would pool attackers with
the innocents behind them.

Share-vs-copy, stated deliberately: this is a port of the parsing primitives
 FRE-366 reviewed in request-client.ts, NOT an import. resolveClientIp carries
a standing rule (1d9287a) that it never feeds a security decision; lifting
that rule for these callers would couple an access-control change to an
analytics branch under review, and the analytics helper only exposes
truncated prefixes while rate limiting needs the full address. If the two
drift, trusted-client-ip.ts is the one security paths follow. The deploy-side
precondition (origin reachable only via Cloudflare + the same-host proxy) is
documented in the file header; if the app is ever directly internet-reachable
no in-app read can recover the true client.

Tests updated deliberately, not to go green: rate-limit.test.ts now pins the
rightmost-minus-one order, cf-connecting-ip precedence, peer-over-headers,
x-real-ip rejection, and the spoof case (a rotating leftmost hop does not
change the resolved client); report.test.ts pins the quota key stability
under a rotating header. New trusted-client-ip.test.ts covers the helper's
own edges: APIEvent wrapper, loopback forms, unparseable hops failing closed.
2026-10-30 05:06:54 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
1d9287a199 analytics: fix the two FRE-369 findings in the funnel instrumentation
The security review of 39d874a (FRE-369) found the address fix recorded
the wrong thing twice. Both are fixed here; the branch is the same one
under review, this commit does not rewrite it.

Q1 — the first x-forwarded-for hop is attacker-chosen text. In
client → Cloudflare → same-host proxy → app, both proxies *append*, so
the header arrives as `<client spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and
`split(",")[0]` took the sender's own invention — the loopback-peer gate
was sound, the hop selection defeated it. Preference is now
`cf-connecting-ip` (Cloudflare overwrites it, so a client value never
survives the edge), then x-forwarded-for counted from the right with one
trusted hop discounted, then the direct peer. Every candidate must parse
as an address. h3's `getRequestIP(…, { xForwardedFor: true })` has the
same leftmost flaw and is documented as not a fix.

Q4 — the table held full client addresses indefinitely. Every analytics
entry now passes through `truncateIpAddress` in `enrichAnalyticsEntry`
(IPv4 /24, IPv6 /56, unparseable dropped), so no writer can persist a
full address by accident. Retention got the schedule it never had:
`/api/analytics/retention` on a daily Vercel cron, Bearer-authenticated
and fail-closed, with the window parameterised (the old
`cleanupOldAnalytics` spliced the number into the SQL). Default 365 days
rather than the review's 90 so enabling the cron is not itself a
destructive event — the tighter window is an operational decision, named
on the task.

Also from the review: the module doc now forbids feeding this helper into
any security decision; `isLoopbackAddress` parses instead of
string-matching (`::ffff:127.9.9.9`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`); and `host` is
normalised (lowercased, port stripped) so `nook.freno.me:443` cannot
silently miss the `host = ?` scope. The weekly loopback caveat matches
the truncated shapes writers produce now, and says plainly that "unique
visitors" counts prefixes.
2026-10-29 18:05:44 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
39d874a7e2 analytics: make each weekly funnel stage separately measurable (FRE-366)
Gap 1 — click and served share one label: trackDownload now takes a
stage ("click" | "served") carried on a new VisitorAnalytics.stage
column; the Nook door and the tRPC proxy record clicks, the DMG file
route records served. summariseDownloads() and the /analytics downloads
block are untouched — the stage is a separate column, so the path
grouping cannot change.

Gap 2 — checkout start records nothing: the checkout route records a
created Stripe session through the shared trackRequest writer (same
referrer, campaign, country dimensions as every door) under its own
path, and STAGES.checkout reads it instead of the /checkout page proxy.

Gap 3 — loopback addresses, no host dimension: every writer now
resolves the client address through resolveClientIp, which trusts
x-forwarded-for only when the direct peer is the loopback production
proxy (trust boundary stated in request-client.ts), and records the
host on each row through the same site-context extractor routing uses.
stage and host reach the table through VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS;
the weekly job applies the same bootstrap before reading so it renders
seven stages against a database no deploy has migrated yet.

The weekly read splits downloadClick/dmgServed, scopes visits to
nook.freno.me, and computes its caveats from the window: pre-instrumentation
rows are stated and excluded, and the loopback warning now fires only
when rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry it.
2026-10-29 17:02:39 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
89f56fc78a metrics: stand up the weekly funnel job (FRE-202)
`marketing/metrics/weekly.md` has been a placeholder since the marketing tree
landed — it promised a funnel and the one thing that moved, and nothing
produced it. This adds the producer: one command reads the live databases and
rewrites the file.

`scripts/weekly-metrics.ts` writes `marketing/metrics/weekly.md` from
`VisitorAnalytics` (visits, downloads, campaigns) and the-nook's `trials`,
`licenses`, `activations` (the paid funnel). It needs four env vars —
TURSO_DB_URL/TOKEN and NOOK_DB_URL/TOKEN — and imports no server env, so the
job runs from a checkout that has no Stripe or Apple secrets.
`src/server/weekly-metrics.ts` holds the queries and the renderer, taking both
connections as arguments; the tests run them against an in-memory SQLite shaped
like production, the same way the backfill suite does.

The campaign breakdown groups exactly as `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`
does (top 10, untagged excluded), so the weekly read and /analytics cannot
drift into different label sets.

The first real report says more about the instrumentation than about demand,
and the renderer computes that rather than asserting it:

- every addressed row the table has ever held (12,035 of 12,048) is loopback,
  so "unique visitors" is one host and per-channel reach cannot be read;
- the landing door and the file route both write `/api/downloads/thenook`, so
  "download click" and "DMG served" are one label — one served click writes two
  rows, a failed click one, a Sparkle update one;
- `POST /api/the-nook/checkout` records nothing, so checkout start is only a
  page-view proxy;
- `VisitorAnalytics` has no host dimension, so the Nook's `/` is freno.me's `/`.

Those three gaps are reported beside the numbers, not papered over. Week 0
(2026-10-22 → 2026-10-29): visit 61, download 156, trial 2, checkout 0,
purchase 0, activation 0 — and the one thing that moved is the download stage,
0 → 156, because the label was introduced that week.

Tests: `bun test src/server/weekly-metrics.test.ts` — 12 pass, 0 fail. The full
suite's 15 failures are pre-existing: this checkout's .env lacks
NOOK_LICENSE_PRIVATE_KEY, NOOK_STRIPE_SK/WEBHOOK/PRICE and LINEAGE_JWT_SECRET,
and every failure is that env validation.

Scripts/ is gitignored, so `scripts/weekly-metrics.ts` was added with `-f`, the
way the existing tracked scripts are.

FRE-202
2026-10-29 15:58:51 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
d44133fcb3 site: guard the removed remote claim and agent count against return (FRE-323, FRE-359) 2026-10-29 14:38:31 +00:00
Freno CMO
578ee58f9c marketing: the remote correction is committed, not deployed
copy.md said the sentences were "removed from the live site" and
rationale.md said "the landing page now says only what the product can back
today". Neither is true: nook.freno.me still serves all of them (HTTP 200,
re-fetched 2026-10-29T14:20Z) because the push is blocked on a write
credential (card 82d1e1b7). Both files now say committed-not-deployed, and
positioning.md's excluded-count row records FRE-359 verdict B and where the
count was removed.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-29 14:22:12 +00:00
Freno CMO
d2c2e6a4ee agents: drop the count and the coverage claim (FRE-359 verdict B)
FRE-359's verdict is B: the page's thirteen is the registry's first thirteen
of eighteen rows, so the count, "every coding agent The Nook supports" and
"Supported agents" all overstate or understate the app. The permitted
sentences are the CTO's, verbatim.

- agents.tsx: head description, ogTitle and H1 paragraph replaced with the
  verdict's sentences; title/H1 "Supported agents" -> "Agent coverage".
- agents.test.ts: the stale NOOK-336 guard asserted "all thirteen" and
  the 13-name roster, so it passed in lockstep with the page. It now asserts
  no count of any form, no completeness phrase, and that the rows are a
  subset of the 18-name registry list (copied 2026-10-29, @ f4258034) in
  registry order. The table still lists 13 rows; regenerating it from the
  registry is its own ticket, and the guard no longer pretends otherwise.
- FeatureBreakdowns.tsx / IslandExtras.tsx: the landing "13 agents:" bullet
  and the "13 agents" marquee chip lose the count; the chip becomes
  "Agents wired in".

bun test src/routes/nook/agents.test.ts: 4 pass. Server security and appcast
suites fail in this checkout on missing env (Environment validation failed /
mainDBConnection), unrelated to these files.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-29 14:22:11 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
c718370674 /agents: take the remote-session sentence off the page
FRE-323 removed the remote claim from the landing page and missed the second
page that carries it. /agents said 'Agents can run on this Mac or on remote
machines over SSH — remote sessions report into the same grid', which is the
same unverified claim (FRE-315 §1, FRE-320), in front of the same launch
traffic. Removed; the paragraph now ends at 'the agent keeps its own prompting'.

Not deployed: same read-only credential as c1c498e.
2026-10-29 10:20:13 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
210a7e6e75 marketing: reconcile positioning.md with the CTO verdicts and the price decision
The source-of-truth file still sold claims the board has since ruled on:

- 'thirteen agents' as a public coverage count — FRE-322 §1 counts 18 specs,
  9 of which can raise an approval card; no count is publishable (FRE-203 plan-b).
- 'Price rises to 5 at 1.0' — withdrawn by the Chief of Staff on 2026-10-29
  04:01; price stays $10 and is not a launch asset.
- 'macOS 14+' — the app cannot start below 14.2 (881190d, site 134f41e).
- Approved-claims table carried no launch sentence at all, and no row for the
  remote-SSH hold or the banned absolute privacy sentences.
- Pointed at the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md, which no longer exists.

Now: the Plan B claim set, a per-claim status table with verdict pointers,
FRE-354's corrections to the hook/bridge sentence and the Sentry disclosure,
the iPhone TestFlight state, and an explicit excluded/banned list.
2026-10-29 10:19:14 +00:00
Paperclip Agent
c1c498e37f site: remove the unproven remote claim from the Nook landing page
FRE-323. The one-click remote install is app-UI-only and needs hand-edited ~/.ssh/config plus a one-time ssh-copy-id (FRE-320); FRE-315 and FRE-322 hold the claim unverified and demo-gated.

- drop the Remote tile and its mock from the feature collage
- drop the "Any SSH box, one click away" breakdown, its demo and bullets
- drop "Works across every hooked agent, local or remote"
- drop the "One-click SSH setup" chip
- move the copy to marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/ and mark remote held in marketing/positioning.md

No replacement claim was added. Deploy waits on a push credential for the GitHub repo Vercel builds.
2026-10-29 05:55:26 +00:00
134f41eac4 Merge branch 'NOOK-881' — the landing page, FAQ and downloads list said macOS 14, but the app cannot start below 14.2: a CoreAudio overlay symbol its mixer uses only exists from 14.2, and the old bundle floor let LaunchServices launch it on machines that could never run it. The FAQ now names the audio tap API rather than the observation framework, and the downloads list's 14.6+ becomes 14.2+. InputHalo and Gaze keep their own floors. 2026-10-23 13:28:47 -04:00
881190d1d4 nook: say macOS 14.2, which is what the app actually needs
The landing page, the FAQ and the downloads list still promised macOS 14. The
app cannot start there: dyld refuses it on 14.0 and 14.1 because a
CoreAudio overlay symbol its mixer uses only exists from 14.2, and the old
floor in its bundle had LaunchServices launching it on machines that could
never run it (NOOK-881).

The FAQ answer named the observation framework as the reason for 14; the
binding reason is the per-app audio tap API, which Apple shipped in 14.2. The
downloads list said 14.6+, which was already stricter than the truth.

InputHalo and Gaze still read 14.6+; their floors are their own and this
change leaves them alone.

Tests: bun test src/routes/nook (2 pass); bunx tsc --noEmit reports nothing in
the three files changed (the checkout's 286 pre-existing errors are elsewhere).

NOOK-881
2026-10-23 13:28:45 -04:00
47 changed files with 3724 additions and 329 deletions

View File

@@ -22,3 +22,12 @@ a human reviews and moves it to `approved/` → the human publishes from `approv
under their own account → the artifact (or a pointer) lands in `posted/`.
Nothing in `drafts/` or `pending/` is ever publishable, by anyone, by any means.
## The weekly read
`bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts` (or `bun run metrics:weekly`)
rewrites `metrics/weekly.md` from the live databases: the staged funnel, the
campaign breakdown (`getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`' grouping), and the one
stage that moved. It needs `TURSO_DB_URL`, `TURSO_DB_TOKEN`, `NOOK_DB_URL` and
`NOOK_DB_TOKEN` — no other production secret. The file is generated; never
hand-edit it. The numbers are engineering's; the interpretation is the CMO's.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
# Remote SSH copy — HELD, do not publish
**Status:** removed from the `freno-dev` source on 2026-10-29 in the FRE-323
correction, and **not yet off the live site** — the deploy is blocked on a write
credential to `mikefreno/freno-dev` (card `82d1e1b7`). `nook.freno.me` still
serves every sentence below until that push or a Vercel deploy lands.
**Owner:** CMO. **Verified by:** CTO, on the FRE-320/FRE-205 work.
**Restore only when:** FRE-320/FRE-205 ship a genuinely one-click install, the CTO
verifies that flow, and a recording shows a remote agent joining the island.
Until then this file is the only home for these sentences.
## What was removed
### 1. Landing collage tile
Source: `src/components/nook/FeatureCollage.tsx` (removed 2026-10-29).
```
kicker: Remote
title: Agents on other machines
body: Run agents on Linux boxes and SSH servers — one click installs the
nook-hook, and their sessions join the same island.
```
The mock attached to it showed two session rows whose agent chips named
`build-box` and `gpu-rig`.
### 2. Landing feature breakdown section
Source: `src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx` (removed 2026-10-29).
```
kicker: Remote
title: Any SSH box, one click away
body: Pick a host from your ssh config or your tailnet and click once — the
nook-hook installs itself and its agents appear beside your local ones,
indistinguishable.
bullets:
- One click: connect, push the hook, configure agents, check it can reach this Mac
- Hosts mirror this Mac's installed integrations automatically
- Remote sessions are ordinary rows; the agent chip names the machine
```
The section's demo animated a `gpu-rig` host moving from "Not set up" through
`connecting` → `pushing the hook binary` → `configuring agents` → `checking the
host can reach this Mac` → `Live`, then showed a remote session row.
### 3. Approvals bullet
Source: `src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx` (removed 2026-10-29).
```
- Works across every hooked agent, local or remote
```
### 4. Feature chip
Source: `src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx` (removed 2026-10-29).
```
One-click SSH setup
```
## What replaced it
Nothing. The Remote tile and section were removed rather than replaced; the
existing Approvals cell already carries the verified local claim:
> Approve an agent's tool call from your Mac's notch, and the agent carries on.
## Restore checklist
1. FRE-320/FRE-205 have shipped the one-click install and removed the
`~/.ssh/config` / `ssh-copy-id` friction described in FRE-320.
2. The CTO has verified the shipping flow and the evidence is on FRE-320.
3. A recording exists showing a remote agent joining the island.
4. CMO restores the copy above, then owns the launch plan for it — with an
owner and date per item — before anything goes back on the site.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# Why the remote claim is parked
The site was selling a setup path a buyer does not get.
FRE-320 measured today's actual path (2026-10-29): the one-click flow is
app-UI-only, needs a hand-edited `~/.ssh/config` for any host not already in ssh
config or on the tailnet, needs a one-time `ssh-copy-id` because the app runs ssh
with `BatchMode=yes`, and has no manual fallback for minting the per-host
credential. FRE-315 and FRE-322 §3 correction 4 marked the remote claim
unverified and demo-gated. The CTO named it the largest launch risk because it
was already in front of buyers.
So the `freno-dev` source now says only what the product can back today: local
agents, the card, and the notch. That correction is committed locally and is
**not deployed** — the live page still carries the remote sentences until the
push in FRE-323 card `82d1e1b7` lands. The remote story is not deleted — it is
parked here with the FRE-320/FRE-205 work so it can return the day the one-click
install ships and is recorded.
## What has to be true before it returns
| Requirement | Owner | Date |
|---|---|---|
| One-click install ships without hand-edited `~/.ssh/config` or `ssh-copy-id` | FRE-320/FRE-205 engineering | When FRE-320/FRE-205 ships |
| CTO verifies the shipping flow and records the evidence on FRE-320 | CTO | Same day, before any copy moves |
| A recording shows a remote agent joining the island | Sponsor/CMO | Before restore |
| Restore copy and rebuild the launch plan with an owner + date per item | CMO | Day the three rows above are true |
Nothing in this folder is publishable. `marketing/approved/` remains the only
place a human publishes from.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,43 @@
# Weekly funnel snapshot
Generated weekly from the analytics DB + `trials`/`licenses`/`activations`.
Format: the funnel numbers, what moved, and the one thing worth acting on.
Window: **2026-10-22 18:05:00 → 2026-10-29 18:05:00 UTC** (7 days). Previous: 2026-10-15 18:05:00 → 2026-10-22 18:05:00 UTC.
Generated by `bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts`; regenerated weekly, never hand-edited. The analysis is the CMO's.
## Funnel
| Stage | This week | Last week | Change |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| visit (nook.freno.me page views) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| download click | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DMG served | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| trial started | 2 | 0 | +2 |
| checkout started (Stripe session) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| purchase (licence issued) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| activation | 0 | 0 | 0 |
## Campaigns
Top 10 by volume, untagged excluded — the same grouping `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns` returns.
| Source | Medium | Campaign | Rows |
|---|---|---|---:|
| x | — | — | 1 |
1 of 291 rows in the window carry campaign tags; the rest are untagged and therefore unattributed.
## The one thing that moved
**trial started: 0 → 2 (+2).**
## Before acting on these numbers
- **291 of 291 rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation.** They carry no host, and their recorded address is the production proxy's loopback (127.0.0.1 / ::1) — the writers then recorded the direct peer, not the visitor. They are excluded from every host-scoped stage above (visits, and the download click/served split), and "unique visitors" over them still collapses to one host. Rows recorded since carry the site they addressed and the visitor's address truncated to a prefix (/24, or /56 for IPv6 — the FRE-369 privacy floor), so "unique visitors" counts networks, not machines.
- **Download rows are automation-heavy.** Of this window's 137 download rows, 0 are clicks and 0 are served files; the remaining 137 predate the click/served stage label and cannot be split, so they count in neither stage. 112 of all 137 are not browser user agents (curl, Sparkle, link-preview crawlers).
- **No conversion rate before the cohort matures.** Trial→paid belongs to the mature Day 28–35 read (FRE-197); a ratio from a partial cohort is not a metric.
## Sources
- `VisitorAnalytics` (freno.me Turso DB) — visits, downloads, campaigns.
- `trials`, `licenses`, `activations` (the-nook Turso DB) — the paid funnel.
- Generated 2026-10-29T18:05:00Z.

View File

@@ -4,13 +4,39 @@ Every drafted asset draws its voice, claims, and constraints from this file. If
artifact invents its own framing, fix the artifact or fix this file — never both
silently diverging.
Primary source: `~/Code/the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md`.
**Reconciled 2026-10-29**, and again **2026-11-03** for the FRE-997 count
correction, against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322], [FRE-354],
[FRE-997]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
launch route ([FRE-346] → [FRE-203] `plan-b`), and `The-Nook` master (app floor is
**14.2**, not 14.0 — `freno-dev` `881190d`, site merge `134f41e`). The previous
version of this file named an upstream `the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md` that
no longer exists; the verdicts below are the source of truth it was pointing at.
[FRE-315]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-315
[FRE-322]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-322
[FRE-354]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-354
[FRE-320]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-320
[FRE-346]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-346
[FRE-203]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-203
[FRE-997]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-997
## The sentence
> **Your Mac and your agents, under control.** The Nook puts your whole coding-agent
> fleet in the notch — thirteen agents, local or over SSH — so you see what is running,
> unblock it in one tap, and keep the machine from overheating while it works.
There is no single approved public sentence yet, and saying otherwise is the one
mistake this file exists to prevent. What exists is a **launch claim set** — two
sentences, both from one 15-second take, recorded as the chosen route by the Chief
of Staff on 2026-10-29 ([FRE-346] `decision` §2–§4):
| Slot | Exact sentence | Status today |
|---|---|---|
| Launch line | **"Every agent you're running reports into one notch, and the one waiting on you pins above the rest."** | Verified by code ([FRE-322] §3). Needs the one-Mac take before it is publishable. |
| Second line, same take | **"Approve an agent's tool call from your Mac's notch, and the agent carries on."** | Needs the demo ([FRE-322] §1). The same take settles it. |
Working line for internal writing, not for publication:
> **Your Mac and your agents, under control.** One notch for the whole fleet: you
> see what is running, you unblock what is waiting, and the machine stays cool
> while it works.
## The wedge
@@ -22,15 +48,18 @@ The thing to say over and over, in every channel, in slightly different words:
It is acute, quantifiable, and true — and it is the demo: a card appears, you tap
Allow, work resumes. Ten seconds, no explanation needed.
## The bundling reframe
## The consolidation reframe
Three audiences (agent herders, hardware tinkerers, glanceable-widget users) in one
$10 app reads like a grab bag. Reframe as consolidation, which is the honest story:
app reads like a grab bag. Reframe as consolidation, which is the honest story:
> One $10 app instead of a notch toy, a fan utility, a battery limiter, a menu-bar
> stats strip, and a notification hack. Same one-time purchase, no subscription.
> One app instead of a notch toy, a fan utility, a battery limiter, a menu-bar stats
> strip, and a notification hack. One purchase, no subscription.
Price rises to $15 at 1.0 — dated and honest, not a permanent beta.
**No price, no discount and no future price in copy.** The price is $10, it stays
$10, and the dated rise to $15 is withdrawn (Chief of Staff, 2026-10-29 04:01). A
price change is a Chief of Staff + sponsor call; it is never a marketing decision
and never a launch asset.
## Hard rules
@@ -48,24 +77,49 @@ pages, marketing copy, comparison tables, meta descriptions, emails, FAQs, all o
community replies written by a human, where quoting what a user said about another
tool is normal conversation.
### 2. A claim requires a test to exist
### 2. A claim needs a verdict, not just a test
Copy that says "13 agents" or "no data leaves the device" must have a test backing it.
If a claim cannot be pointed at code or a test, it does not go in copy.
Copy that says "every agent", "13 agents", "no data leaves the device" must point at
both a test **and** a CTO verdict naming the exact sentence. A passing test is not a
verdict; a verdict is not a recording. If a sentence cannot be traced to a row in the
tables below, it does not go in copy.
### 3. Honest privacy scoping
Telemetry and the trial email **do** leave the device. The defensible claim is:
Telemetry and the licence check **do** leave the device: Sentry runs on **every
launch, unconditionally** (with the Mac's IP address via `sendDefaultPii`), and the
trial check sends `IOPlatformUUID` and the device name to `freno.me` ([FRE-322]
§2.4, corrected by [FRE-354] `(b)`). Never publish, in any wording:
> **No prompt or code content leaves the device.**
- "no data leaves the device" / "local-only" / "no telemetry" / "no account"
- "nothing leaves your Mac"
Never "no data leaves the device".
The one favourable engine sentence — about the **hook and bridge only**, never
"The Nook" — as corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`: the hook and bridge **are not a cloud
service**. Do not write "talk to nothing but your Mac" (too absolute: the
`NOOK_PORTS` fan-out resolves `host.docker.internal` and the default gateway, and
`defaultGateway()` opens a no-packet UDP socket to `8.8.8.8:80`), and do not narrow
it to "over SSH" (a tailnet peer dials directly).
It is verified as a code fact ([FRE-322] §2, [FRE-354] `(j)`), and it is still
**held** until the disclosures land: Sentry gated behind a preference or removed,
and `/privacy` + `/faq` corrected against the egress inventory (patch on branch
`faq/from-objections-2026-10-29`, verified by [FRE-354]). A true sentence next to
false ones is worse than no sentence.
### 4. Sell what works today
Phone approvals are deferred until a shipped iOS app exists — no "(coming soon)"
parentheticals. The launch story is remote SSH: agents running on other machines,
visible and unblockable from the Mac's notch.
An iPhone + Apple Watch companion **is** in users' hands as a TestFlight beta
(`ios-v0.3.2`, 2026-10-22; [FRE-354] open question). That makes one thing true and
one thing forbidden: say "TestFlight beta" when the phone exists in a sentence at
all, and never claim approvals-from-phone as a shipped capability without its own
CTO verdict — no "(coming soon)" parentheticals either way.
Remote SSH is **held**, not approved: the one-click install has not
been verified end to end ([FRE-315] §1) and the shipped path needs hand-edited
`~/.ssh/config` and a one-time `ssh-copy-id` ([FRE-320]). Its copy stays parked in
`marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` until the CTO verifies the shipping flow **and** a
recording shows a remote agent joining the notch.
### 5. Humans hold every account
@@ -73,23 +127,30 @@ No agent authenticates, posts, upvotes, or DMs. No sock puppets, no self-mention
without disclosure. `approved/` **is the only thing a human ever publishes from** —
nothing posts itself.
## Approved claims (each backed by code)
## Claims: status at 2026-11-03
| Claim | Backing |
|---|---|
| Thirteen hooked agents, one glance | `AgentSpec.all` — claude, codex, opencode, pi, omp, muse, hermes, openclaw, zai, gemini, cline, qwen, deepseek |
| Remote agents over SSH | `hook/setup.go` remote install path; `NOOK_HOST` TCP transport |
| Permission gate answered from a card | awaitPolicyTable + bridge directive path (`hook/normalize.go`, `serialize.go`) |
| Fan / thermal / charge control | `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext) |
| One-time purchase, no subscription | $10 → $15 at 1.0; Stripe checkout |
| macOS 14+ | 27 source files use the `@Observable` framework |
| No prompt or code content leaves the device | envelope carries session/event/terminal metadata only (see `docs/agent-interface.md`) |
Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a row.
| Claim | Status | Evidence / next step |
|---|---|---|
| Approve an agent's tool call from the notch, and it carries on | **Needs demo** — not publishable | [FRE-322] §1. `AgentLiveTurnTests` has never run on a signed-in host; one observed local run settles it. Say "an agent", never "any agent", never "always". |
| Every agent you're running reports into one notch; the blocked one pins above the rest | **Verified by code, gated on the take** | [FRE-322] §3. Same one-Mac take as above. No count in the sentence. |
| The hook and bridge are not a cloud service | **Verified code fact, held on disclosure** | [FRE-322] §2, wording corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`. Held until Sentry is gated/removed and `/privacy` + `/faq` land. Never widen to "The Nook", never "nothing but your Mac". |
| Fan, thermal and charge control | **No claim verdict yet — do not lead with it** | Backed by `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext), but no CTO sentence exists for it. Documentary, not launch. |
| One-time purchase, no subscription | **Publishable fact, price not a launch asset** | $10, held at $10. No dated rise, no discount framing, no pricing copy. |
| Agent coverage numbers ("eighteen agents", "18 agents") | **Publishable at 18** | [FRE-997]: the /agents table now lists every row of `AgentSpec.all` and `agents.test.ts` asserts equality with the 18-name registry in registry order, so the landing bullet, the marquee chip and the /agents copy say 18. No other number is publishable. |
| macOS 14.2 or later | **Publishable fact** | The app cannot start below 14.2 (`freno-dev` `881190d`, site `134f41e`). "macOS 14+" is false and was fixed on the site. |
| Remote agents over SSH, one click to install | **Held** | [FRE-315] §1, [FRE-320], [FRE-323]. Needs a verified one-click install plus a recording. |
| "Nothing leaves your Mac", "no telemetry", "local-only", "no account" | **False today — banned** | Sentry unconditional, licence check with hardware fingerprint ([FRE-322] §2.4). |
| Approvals from the iPhone or Apple Watch | **No verdict — not a launch claim** | The companion is a TestFlight beta ([FRE-354]); the approval-from-phone claim has no CTO verdict and stays out of launch copy. |
## Voice
- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives ("thirteen agents",
"one tap", "$10 once").
- The notch/island is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — the only count
that ships is eighteen, and it is the registry's own size (see the coverage row
above).
- The notch is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
- Never apologize for being a utility. The utility is the point.
- Banned phrasings: competitor names (see rule 1), "AI-powered", "revolutionary",
"game-changer", "seamlessly". Unverifiable superlatives generally.
"game-changer", "seamlessly", any unverifiable superlative — and the specific
banned sentences in rule 3 and the table above.

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
"test:coverage": "bun test --coverage",
"perf": "bun run scripts/perf-test.ts",
"perf:compare": "bun run scripts/perf-compare.ts",
"metrics:weekly": "bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts",
"nook:grant": "NODE_ENV=production bun --env-file=.env scripts/grant-nook-license.ts"
},
"dependencies": {

159
scripts/weekly-metrics.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
import { createClient } from "@libsql/client/web";
import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
import {
ensureAnalyticsSchema,
getWeeklyReport,
renderWeeklyMarkdown,
type Connections
} from "~/server/weekly-metrics";
/**
* Write `marketing/metrics/weekly.md` from the live analytics and licence DBs.
*
* bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts
* bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts --days 14 --now 2026-11-05T09:00:00Z
*
* Required environment (all four; the analytics token also opens the licence
* DB, which is why the weekly job can run from a checkout that has no Stripe
* or Apple secrets):
*
* TURSO_DB_URL / TURSO_DB_TOKEN freno.me DB — VisitorAnalytics
* NOOK_DB_URL / NOOK_DB_TOKEN the-nook DB — trials, licenses, activations
*
* This script deliberately does not import `~/env/server`: that schema demands
* every production secret, and the metrics job needs two databases and nothing
* else.
*
* The output path is anchored at the repo root, so running it from any cwd
* writes the same file.
*/
interface Options {
days: number;
now: Date;
out: string;
stdout: boolean;
}
function usage(): string {
return [
"Usage: bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts [options]",
"",
" --days N window length in days (default 7)",
" --now ISO end of the window (default: now)",
" --out PATH where to write (default: marketing/metrics/weekly.md)",
" --stdout print the report instead of writing a file"
].join("\n");
}
function parseArgs(argv: string[]): Options {
const repoRoot = resolve(import.meta.dir, "..");
const options: Options = {
days: 7,
now: new Date(),
out: resolve(repoRoot, "marketing/metrics/weekly.md"),
stdout: false
};
for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
const arg = argv[i]!;
const value = () => {
const next = argv[i + 1];
if (next === undefined) throw new Error(`${arg} needs a value\n\n${usage()}`);
i += 1;
return next;
};
switch (arg) {
case "--days": {
const days = Number(value());
if (!Number.isFinite(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(`--days must be a positive number\n\n${usage()}`);
}
options.days = days;
break;
}
case "--now": {
const now = new Date(value());
if (Number.isNaN(now.getTime())) {
throw new Error(`--now must be an ISO timestamp\n\n${usage()}`);
}
options.now = now;
break;
}
case "--out":
options.out = resolve(value());
break;
case "--stdout":
options.stdout = true;
break;
case "-h":
case "--help":
console.log(usage());
process.exit(0);
default:
throw new Error(`Unknown argument ${arg}\n\n${usage()}`);
}
}
return options;
}
function requiredEnv(name: string): string {
const value = process.env[name];
if (!value || value.trim() === "") {
throw new Error(
`${name} is not set. The weekly job needs TURSO_DB_URL, TURSO_DB_TOKEN, ` +
`NOOK_DB_URL and NOOK_DB_TOKEN — run it as ` +
`\`bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts\` with those four in .env.`
);
}
return value;
}
function connect(url: string, token: string) {
return createClient({ url, authToken: token });
}
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const options = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
const connections: Connections = {
analytics: connect(requiredEnv("TURSO_DB_URL"), requiredEnv("TURSO_DB_TOKEN")),
nook: connect(requiredEnv("NOOK_DB_URL"), requiredEnv("NOOK_DB_TOKEN"))
};
// The app migrates the table on boot, but this job must not depend on a
// deploy having happened: add any missing post-hoc columns (stage, host)
// through the same idempotent bootstrap path first.
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(connections.analytics);
const report = await getWeeklyReport(connections, {
days: options.days,
now: options.now
});
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
if (options.stdout) {
process.stdout.write(markdown);
return;
}
await mkdir(dirname(options.out), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(options.out, markdown, "utf8");
const f = report.counts;
console.log(
`wrote ${options.out}\n` +
`window ${report.window.start} → ${report.window.end}\n` +
`visit ${f.visit}, download click ${f.downloadClick}, DMG served ${f.dmgServed}, ` +
`trial ${f.trial}, checkout ${f.checkout}, purchase ${f.purchase}, activation ${f.activation}\n` +
`mover: ${report.mover ? `${report.mover.label} ${report.mover.before} → ${report.mover.now}` : "none"}`
);
}
main().catch((error) => {
console.error(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
process.exit(1);
});

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import {
For,
Show,
createEffect,
createSignal,
onCleanup,
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ import { Campfire, type CampfireState } from "./Campfire";
import {
ApprovalCardMock,
SessionRowMock,
Glyph,
CLAUDE,
CODEX
} from "./ModuleMocks";
@@ -37,7 +35,7 @@ import {
* Detailed feature breakdowns: alternating copy + live-demo sections.
* Each demo stages the real interaction loop: attention flares, approval
* resolves, fans throttle, the charge ceiling holds, meetings surface,
* the camera wakes, a remote host goes live. Newer demos live in
* the camera wakes. Newer demos live in
* MoreDemos.tsx; app-anatomy pieces in ModuleMocks.tsx.
*/
@@ -807,112 +805,6 @@ function CameraDemo() {
);
}
/* ── Demo 7: Settings ▸ Remote hosts — one click to Live ──────────── */
/** RemoteMirror's progress steps, in order. */
const SETUP_STEPS = [
"connecting",
"pushing the hook binary",
"configuring agents",
"checking the host can reach this Mac"
];
function RemoteHostDemo() {
/* -1 not set up · 0…3 setting up · 4 live */
const [step, setStep] = createSignal(-1);
const [pressed, setPressed] = createSignal(false);
useDemoLoop(11000, [
[0, () => (setStep(-1), setPressed(false))],
[1400, () => setPressed(true)],
[1700, () => (setPressed(false), setStep(0))],
[2700, () => setStep(1)],
[3700, () => setStep(2)],
[4700, () => setStep(3)],
[5800, () => setStep(4)]
]);
const live = () => step() === 4;
const working = () => step() >= 0 && step() < 4;
const chip = () =>
live()
? { color: "rgb(48,209,88)", label: "Live" }
: working()
? { color: "rgba(255,255,255,0.55)", label: "Setting up" }
: { color: "rgba(255,255,255,0.35)", label: "Not set up" };
return (
<div class="relative mx-auto w-full max-w-[360px] space-y-3">
{/* the host's card in Settings ▸ Agents ▸ Remote hosts */}
<ModuleCard>
<div class="space-y-2 text-left">
<div class="flex items-center gap-2.5">
<div class="min-w-0 flex-1">
<p class="text-[13px] font-semibold text-white">gpu-rig</p>
<p class="truncate text-[11px] text-white/45">tailnet peer</p>
</div>
<Show when={working()}>
<span class="h-3 w-3 animate-spin rounded-full border-[1.5px] border-white/25 border-t-white/80" />
</Show>
<span class="flex items-center gap-1.5 text-[10.5px] font-medium text-white/85">
<span
class="h-[7px] w-[7px] rounded-full transition-colors duration-300"
style={{ background: chip().color }}
/>
{chip().label}
</span>
<Show
when={live()}
fallback={
<span
class="rounded-md px-2.5 py-1 text-[11px] font-semibold text-white transition-all duration-200"
style={{
background: ACCENT,
opacity: working() ? 0 : 1,
transform: pressed() ? "scale(0.92)" : "scale(1)"
}}
>
Set up
</span>
}
>
<Glyph name="refresh" size={11} class="text-white/50" />
<span class="rounded-md bg-white/10 px-2 py-1 text-[11px] font-semibold text-[#ff6961]">
Remove
</span>
</Show>
</div>
<p class="h-4 text-[11px] text-white/50">
{working() ? SETUP_STEPS[step()] : " "}
</p>
</div>
</ModuleCard>
{/* its agents arrive as ordinary rows, the machine named in the chip */}
<div
class="transition-all duration-500"
style={{
opacity: live() ? 1 : 0,
transform: live() ? "translateY(0)" : "translateY(6px)"
}}
>
<SessionRowMock
title="trainer · fp16"
prompt="benchmark fp16"
state="Running python bench.py…"
status="running"
agent={CODEX}
host="gpu-rig"
origin="iTerm2"
age="now"
/>
</div>
<FakeCursor
phase={pressed() ? "press" : step() === -1 ? "idle" : "live"}
at={{ x: 88, y: 16 }}
/>
</div>
);
}
/* ── Demo 8: campfire states ───────────────────────────────────────── */
function CampfireDemo() {
@@ -959,7 +851,7 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
title="Your whole fleet, in one pixel strip"
body="Every session, every agent, one square each. The pill never wraps, never grows — an arriving question flashes the fire and swaps the slot, then hands the notch back."
bullets={[
"13 agents: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, and more",
"18 agents: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, and more",
"Custom agents: your own coding agent can wire itself in from the published contract",
"Slot rankings — you choose which data earns the notch",
"You don't need a notch — external displays get the same island, floating top-center"
@@ -976,7 +868,6 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
"Approval cards pin above the session list; questions answer inside their row",
"Allow for session waves through the rest of that session's requests",
"Answer from iPhone or Apple Watch too, now in TestFlight beta",
"Works across every hooked agent, local or remote"
]}
reversed
>
@@ -996,20 +887,6 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
<TerminalReplyDemo />
</BreakdownSection>
<BreakdownSection
kicker="Remote"
title="Any SSH box, one click away"
body="Pick a host from your ssh config or your tailnet and click once — the nook-hook installs itself and its agents appear beside your local ones, indistinguishable."
bullets={[
"One click: connect, push the hook, configure agents, check it can reach this Mac",
"Hosts mirror this Mac's installed integrations automatically",
"Remote sessions are ordinary rows; the agent chip names the machine"
]}
reversed
>
<RemoteHostDemo />
</BreakdownSection>
<BreakdownSection
kicker="The campfire"
title="A hearth that tells the truth"

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,6 @@
import { For, createSignal, onCleanup, onMount, type JSX } from "solid-js";
import { IslandPill, STATUS, CALM, CRITICAL, ModuleCard } from "./IslandMock";
import {
ApprovalCardMock,
SessionRowMock,
DieLine,
CLAUDE,
CODEX
} from "./ModuleMocks";
import { ApprovalCardMock, DieLine, CLAUDE } from "./ModuleMocks";
/**
* Feature collage: five cells sold as the app's actual UI. The hero cell
@@ -105,35 +99,6 @@ function FansPanelMock() {
);
}
/**
* Remote agents as the panel draws them: ordinary session rows whose agent
* chip names the machine ("Claude Code · build-box").
*/
function RemoteMock() {
return (
<div class="space-y-1.5">
<SessionRowMock
title="api · main"
prompt="fix the flaky test"
state="Running pytest -x…"
status="running"
agent={CLAUDE}
host="build-box"
age="4m"
/>
<SessionRowMock
title="trainer · fp16"
prompt="benchmark fp16"
state="Done · replied 1m ago"
status="ready"
agent={CODEX}
host="gpu-rig"
age="12m"
/>
</div>
);
}
/* Deterministic usage wander for the traces. */
const wander = (n: number, k: number) =>
0.42 + 0.22 * Math.sin(n * 0.45 + k * 1.7) + 0.12 * Math.sin(n * 1.3 + k);
@@ -256,19 +221,6 @@ export default function FeatureCollage() {
</InkStage>
</CollageCell>
{/* Remote agents */}
<CollageCell
kicker="Remote"
title="Agents on other machines"
body="Run agents on Linux boxes and SSH servers — one click installs the nook-hook, and their sessions join the same island."
>
<InkStage class="w-full">
<div class="w-full px-3 text-left">
<RemoteMock />
</div>
</InkStage>
</CollageCell>
{/* Gauges */}
<CollageCell
kicker="Your Mac"

View File

@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ function LayoutMock() {
/* ── Marquee ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
const CHIPS_A = [
"13 agents",
"18 agents",
"Custom agents",
"Six chiptunes",
"Focus-aware slots",
@@ -740,7 +740,6 @@ const CHIPS_B = [
"tmux · iTerm2 · kitty",
"Markdown replies",
"Tailscale hosts",
"One-click SSH setup",
"iPhone widgets",
"Watch-face widgets",
"Screenshots to clipboard",

View File

@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ export interface VisitorAnalytics {
ttfb?: number | null;
dom_load?: number | null;
load_complete?: number | null;
stage?: string | null;
host?: string | null;
created_at: string;
}

6
src/env/server.ts vendored
View File

@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ const serverEnvSchema = z.object({
// Bearer secret for the daily lifecycle-email cron. Falls back to
// Vercel's CRON_SECRET; unset + no CRON_SECRET = the endpoint denies all.
NOOK_LIFECYCLE_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional(),
// Daily VisitorAnalytics retention cron (/api/analytics-retention). Same
// shape: falls back to CRON_SECRET, and unset denies every request.
ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional(),
// How long a VisitorAnalytics row lives. Unset (or unusable) = 365 days;
// see src/server/analytics-retention.ts before shortening it.
ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS: z.string().optional(),
CRON_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional()
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { env } from "~/env/server";
import { ConnectionFactory } from "~/server/db-connections";
import { runRetentionCron } from "~/server/analytics-retention";
/**
* GET /api/analytics-retention — daily Vercel cron.
*
* Deletes `VisitorAnalytics` rows older than the retention window, so visitor
* data has a bound instead of accumulating forever (FRE-369, finding Q4 — the
* table's only cleaner used to be a manual admin call, and since FRE-366 the
* rows carry a truncated but still real client address).
*
* Window: `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS`, defaulting to 365 when unset or unusable
* (see `~/server/analytics-retention` for why the default is conservative
* rather than the reviewer's 90).
*
* Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` where the secret is
* `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET` or Vercel's `CRON_SECRET`. An unconfigured secret
* denies every request — an unauthenticated trigger of a bulk delete is the one
* outcome this endpoint must never have.
*/
export async function GET(event: APIEvent) {
const result = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: event.request.headers.get("authorization"),
secret: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET ?? env.CRON_SECRET,
configuredDays: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
conn: ConnectionFactory()
});
return new Response(JSON.stringify(result.body), {
status: result.status,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
});
}

View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export async function GET(event: APIEvent) {
console.log(`✓ Serving ${filename} (${body.length} bytes)`);
await trackDownload(event, assetKeys[asset]!);
await trackDownload(event, assetKeys[asset]!, "served");
// SAFETY: `transformToByteArray` yields `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>`, which the
// DOM lib's `BufferSource` (ArrayBuffer-backed) does not accept, though undici

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { env } from "~/env/server";
import { TURNSTILE_CONFIG } from "~/config";
import { verifyTurnstileToken } from "~/server/fetch-utils";
import { json, error } from "./_lib";
import { trackRequest } from "~/server/track-download";
/**
* POST /api/the-nook/checkout
@@ -12,6 +13,14 @@ import { json, error } from "./_lib";
* session for the one-time $10 The Nook license. Returns the hosted
* checkout URL for the client to redirect to.
*
* Analytics: a created session is the funnel's "checkout started" stage
* (FRE-366). Until then the only trace was the client-side /checkout page
* view — a page, not a started checkout. Recorded through the shared
* `trackRequest` writer (referrer, campaign tags, country, real client
* address, host) under this route's own path, best-effort: a failed
* analytics write never blocks a checkout, and an attempt Turnstile or
* Stripe rejects is correctly not a started checkout.
*
* Uses raw `fetch` (Node 24 / Vercel Node functions have global fetch) — no
* `stripe` npm dependency added.
*/
@@ -67,5 +76,14 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent) {
if (!data.url) {
return error("Stripe returned no checkout URL", 502);
}
// The session exists: that is "checkout started". Awaited so the row is
// flushed before the response — a buffered write is not guaranteed to
// survive the response on serverless.
await trackRequest(event, {
path: "/api/the-nook/checkout",
method: "POST"
});
return json({ checkoutUrl: data.url });
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
import { truncateIpAddress } from "~/server/request-client";
// The route's contracts:
// 1. Every click is recorded through the shared analytics buffer with the
@@ -55,9 +56,13 @@ mock.module("~/server/analytics", () => ({
flushAnalytics: async () => {
flushCalls += 1;
},
// Mirrors the real enrichment contract: deviceType is derived from the UA.
// Mirrors the real enrichment contract: deviceType is derived from the UA,
// and the address is cut to its prefix by the FRE-369 privacy floor. The
// real `enrichAnalyticsEntry` does both, so the mirror has to apply the same
// truncation — otherwise this file would prove the door stores a full address.
enrichAnalyticsEntry: (entry: Entry) => ({
...entry,
ipAddress: truncateIpAddress(entry.ipAddress as string | null),
deviceType: String(entry.userAgent ?? "").includes("Macintosh")
? "desktop"
: null
@@ -113,6 +118,10 @@ describe("GET /api/the-nook/download", () => {
expect(logged[0]).toMatchObject({
path: "/api/downloads/thenook",
method: "GET",
// The door is the click half of the split; the file route writes
// "served". And the row names the site it came from (FRE-366).
stage: "click",
host: "nook.freno.me",
referrer: "https://nook.freno.me/"
});
// Flushed within the request, not left to the batch timer.
@@ -137,9 +146,16 @@ describe("GET /api/the-nook/download", () => {
expect(logged[2]!.country).toBe("JP");
});
it("falls back to the forwarded address when no request IP is available", async () => {
await GET(request({ "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.1" }));
expect(logged[0]!.ipAddress).toBe("198.51.100.9");
it("records the forwarded visitor below the trusted edge, truncated", async () => {
// Client → Cloudflare → origin proxy: the sender's spoof is first, the real
// client second, the edge last. And the stored value is the /24, never the
// address itself (FRE-369).
await GET(
request({
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
);
expect(logged[0]!.ipAddress).toBe("203.0.113.0");
});
it("still logs the click when the appcast cannot be read", async () => {

View File

@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ import { resolveLatestDownload } from "./_download";
* Why a redirect and not a direct S3 link: the appcast route and the DMG
* route never logged anything, so step 2 of the funnel (download click →
* DMG served) was invisible. Every click now lands one row in
* VisitorAnalytics under `/api/downloads/thenook`, alongside the clicks and
* served files of every other product — see `~/server/track-download`.
* VisitorAnalytics under `/api/downloads/thenook` with `stage = "click"`,
* distinct from the `stage = "served"` row the file route writes when the
* DMG is actually streamed — the split FRE-366 added, alongside the clicks
* and served files of every other product — see `~/server/track-download`.
*
* Referrer, campaign tags, edge country (with `?c=` override) and user agent
* are read by `trackDownload`, which is shared with the other download doors.
@@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ import { resolveLatestDownload } from "./_download";
export async function GET(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
// Recorded before resolving: a click that dies at resolution is exactly the
// failure the funnel needs to show.
await trackDownload(event, "thenook");
await trackDownload(event, "thenook", "click");
let target: string | null = null;
try {

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
const sentEmails: { to: string; subject: string; html: string }[] = [];
const tokenAnswers: { allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number }[] = [];
/** Every rate-limit key the route derived, in order. */
const rateKeys: string[] = [];
mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
default: async (to: string, subject: string, html: string) => {
@@ -19,7 +21,10 @@ mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
}));
mock.module("~/server/bug-report-rate-limit", () => ({
takeBugReportToken: () => tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true }
takeBugReportToken: (key: string) => {
rateKeys.push(key);
return tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true };
}
}));
const { POST } = await import("./report");
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
sentEmails.length = 0;
tokenAnswers.length = 0;
rateKeys.length = 0;
});
it("emails the owner a report containing the snapshot, escaped", async () => {
@@ -133,10 +139,49 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
it("still succeeds when no fingerprint header exists", async () => {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, { "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1" })
request(validPayload, {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(sentEmails).toHaveLength(1);
// The quota key is the Cloudflare-recorded client, not a header hop the
// sender chose.
expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
});
it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not mint a fresh quota key", async () => {
// FRE-371: the old read keyed on the leftmost hop, which the sender
// controls outright — one scripted loop with a rotating header had
// unlimited reports. With the same Cloudflare-recorded client and a
// different spoofed prefix per request, the key must be stable.
for (const spoof of ["1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", "3.3.3.3"]) {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
"x-forwarded-for": `${spoof}, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1`
})
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
expect(rateKeys).toEqual([
"203.0.113.9",
"203.0.113.9",
"203.0.113.9"
]);
});
it("keys on the rightmost-minus-one hop when Cloudflare's header is absent", async () => {
const res = await POST(
request(validPayload, {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
// Never the leftmost (sender-chosen) hop.
expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
});
it("delivers the landing page's beta request with only the email", async () => {

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { z } from "zod";
import sendEmail from "~/server/email";
import { CONTACT_RECIPIENT_EMAIL } from "~/lib/contact-config";
import { takeBugReportToken } from "~/server/bug-report-rate-limit";
import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
import { json, error } from "./_lib";
/**
@@ -103,10 +104,9 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
)
.trim()
.toLowerCase();
const forwarded = event.request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
const rateKey =
fingerprint ||
(forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : "unknown");
// FRE-371: the IP fallback must be the spoof-resistant read — a rotating
// leftmost x-forwarded-for used to mint unlimited report quota.
const rateKey = fingerprint || resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
const token = takeBugReportToken(rateKey);
if (!token.allowed) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "Too many reports" }), {

View File

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ function MainDownloadsPage() {
<div class="flex flex-col items-center gap-3">
<span class="text-subtext0 font-mono text-sm">
platform: macOS (14.6+)
platform: macOS (14.2+)
</span>
<Button
variant="download"

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/**
* Regression test for the /agents roster (NOOK-336).
* Regression test for the /agents roster and its coverage count.
*
* The page mirrors the app's registry, `AgentSpec.all` in
* the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift. When Muse joined
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
* them. The registry lives in another repo, so the expected roster is
* restated here; when an agent is added there, add it here and on the page.
*
* FRE-997 restored the count. The page said thirteen while the registry held
* eighteen, so the count was dropped rather than corrected (FRE-359 verdict B);
* now that all eighteen rows are on the page, the roster check is an equality
* check again and the page states eighteen. A subset check would let a shipped
* agent go missing behind a passing suite, which is the NOOK-336 failure.
*
* STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as the downloads regressions.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
@@ -16,7 +22,10 @@ import { join } from "node:path";
const SOURCE = readFileSync(join(import.meta.dir, "agents.tsx"), "utf8");
/** AgentSpec.all display names, in registry order. */
/** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
const COPY = SOURCE.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, "");
/** AgentSpec.all display names, in registry order (18 rows). @ The-Nook f4258034, 2026-10-29 */
const REGISTRY = [
"Claude Code",
"Codex",
@@ -30,25 +39,31 @@ const REGISTRY = [
"Gemini CLI",
"Cline",
"Qwen Code",
"DeepSeek"
"DeepSeek",
"Kimi",
"GitHub Copilot CLI",
"Crush",
"Cursor",
"Amp"
];
const NUMBER_WORDS = ["twelve", "thirteen", "fourteen", "fifteen"];
const entries = [...SOURCE.matchAll(/^\s{4}name: "([^"]+)",$/gm)].map((m) => m[1]);
describe("Nook /agents roster (NOOK-336)", () => {
it("lists every registry agent, in registry order", () => {
describe("Nook /agents roster", () => {
it("lists every registry agent, once, in registry order", () => {
expect(entries).toEqual(REGISTRY);
});
it("states the same count everywhere it names one", () => {
const word = NUMBER_WORDS[entries.length - 12];
for (const other of NUMBER_WORDS.filter((w) => w !== word)) {
expect(SOURCE.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(other);
}
expect(SOURCE).toContain(`all ${word}`);
expect(SOURCE).toContain(`The ${entries.length} agents`);
expect(SOURCE).toContain(`watches ${word} coding agents`);
it("states the registry's size", () => {
expect(entries.length).toBe(18);
expect(COPY).toContain("all eighteen");
expect(COPY).toContain("The 18 agents");
expect(COPY).toContain("eighteen coding agents");
});
it("carries no stale count", () => {
expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("thirteen");
expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b13 agents\b/);
expect(COPY).not.toContain("all thirteen");
});
});

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
/**
* `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — supported agents and their event coverage.
* `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — all eighteen agents in the registry and
* each row's event coverage.
*
* The registry below mirrors `AgentSpec.all` in the app
* (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentSpec.swift) and each agent's
* installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
* (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift) and each
* agent's installed hook surface (hook/setup.go) or plugin event subscription
* (plugins/*), normalized onto the shared event vocabulary
* (~/Code/the-nook/docs/agent-interface.md). Copy follows
* marketing/positioning.md: category nouns, honest scoping, no unverifiable
@@ -259,6 +260,92 @@ const AGENTS: AgentEntry[] = [
],
gating:
"Tool calls can be allowed or denied from a card; permission prompts stay with the agent"
},
{
name: "Kimi",
wiring: "Hook rules in its TOML config, one per event",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"AgentStart",
"PreToolUse",
"PermissionRequest",
"PermissionResolved",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SessionError",
"SubagentStart",
"SubagentStop",
"PreCompact",
"Notification"
],
gating:
"Observation — every event appears as a card; its PreToolUse fires before its own permission check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "GitHub Copilot CLI",
wiring: "One hook file of ours in its hooks directory",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PreToolUse",
"PermissionRequest",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SubagentStart",
"SubagentStop",
"ErrorOccurred",
"PreCompact",
"Notification"
],
gating:
"Observation — every event appears as a card; its permission request runs before its own policy check, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "Crush",
wiring:
"One entry in its JSONC config, the only event it documents",
events: ["PreToolUse"],
gating:
"Observation — tool calls appear as cards; its own permission prompts decide"
},
{
name: "Cursor",
wiring:
"Hook entries in its hooks.json, merged with your own. No permission hook, on purpose",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PostToolUse",
"PostToolUseFailure",
"Stop",
"SessionError",
"AfterAgentResponse",
"SubagentStop",
"PreCompact"
],
gating:
"Observation — a permission hook that stays silent blocks the action here, so Cursor keeps its own prompting"
},
{
name: "Amp",
wiring: "In-process extension package",
events: [
"SessionStart",
"SessionEnd",
"UserPromptSubmit",
"PreToolUse",
"PostToolUse",
"Stop",
"SessionError"
],
gating:
"Observation — its plugin API has no permission-wait event, so the agent keeps its own prompting"
}
];
@@ -283,8 +370,8 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
<EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
<PageHead
title="Supported agents"
description="Every coding agent The Nook supports — all thirteen, with each hook's exact event coverage and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
ogTitle="The 13 agents The Nook supports, and what each hook sees"
description="Every coding agent The Nook supports — all eighteen, with each hook's exact event coverage and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
ogTitle="The 18 agents The Nook supports, and what each hook sees"
/>
<SubdomainHeader />
<main class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
@@ -292,7 +379,7 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
Supported agents
</h1>
<p class="text-subtext0 mb-2 max-w-2xl text-lg">
The Nook watches thirteen coding agents in one place — your menu bar and
The Nook watches eighteen coding agents in one place — your menu bar and
notch show every session that is running, thinking, or blocked, and a
card answers permission prompts without leaving your keyboard.
</p>
@@ -300,8 +387,7 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
Each agent reports its own set of events. "Allow / Deny from a card"
means the agent hands the decision to The Nook while it waits;
"Observe" means every event still appears live, but the agent keeps
its own prompting. Agents can run on this Mac or on remote machines
over SSH — remote sessions report into the same grid.
its own prompting.
</p>
<div class="grid gap-4 lg:grid-cols-2">

View File

@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ const FAQ: FaqEntry[] = [
"The app itself runs unprivileged. Fan control and charge limiting go through a small helper component that macOS requires to run as root for hardware access — the app installs it on first use and you approve it once with your password. The hooks live in each agent's own config directory; you can inspect or remove every file it writes."
},
{
question: "Why macOS 14 or later?",
question: "Why macOS 14.2 or later?",
answer:
"The interface is built on Apple's current observation framework, which ships with macOS 14 (Sonoma)."
"The audio mixer listens to each app's own sound stream, and Apple only shipped that API in macOS 14.2 (Sonoma)."
},
{
question: "Does it work offline?",
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ export default function NookFaqPage() {
<EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
<PageHead
title="Frequently asked questions"
description="Does The Nook read your prompts? Do you need a notch? Battery cost, permissions, the macOS 14 requirement, offline use — answered straight."
description="Does The Nook read your prompts? Do you need a notch? Battery cost, permissions, the macOS 14.2 requirement, offline use — answered straight."
ogTitle="The Nook — FAQ"
/>
<SubdomainHeader />

View File

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export default function NookLanding() {
UI.
</p>
<p class="text-subtext1 mb-8 text-sm">
macOS 14+ · 14-day free trial · up to 3 devices
macOS 14.2+ · 14-day free trial · up to 3 devices
</p>
<div class="flex flex-col items-center gap-4 sm:flex-row sm:space-x-4">

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
/**
* Regression test for the removed remote / SSH claims and the removed agent
* count (FRE-323, FRE-359 verdict B).
*
* FRE-323 took the remote story off the site because it was unverified and
* demo-gated (FRE-315, FRE-320, FRE-322 §3 correction 4): the "one click
* installs the nook-hook" flow is app-UI-only, needs a hand-edited
* `~/.ssh/config` for any host not already in ssh config or on the tailnet,
* needs a one-time `ssh-copy-id` because the app runs ssh with
* `BatchMode=yes`, and has no manual fallback for minting the per-host
* credential. FRE-359 verdict B removed the coverage count for the same
* reason: the /agents table lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows.
*
* FRE-997 corrects the second half without touching the first. The count was
* stale, not unverifiable: `AgentSpec.all` holds eighteen, /agents now lists
* all eighteen and `agents.test.ts` asserts that roster as an equality again.
* So the two completeness phrasings FRE-359 banned ("every coding agent",
* "Supported agents") no longer rest on a 13-of-18 gap — the ban existed
* because the page claimed the set and listed two thirds of it. They are out
* of `BANNED_COVERAGE` on this branch for that reason alone; the stale counts
* stay banned, and every FRE-323 remote sentence stays banned, because this
* branch still carries the FRE-323 site state.
*
* The copy was not thrown away — it is parked in
* `marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` with the restore gate, and this test asserts
* it is still there so nobody deletes the parked story as stale. It goes back
* on the site only when the one-click install ships and is recorded.
*
* STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as `agents.test.ts` and
* `downloads.test.ts` (SolidJS does not render under `bun:test`).
*
* Deliberate exceptions, not audited here — both were weighed with the Chief
* of Staff at the go/no-go and left in place on purpose:
* - `src/routes/nook/agents.tsx` Muse row: "This Mac only — remote hosts skip
* it" is a limitation disclosure, not a capability claim.
* - `src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx` "Tailscale hosts" chip: adjacent to
* the removed remote story, but tailnet host lookup does exist. Raised on
* FRE-323 rather than widened into this correction.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
const ROOT = join(import.meta.dir, "../../..");
/** Shipped page and component source. Tests and drafts may quote the old copy. */
const AUDITED = [
"src/routes/nook/index.tsx",
"src/routes/nook/agents.tsx",
"src/routes/nook/faq.tsx",
"src/components/nook/FeatureCollage.tsx",
"src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx",
"src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx"
];
/** Every sentence FRE-323 ordered off the site. */
const BANNED_REMOTE_CLAIMS = [
"Agents on other machines",
"one click installs the nook-hook",
"Any SSH box",
"Works across every hooked agent, local or remote",
"Remote sessions are ordinary rows",
"One-click SSH setup",
"remote machines over SSH",
"this Mac or remote machines"
];
/** FRE-359 verdict B: no stale count, in any form.
*
* "every coding agent" and "Supported agents" left this list with FRE-997:
* the page now lists all eighteen registry rows and `agents.test.ts` asserts
* that equality, so the completeness claim is backed rather than incomplete. */
const BANNED_COVERAGE = [
"all thirteen",
"thirteen coding agents",
"13 agents"
];
/** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
function copyOf(file: string): string {
return readFileSync(join(ROOT, file), "utf8")
.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "")
.replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, "");
}
describe("remote claims stay off the site (FRE-323)", () => {
for (const file of AUDITED) {
it(`${file} does not restore a removed remote sentence`, () => {
const copy = copyOf(file);
for (const phrase of BANNED_REMOTE_CLAIMS) {
expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
}
});
}
it("/agents no longer offers remote sessions", () => {
const copy = copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx");
expect(copy).not.toContain("remote sessions report into the same grid");
expect(copy).not.toContain("on this Mac or on remote");
});
it("the parked copy still exists, so restoring the story is a revert and not a rewrite", () => {
const parked = readFileSync(join(ROOT, "marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/copy.md"), "utf8");
for (const phrase of ["Agents on other machines", "Any SSH box, one click away"]) {
expect(parked).toContain(phrase);
}
expect(readFileSync(join(ROOT, "marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/rationale.md"), "utf8")).toContain(
"FRE-320"
);
});
});
describe("the agent count is corrected, not dropped (FRE-997)", () => {
for (const file of AUDITED) {
it(`${file} states no stale count`, () => {
const copy = copyOf(file);
for (const phrase of BANNED_COVERAGE) {
expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
}
});
}
it("/agents states the registry's size", () => {
expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Supported agents");
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
/**
* A Smarter Remote privacy policy — `freno.me/smarter-remote/privacy`.
*
* Linked from the iOS app's paywall (App Review 3.1.2). Reflects what the app
* actually does: TV control stays on the local network, pairing data stays on
* the phone, purchases go through Apple and RevenueCat, and sharing is a QR
* code passed between phones.
*/
import { A } from "@solidjs/router";
import { PageHead } from "~/components/PageHead";
import { EdgeCacheHeaders } from "~/components/EdgeCacheHeaders";
export default function SmarterRemotePrivacyPolicy() {
return (
<>
<EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
<PageHead
title="A Smarter Remote Privacy Policy"
description="Privacy policy for A Smarter Remote, a universal TV remote app that works over your local Wi-Fi network."
/>
<div class="bg-base">
<div class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
<div class="py-4 text-xl">A Smarter Remote&apos;s Privacy Policy</div>
<div class="py-2">Last Updated: November 2, 2026</div>
<div class="py-2">
Welcome to A Smarter Remote (&apos;We&apos;, &apos;Us&apos;,
&apos;Our&apos;). The app controls your TVs over your own Wi-Fi
network. It has no accounts, no ads, and no analytics. This policy
explains the little data it does handle.
</div>
<ol>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> Data We Collect
</div>
<div class="pl-4">
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(a) Your TVs:</div> The app finds TVs on
your local network and stores their names, network addresses,
and platform on your phone. Pairing codes and tokens are kept
in your phone&apos;s Keychain. This data is sent only to the
TV itself, over your local network. It never reaches us.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(b) Purchases:</div> Payments are handled
by Apple. We use RevenueCat to check whether you own A Smarter
Remote Pro. RevenueCat receives an anonymous app user ID, your
purchase and subscription history, and basic device and app
details such as OS version, app version, and region. It does
not receive your name, email, or payment details.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(c) Voice input:</div> If you use voice
search, your speech is converted to text by Apple&apos;s
speech recognition. Apple may process it on its servers. The
resulting text is sent only to your TV.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(d) Sharing:</div> If you share a TV with
someone, its name, address, and platform are put into a QR
code on your screen for them to scan. It goes from one phone
to the other and does not pass through our servers.
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">2.</span> How We Use It
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
Data about your TVs is used only to control them. Purchase
records are used only to unlock Pro. We do not use any of it for
advertising, and we do not sell it.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">3.</span> Local Network Access
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
iOS asks for permission before the app can use your local
network. The app needs it to find and control your TVs. If you
decline, the app cannot reach your TVs. You can change this in
Settings &gt; Privacy &amp; Security &gt; Local Network.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">4.</span> Deleting Your Data
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
Removing a TV in the app deletes its stored details and
credentials from your phone. Deleting the app removes all of
them. Subscriptions are managed and cancelled in your App Store
account settings.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">5.</span> Children&apos;s Privacy
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
The app does not knowingly collect personal information from
anyone, including children under 13.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">6.</span> Changes to the Privacy Policy
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
We may update this policy periodically. Any changes are posted on
this page, so please review it from time to time.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">7.</span> Contact Us
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
If you have any questions about this policy, you can contact us{" "}
<A href="/contact" class="text-blue hover-underline-animation">
here
</A>
.
</div>
</div>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
/**
* A Smarter Remote terms of use — `freno.me/smarter-remote/terms`.
*
* Linked from the iOS app's paywall (App Review 3.1.2). Builds on Apple's
* standard EULA and adds the Pro subscription and lifetime purchase terms.
*/
import { A } from "@solidjs/router";
import { PageHead } from "~/components/PageHead";
import { EdgeCacheHeaders } from "~/components/EdgeCacheHeaders";
export default function SmarterRemoteTerms() {
return (
<>
<EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
<PageHead
title="A Smarter Remote Terms of Use"
description="Terms of use for A Smarter Remote and its Pro subscription."
/>
<div class="bg-base">
<div class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
<div class="py-4 text-xl">A Smarter Remote&apos;s Terms of Use</div>
<div class="py-2">Last Updated: November 2, 2026</div>
<div class="py-2">
These terms cover your use of the A Smarter Remote app (&apos;the
App&apos;). By using the App you agree to them. The App is licensed
to you under Apple&apos;s{" "}
<a
href="https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/dev/stdeula/"
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
class="text-blue hover-underline-animation"
>
Licensed Application End User License Agreement
</a>
, and the terms below add to it.
</div>
<ol>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> A Smarter Remote Pro
</div>
<div class="pl-4">
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(a) What it includes:</div> The free App
controls one TV. Pro removes that limit and unlocks the
features marked Pro in the App.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(b) Yearly subscription:</div> Payment is
charged to your Apple account when you confirm the purchase,
or when any free trial ends. The subscription renews
automatically at the same price unless you cancel at least 24
hours before the end of the current period. Your account is
charged for renewal within 24 hours before the period ends.
Any unused part of a free trial is forfeited when you buy a
subscription.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(c) Lifetime purchase:</div> A one-time
payment that unlocks Pro with no recurring charge.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(d) Managing and refunds:</div> You can
manage or cancel a subscription in your App Store account
settings. Refunds are handled by Apple under its policies.
Restore Purchases in the App re-unlocks Pro on another device
signed in to the same Apple account.
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">2.</span> Your TVs
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
The App controls TVs through the network features their makers
provide. Which features work depends on your TV&apos;s model and
software, which can change without notice. We do not guarantee
that every feature works on every TV. Only control TVs you own
or have permission to use.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">3.</span> No Warranty
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
The App is provided &apos;as is&apos;, without warranties of any
kind, to the extent the law allows. To the extent the law allows,
we are not liable for indirect or consequential damages arising
from your use of the App.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">4.</span> Privacy
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
How the App handles data is described in the{" "}
<A
href="/smarter-remote/privacy"
class="text-blue hover-underline-animation"
>
Privacy Policy
</A>
.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">5.</span> Changes to These Terms
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
We may update these terms periodically. Any changes are posted on
this page. Continuing to use the App after a change means you
accept the new terms.
</div>
</div>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">6.</span> Contact Us
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
If you have any questions about these terms, you can contact us{" "}
<A href="/contact" class="text-blue hover-underline-animation">
here
</A>
.
</div>
</div>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
import { VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL } from "./analytics-schema";
import {
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
isAuthorizedCron,
pruneVisitorAnalytics,
resolveRetentionDays,
runRetentionCron
} from "./analytics-retention";
// Why a real in-memory SQLite database: retention is a `DELETE` whose whole
// job is a date comparison. A stub returning a canned count would pass with a
// window that is off by a unit, inverted, or — the failure this file exists for
// — never applied at all. Same reasoning as the backfill and schema suites, and
// nothing is module-mocked here on purpose: bun's `mock.module` is process-wide.
let db: Database;
const conn = {
async execute(query: { sql: string; args?: unknown[] }) {
const statement = db.query(query.sql);
const args = (query.args ?? []) as never[];
// `DELETE … RETURNING id` answers with rows, which is how the prune counts
// what it removed; bun:sqlite exposes those through `.all()`.
if (
/^\s*(select|pragma|with)\b/i.test(query.sql) ||
/\breturning\b/i.test(query.sql)
) {
return { rows: statement.all(...args) as unknown[], rowsAffected: 0 };
}
return {
rows: [] as unknown[],
rowsAffected: statement.run(...args).changes
};
}
};
function insert(id: string, createdAt: string) {
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES (?, '/x', 'GET', ?)`,
[id, createdAt]
);
}
function rowCount(): number {
return (db.query(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics`).get() as {
n: number;
}).n;
}
beforeEach(() => {
db = new Database(":memory:");
db.run(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL);
});
describe("resolveRetentionDays", () => {
it("takes a usable configured window", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays("90")).toBe(90);
expect(resolveRetentionDays(30)).toBe(30);
});
it("falls back to the default when the value is missing or nonsense", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays(undefined)).toBe(
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS
);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("0")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("-5")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("1.5")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
expect(resolveRetentionDays("all")).toBe(DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS);
});
it("refuses a window so long it means 'never prune'", () => {
expect(resolveRetentionDays(String(MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS + 1))).toBe(
DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS
);
});
});
describe("pruneVisitorAnalytics", () => {
it("deletes only rows older than the window", async () => {
insert("young", "2020-01-01 00:00:00");
insert("old", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
// A row exactly at `now - 365 days` boundary in the other direction: the
// comparison is `<`, so the recent one survives.
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-10 days') WHERE id = 'young'`
);
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-400 days') WHERE id = 'old'`
);
const deleted = await pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 365);
expect(deleted).toBe(1);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("deletes nothing when every row is inside the window", async () => {
insert("a", "x");
db.run(
`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = datetime('now', '-1 day') WHERE id = 'a'`
);
expect(await pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 365)).toBe(0);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("refuses a window it was not given a number for", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, 0)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, -30)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, NaN)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
// "0" is not a window either — and must not delete the table.
await expect(
pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, "0" as unknown as number)
).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("passes the window as a parameter, not as interpolated SQL", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
const injected = "365); DROP TABLE VisitorAnalytics; --" as unknown as number;
// Truncating a non-numeric string yields NaN, which the guard refuses — so
// the statement never runs and the table is still there.
await expect(pruneVisitorAnalytics(conn, injected)).rejects.toThrow(/window/);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
});
describe("isAuthorizedCron", () => {
it("matches the bearer secret and nothing else", () => {
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer sekrit", "sekrit")).toBe(true);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("bearer SEKRIT".toLowerCase(), "sekrit")).toBe(true);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer nope", "sekrit")).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron(null, "sekrit")).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer sekrit", null)).toBe(false);
});
it("denies everything when no secret is configured (fail closed)", () => {
expect(isAuthorizedCron("Bearer ", undefined)).toBe(false);
expect(isAuthorizedCron(undefined, "")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("runRetentionCron", () => {
it("denies an unauthenticated trigger before touching the table", async () => {
insert("a", "2019-01-01 00:00:00");
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: null,
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("prunes on its window and reports what it removed", async () => {
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES ('old','/x','GET',datetime('now','-400 days'))`
);
db.run(
`INSERT INTO VisitorAnalytics (id, path, method, created_at) VALUES ('new','/x','GET',datetime('now','-1 day'))`
);
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: "Bearer sekrit",
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ success: true, days: 365, deleted: 1 });
expect(rowCount()).toBe(1);
});
it("says it failed rather than reporting a quiet zero", async () => {
db.close(); // the table is gone: the prune's statement must now throw
const res = await runRetentionCron({
authorization: "Bearer sekrit",
secret: "sekrit",
configuredDays: "365",
conn
});
expect(res.status).toBe(500);
expect(res.body.days).toBe(365);
expect(res.body.deleted).toBeUndefined();
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
/**
* Scheduled retention for `VisitorAnalytics` (FRE-369, finding Q4).
*
* The table used to grow without bound: `cleanupOldAnalytics` existed but was
* reachable only as a manual tRPC call, and once FRE-366 started recording a
* real client address instead of the proxy's loopback, "unbounded" meant
* unbounded personal data in a hosted third-party database. Two halves answer
* that — the write-time prefix in `./request-client`, and this: a bound on how
* long any row exists at all.
*
* The default (365 days) is deliberately conservative so enabling the schedule
* is not itself a destructive event: it deletes nothing on its first run
* against a database whose history starts inside the window, and it bounds
* growth from then on. Tighten it to the reviewer's suggested 90 by setting
* `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS=90` — that first run *will* delete months of
* history that the /analytics dashboard and the weekly report read, which is an
* operational decision, not one this file should make silently.
*/
/** Kept when `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS` is unset or unusable. */
export const DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS = 365;
/** Anything longer is a misconfiguration, not a policy (≈ 2 years). */
export const MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS = 730;
/**
* The slice of a connection this module needs — the same shape
* `weekly-metrics.ts` pins as `MetricsConn`, so a libsql client satisfies it
* without a cast (and the in-memory SQLite test adapter satisfies it too).
*/
export interface AnalyticsConn {
execute(query: {
sql: string;
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
args?: any[];
}): Promise<{ rows: unknown[]; rowsAffected?: number }>;
}
/**
* The retention window to enforce: a positive integer at most
* {@link MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS}, else the default. Accepts the env
* string form and a number, because both callers hand over a different shape.
*/
export function resolveRetentionDays(
configured: string | number | undefined | null
): number {
const days = typeof configured === "number" ? configured : Number(configured);
if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days <= 0) return DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS;
if (days > MAX_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS) return DEFAULT_ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS;
return days;
}
/**
* Delete analytics rows older than `olderThanDays` and report how many went.
*
* The window is a SQL parameter, not interpolated text: `cleanupOldAnalytics`
* used to splice the number into the statement, which only ever sat behind a
* `z.number()` input on the tRPC side — one unvalidated caller away from
* injection. A non-integer is refused here rather than passed on, so neither
* path can delete on a window the code did not check.
*/
export async function pruneVisitorAnalytics(
conn: AnalyticsConn,
olderThanDays: number
): Promise<number> {
const days = Math.trunc(Number(olderThanDays));
if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(
`Refusing to prune VisitorAnalytics on a non-positive window: ${olderThanDays}`
);
}
const result = await conn.execute({
sql: `DELETE FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at < datetime('now', ?)
RETURNING id`,
args: [`-${days} days`]
});
// Counted from `RETURNING id` rather than `rowsAffected`, keeping the contract
// `cleanupOldAnalytics` had: the caller is told how many rows actually went.
return result.rows.length;
}
/** Whether a cron may run: Bearer match, and an unset secret denies everything. */
export function isAuthorizedCron(
authorization: string | null | undefined,
secret: string | undefined | null
): boolean {
if (!secret) return false;
const provided = (authorization ?? "").replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, "").trim();
return Boolean(provided) && provided === secret;
}
export interface RetentionOutcome {
status: number;
body: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/**
* The whole cron decision, away from the route: authorise, resolve the window,
* prune. Returns the status and body the route should send, so the behaviour is
* testable without a database or an environment.
*
* Fail closed on auth (an unauthenticated trigger deleting real history is the
* worst thing this endpoint can do), and 500 rather than a silent zero on a
* failed prune — a retention job that quietly stopped pruning is exactly the
* state that created this issue.
*/
export async function runRetentionCron(options: {
authorization: string | null | undefined;
secret: string | undefined | null;
configuredDays: string | number | undefined | null;
conn: AnalyticsConn;
}): Promise<RetentionOutcome> {
if (!isAuthorizedCron(options.authorization, options.secret)) {
return { status: 401, body: { error: "Unauthorized" } };
}
const days = resolveRetentionDays(options.configuredDays);
try {
const deleted = await pruneVisitorAnalytics(options.conn, days);
return { status: 200, body: { success: true, days, deleted } };
} catch (error) {
console.error("Analytics retention job failed:", error);
return { status: 500, body: { error: "Analytics retention job failed", days } };
}
}

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ const sampleArgs = [
2, // inp
3, // ttfb
4, // dom_load
5 // load_complete
5, // load_complete
"click", // stage
"nook.freno.me" // host
];
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
}
// The reverse direction matters too: a column the code writes but the
// DDL omits is the failure this whole file exists to catch.
expect(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.length).toBe(23);
expect(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.length).toBe(25);
});
it("has one placeholder per inserted column", () => {
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
const row = db
.prepare(
`SELECT path, country, utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign
`SELECT path, country, utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, stage, host
FROM VisitorAnalytics`
)
.get() as Record<string, unknown>;
@@ -93,7 +95,9 @@ describe("VisitorAnalytics schema", () => {
country: "GB",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch"
utm_campaign: "launch",
stage: "click",
host: "nook.freno.me"
});
});

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL = `
utm_source TEXT,
utm_medium TEXT,
utm_campaign TEXT,
stage TEXT,
host TEXT,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES User(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
)
`;
@@ -79,6 +81,18 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS = [
{
name: "utm_campaign",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN utm_campaign TEXT`
},
{
// Which funnel stage a download row is: "click" (a door) or "served"
// (the file route). Null on every non-download row (FRE-366).
name: "stage",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN stage TEXT`
},
{
// The Host the client addressed, e.g. "nook.freno.me" — the site
// dimension the table never had (FRE-366).
name: "host",
ddl: `ALTER TABLE VisitorAnalytics ADD COLUMN host TEXT`
}
];
@@ -110,7 +124,9 @@ export const VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS = [
"inp",
"ttfb",
"dom_load",
"load_complete"
"load_complete",
"stage",
"host"
] as const;
/**

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INDEXES,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT
} from "./analytics-schema";
import { truncateIpAddress } from "./request-client";
import { pruneVisitorAnalytics } from "./analytics-retention";
/**
* Idempotent schema bootstrap, mirroring `nook.ts`. The table had no DDL in
@@ -64,6 +66,10 @@ export interface AnalyticsEntry {
ttfb?: number | null;
domLoad?: number | null;
loadComplete?: number | null;
/** Funnel stage for download rows ("click" | "served"); null elsewhere. */
stage?: string | null;
/** Host the client addressed, e.g. "nook.freno.me" — the site dimension. */
host?: string | null;
}
/**
@@ -124,7 +130,9 @@ async function flushAnalyticsBuffer(): Promise<void> {
entry.inp || null,
entry.ttfb || null,
entry.domLoad || null,
entry.loadComplete || null
entry.loadComplete || null,
entry.stage || null,
entry.host || null
]
});
}
@@ -258,6 +266,8 @@ export async function queryAnalytics(
utm_medium: row.utm_medium as string | null,
utm_campaign: row.utm_campaign as string | null,
duration_ms: row.duration_ms as number | null,
stage: row.stage as string | null,
host: row.host as string | null,
created_at: row.created_at as string
}));
}
@@ -309,6 +319,10 @@ export async function getAnalyticsSummary(days: number = 30): Promise<{
});
const totalApiCalls = (totalApiCallsResult.rows[0]?.count as number) || 0;
// Since the FRE-369 privacy floor, `ip_address` holds a truncated prefix
// (/24 for v4, /56 for v6), so this counts distinct prefixes — households and
// mobile exits, not machines. It was never accurate before that either: every
// row held the proxy's loopback, so the count was 1.
const uniqueVisitorsResult = await conn.execute({
sql: `SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address) as count FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE ip_address IS NOT NULL
@@ -620,19 +634,15 @@ export async function getPerformanceStats(days: number = 30): Promise<{
};
}
/**
* Delete visitor analytics older than `olderThanDays`. Reachable from tRPC
* (admin) and from the daily retention cron (`/api/analytics/retention`);
* the SQL and the input rules live in `./analytics-retention`.
*/
export async function cleanupOldAnalytics(
olderThanDays: number
): Promise<number> {
const conn = ConnectionFactory();
const result = await conn.execute({
sql: `DELETE FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at < datetime('now', '-${olderThanDays} days')
RETURNING id`,
args: []
});
return result.rows.length;
return pruneVisitorAnalytics(ConnectionFactory(), olderThanDays);
}
function parseUserAgent(userAgent?: string): {
@@ -667,6 +677,16 @@ function parseUserAgent(userAgent?: string): {
return { deviceType, browser, os };
}
/**
* Fill in what the writer did not supply, and apply the privacy floor.
*
* Every analytics entry — page views, tRPC context, downloads, checkout —
* passes through here, which is why the truncation lives here and not at the
* call sites: a future writer cannot forget it, and no caller can persist a
* full client address by accident (FRE-369, finding Q4). The audit log
* (`./audit.ts`) is a separate, pre-existing surface with its own stakes and is
* deliberately untouched by this change.
*/
export function enrichAnalyticsEntry(entry: AnalyticsEntry): AnalyticsEntry {
const { deviceType, browser, os } = parseUserAgent(
entry.userAgent || undefined
@@ -674,6 +694,7 @@ export function enrichAnalyticsEntry(entry: AnalyticsEntry): AnalyticsEntry {
return {
...entry,
ipAddress: truncateIpAddress(entry.ipAddress),
deviceType: entry.deviceType || deviceType,
browser: entry.browser || browser,
os: entry.os || os

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
} from "~/server/analytics";
import { ConnectionFactory } from "~/server/database";
import { v4 as uuid } from "uuid";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
import { parseUtm } from "~/server/utm";
import { VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT } from "~/server/analytics-schema";
@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
getHeader(req.headers, "referer") ||
getHeader(req.headers, "referrer") ||
getHeader(ctx.event.request?.headers, "referer");
const ipAddress = getRequestIP(ctx.event.nativeEvent) || undefined;
const ipAddress = resolveClientIp(ctx.event) || undefined;
const host = requestHost(ctx.event) || undefined;
const enriched = enrichAnalyticsEntry({
userId: ctx.userId,
path: input.path,
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
userAgent,
referrer,
ipAddress,
host,
// The client beacon sends `pathname + search`, so the page URL's
// own query string is the campaign source; the referrer fills any
// gap (e.g. clicks that arrive on a clean path).
@@ -145,7 +147,9 @@ export const analyticsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
enriched.inp || null,
enriched.ttfb || null,
enriched.domLoad || null,
enriched.loadComplete || null
enriched.loadComplete || null,
enriched.stage || null,
enriched.host || null
]
});

View File

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export const downloadsRouter = createTRPCRouter({
// exactly the event the funnel needs to show. Unknown asset names are
// skipped rather than recorded as a download that never happened.
if (assets[input.asset_name] || latestAssets[input.asset_name]) {
await trackDownload(ctx.event, input.asset_name);
await trackDownload(ctx.event, input.asset_name, "click");
}
const bucket = env.VITE_DOWNLOAD_BUCKET_STRING;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { logVisit, enrichAnalyticsEntry } from "~/server/analytics";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
import { getAuthPayloadFromEvent } from "~/server/auth";
export type Context = {
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ async function createContextInner(event: APIEvent): Promise<Context> {
getHeader(req.headers, "referer") ||
getHeader(req.headers, "referrer") ||
getHeader(event.request?.headers, "referer");
const ipAddress = getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent) || undefined;
// Behind the production proxy the direct peer is loopback, so the real
// client address comes from the forwarded header the proxy sets — see
// `~/server/request-client` for the trust boundary (FRE-366).
const ipAddress = resolveClientIp(event) || undefined;
const host = requestHost(event) || undefined;
// Don't log the performance logging endpoint itself to avoid circular tracking
if (!path.includes("analytics.logPerformance")) {
@@ -62,7 +66,8 @@ async function createContextInner(event: APIEvent): Promise<Context> {
method,
userAgent,
referrer,
ipAddress
ipAddress,
host
})
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, mock } from "bun:test";
// The trust boundary of FRE-366, as corrected by the FRE-369 security review.
// Two things must stay true here:
// 1. The address we record is the visitor, not whoever typed a header first.
// Cloudflare and the origin proxy both *append* to x-forwarded-for, so the
// leftmost hop is the client's own invention — `cf-connecting-ip` (which
// Cloudflare overwrites) comes first, then the hop below the trusted edge.
// 2. What reaches the database is a prefix, never a full address
// (`truncateIpAddress`), because a visitor row is not worth a precise
// location.
// A regression on (1) re-records whatever an attacker claims; on (2) it stores
// personal data we promised not to.
let directIp: string | null = null;
mock.module("vinxi/http", () => ({
getRequestIP: () => directIp
}));
const {
resolveClientIp,
isLoopbackAddress,
isIpAddress,
truncateIpAddress,
normaliseHost,
requestHost
} = await import("./request-client");
function event(
headers: Record<string, string> = {},
url = "https://nook.freno.me/downloads"
) {
return {
request: new Request(url, { headers }),
nativeEvent: {}
} as never;
}
beforeEach(() => {
directIp = null;
});
describe("resolveClientIp", () => {
it("prefers Cloudflare's connecting address over any forwarded header", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("takes the hop below the trusted edge — never the leftmost one", () => {
// client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy: the sender's spoof is
// first, the real client second, the edge last.
directIp = "::1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("refuses a single-hop forwarded header: nothing above it to discount", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(event({ "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9" }))
).toBe("127.0.0.1");
});
it("ignores a forwarded header from a real peer — it is spoofable", () => {
directIp = "203.0.113.7";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "198.51.100.9",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("ignores a header value that is not an address", () => {
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(
event({
"cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-address",
"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 203.0.113.7, 198.51.100.1"
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
directIp = "127.0.0.1";
expect(
resolveClientIp(event({ "cf-connecting-ip": "evil.example.com" }))
).toBe("127.0.0.1");
});
it("keeps the loopback peer when the proxy set nothing usable", () => {
directIp = "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
expect(resolveClientIp(event())).toBe("::ffff:127.0.0.1");
});
it("records nothing rather than inventing an address", () => {
expect(resolveClientIp(event())).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
it("covers the v4 range and every spelling of v6 loopback", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.53")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.9.9.9")).toBe(true);
});
it("is not loopback for a real peer, or for text it cannot parse", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("10.0.0.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("localhost")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.53")).toBe(false); // not a complete address
expect(isLoopbackAddress("")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("isIpAddress", () => {
it("accepts a dotted quad and an IPv6 literal", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("198.51.100.9")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:198.51.100.9")).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects anything a proxy could not have meant", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("999.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("1.2.3")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8:::1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("evil.example.com")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("truncateIpAddress", () => {
it("cuts IPv4 to its /24", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("198.51.100.9")).toBe("198.51.100.0");
expect(truncateIpAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe("127.0.0.0");
});
it("cuts IPv6 to its /56, uncompressed and stable", () => {
expect(
truncateIpAddress("2001:db8:85a3:1234:5678:9abc:defa:1234")
).toBe("2001:db8:85a3:1200:0:0:0:0");
// The compressed spelling of the same address truncates to the same string,
// so `COUNT(DISTINCT ip_address)` cannot be split by how a proxy rendered it.
expect(truncateIpAddress("2001:db8:85a3:1234::")).toBe(
"2001:db8:85a3:1200:0:0:0:0"
);
expect(truncateIpAddress("::1")).toBe("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0");
});
it("treats an IPv4-mapped v6 address as the v4 it is", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("::ffff:198.51.100.9")).toBe("198.51.100.0");
});
it("drops what it cannot parse rather than storing it", () => {
expect(truncateIpAddress("203.0.113.999")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress("<script>alert(1)</script>")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress("")).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress(null)).toBeNull();
expect(truncateIpAddress(undefined)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("normaliseHost", () => {
it("lowercases and strips the port so the weekly host scope can match", () => {
expect(normaliseHost("Nook.Freno.ME:443")).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(normaliseHost("nook.freno.me.")).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(normaliseHost("[::1]:3000")).toBe("::1");
expect(normaliseHost(" ")).toBeNull();
expect(normaliseHost(null)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("requestHost", () => {
it("reads the host the client addressed from the request URL", () => {
expect(requestHost(event())).toBe("nook.freno.me");
expect(requestHost(event({}, "https://freno.me/"))).toBe("freno.me");
});
it("normalises a host that carries a port", () => {
expect(requestHost(event({}, "https://nook.freno.me:443/downloads"))).toBe(
"nook.freno.me"
);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import { hostFromEventLike } from "./site-context-server";
/**
* The client address and the site a request addressed, for the analytics
* writers (FRE-366).
*
* Until this existed every writer called `getRequestIP` and only looked at
* `x-forwarded-for` when it returned null — so behind the production proxy the
* recorded address was the proxy itself, and all 12,035 addressed rows in
* VisitorAnalytics carried 127.0.0.1 / ::1.
*
* STANDING RULE (FRE-369, the security review of that change): nothing here is
* a security signal. The address is a *best guess at a visitor*, not an
* authenticated identity — do not import it into auth, rate limiting, abuse
* control, fraud checks, or anything that grants or denies access. A caller
* that needs a security decision must re-derive trust for its own stakes; the
* blast radius of a wrong answer here is a poisoned analytics row, and that is
* the only reason the shortcuts below are acceptable.
*
* Trust boundary, stated plainly: `x-forwarded-for` is client-controlled text.
* It is believed only when the direct peer is a loopback address — the
* production shape, where a same-host proxy (nginx/caddy) terminates TLS and
* sets the header itself. Anywhere else the direct peer IS the client (dev,
* direct hit) and a forwarded header from it is ignored as spoofable.
*
* Which hop is the visitor (FRE-369 finding Q1): the request arrives as
* `client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy → app`, and both proxies
* *append*. So `x-forwarded-for` reaches us as
* `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the leftmost
* hop is exactly the one the sender chose — the original FRE-366 read took it
* and was wrong. Order of preference:
*
* 1. `cf-connecting-ip` — Cloudflare *overwrites* this header, so a
* client-supplied value never survives the edge. Authoritative.
* 2. `x-forwarded-for`, counted from the right: drop the rightmost hop (the
* Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the one
* before it. Never the leftmost.
* 3. the direct peer, as before.
*
* h3's own `getRequestIP(event, { xForwardedFor: true })` also takes the
* leftmost hop, so it is not a fix for this and must not be swapped in.
*
* Residual caveat, deliberately not papered over: step 2 assumes the pinned
* topology (one trusted proxy above us, i.e. Cloudflare). Behind a *single*
* forwarding proxy that does not set `cf-connecting-ip`, a client that sent its
* own `x-forwarded-for` sits at the hop we read. That is why the value is only
* ever stored truncated (see `truncateIpAddress`) and why it stays out of every
* security path. Deploy-side precondition this repo cannot verify: the origin
* must be reachable only from Cloudflare (origin firewall / authenticated
* origin pull). If it is directly reachable, an attacker can set every header
* in this file and no read here can recover the truth.
*/
/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
/**
* Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
* taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
* because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
* raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
*/
const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
function header(event: APIEvent, name: string): string | null {
try {
return event.request?.headers?.get?.(name) ?? null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* The visitor's address, resolved through the trust boundary above.
*
* Never store the result of this directly: `enrichAnalyticsEntry` runs every
* analytics entry through {@link truncateIpAddress} so a full address cannot
* reach the database even from a writer that forgets. Callers that need the
* un-truncated value must justify it in review.
*/
export function resolveClientIp(event: APIEvent): string | null {
const direct = getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent);
// A real peer is its own client: believed, and no forwarded header from it
// is (it would be the peer lying about who it is).
if (direct && !isLoopbackAddress(direct)) return direct;
// 1. Cloudflare's own record of the connecting address.
const connecting = cleanHop(header(event, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
// 2. Rightmost-minus-the-trusted-hop, never leftmost.
const hops = (header(event, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
.split(",")
.map(cleanHop)
.filter(Boolean);
const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
if (index >= 0) {
const candidate = hops[index]!;
if (isIpAddress(candidate)) return candidate;
}
// 3. Nothing trustworthy: record what we actually saw, even though it is the
// proxy. `readTraffic` reports these rows rather than hiding them.
return direct ?? null;
}
function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
return (value ?? "").trim();
}
/**
* Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
*
* Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
* `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
* recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
* closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
* believed.
*/
export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
if (!bytes) return false;
if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
// IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
const tail = bytes[15]!;
return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
}
// ── Addresses: parse, validate, truncate ────────────────────────────────────
/**
* The privacy floor the security review required before this ships (FRE-369,
* finding Q4): VisitorAnalytics must never hold a full client address. IPv4 is
* cut to /24, IPv6 to /56 — the prefix that identifies a household and that a
* rotating "privacy" IPv6 address does not actually change. Funnel stages count
* rows, and `uniqueVisitors` survives as a count of distinct prefixes, so
* nothing measured here needs the last octet.
*
* An address that does not parse is dropped rather than stored: an unparseable
* string is client text we cannot reason about, and keeping it would smuggle
* the very granularity this function exists to remove.
*/
export function truncateIpAddress(ip: string | null | undefined): string | null {
const value = cleanHop(ip);
if (!value) return null;
const bytes = addressBytes(value);
if (!bytes) return null;
const mapped = bytes.length === 16 ? ipv4FromBytes(bytes) : null;
if (bytes.length === 4 || mapped) {
const octets = (mapped ?? value).split(".").map(Number) as number[];
return `${octets[0]}.${octets[1]}.${octets[2]}.0`;
}
// /56 = keep the first 7 bytes, zero the rest. Rendered uncompressed and
// lowercase so one client always truncates to one stored string.
const kept = bytes.map((_, i) => (i >= 7 ? 0 : _));
const groups: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
groups.push((((kept[i]! << 8) | kept[i + 1]!) >>> 0).toString(16));
}
return groups.join(":");
}
/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
}
function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
const parts = value.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
return parts.every(
(part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
);
}
/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
const halves = raw.split("::");
if (halves.length > 2) return null;
const compressed = halves.length === 2;
const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
if (!head || !tail) return null;
const total = head.length + tail.length;
if (compressed) {
if (total > 8) return null;
return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
if (total !== 8) return null;
return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
if (side === "") return [];
const out: number[] = [];
for (const part of side.split(":")) {
if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
} else if (isIpv4(part)) {
const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
} else {
return null;
}
}
return out;
}
function split16(group: number): number[] {
return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
}
/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
}
/**
* The site the request addressed — the `Host` the client asked for, normalised
* to `nook.freno.me`. Recorded on every analytics row so a weekly read can
* scope to one site; without it `/` on nook.freno.me is the same row as `/` on
* freno.me. Thin alias over the site-context extractor so the analytics writers
* share one host-parsing implementation with routing.
*
* Normalised (lowercased, port stripped) because the weekly read scopes with
* `host = ?`: `nook.freno.me:443` or `Nook.Freno.ME` would otherwise store a
* value that silently never matches the scope (FRE-369, finding Q3 — no
* injection risk, but a correctness one worth fixing at write time).
*/
export function requestHost(event: APIEvent): string | null {
return normaliseHost(hostFromEventLike(event)) ?? normaliseHost(urlHost(event));
}
function urlHost(event: APIEvent): string | null {
// `host` is a forbidden header and some server shapes drop it from
// `event.request.headers`; the request URL is absolute on the server and
// carries the same host the client addressed.
try {
const url = event.request?.url;
return url ? new URL(url).host || null : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Lowercase, drop the port and any trailing dot; null when nothing is left. */
export function normaliseHost(host: string | null | undefined): string | null {
const raw = cleanHop(host).toLowerCase();
if (!raw) return null;
// A bracketed IPv6 literal keeps its brackets' contents (`[::1]:3000` →
// `::1`); anything else drops a trailing `:port`.
const closing = raw.indexOf("]");
const withoutPort = raw.startsWith("[")
? closing > 0
? raw.slice(1, closing)
: raw.slice(1)
: raw.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
const trimmed = withoutPort.replace(/\.$/, "");
return trimmed || null;
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { getCookie, setCookie } from "vinxi/http";
import type { H3Event } from "vinxi/http";
import { t } from "~/server/api/utils";
import { logAuditEvent } from "~/server/audit";
import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
import { env } from "~/env/server";
import {
AUTH_CONFIG,
@@ -328,39 +329,15 @@ async function cleanupExpiredRateLimits(): Promise<void> {
}
/**
* Get client IP address from request headers.
* Only trusts X-Forwarded-For outside of local development (set by the Vercel
* edge network in production; trusted in tests so the header-parsing path is
* exercised). In local development, uses the socket address to prevent header
* spoofing.
* Get client IP address for a security decision (rate limiting, audit).
*
* Thin alias over `resolveTrustedClientIp` (./trusted-client-ip), which owns
* the trust order: the previous leftmost `x-forwarded-for` read was
* client-spoofable in our append-only proxy topology, and `x-real-ip` was
* read unconditionally — both fixed there (FRE-371).
*/
export function getClientIP(event: H3Event): string {
// In production on Vercel, X-Forwarded-For is set by the edge network
// and cannot be spoofed by clients. In dev, ignore it.
if (env.NODE_ENV !== "development") {
const forwarded = getHeaderValue(event, "x-forwarded-for");
if (forwarded) {
return forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
}
const realIP = getHeaderValue(event, "x-real-ip");
if (realIP) {
return realIP;
}
}
// Fallback: try socket remote address
try {
const nodeReq = event.node.req;
if (nodeReq?.socket?.remoteAddress) {
const addr = nodeReq.socket.remoteAddress;
// Clean up IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses
return addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "");
}
} catch {
// socket access failed
}
return "unknown";
return resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
}
/**

View File

@@ -150,29 +150,100 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
});
describe("getClientIP", () => {
it("should extract IP from x-forwarded-for header", () => {
// FRE-371: the read is spoof-resistant now. In the pinned topology
// (client → Cloudflare → origin proxy → app) both proxies APPEND, so
// x-forwarded-for arrives as `<spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and the
// leftmost hop is whatever the sender typed. Trust order:
// cf-connecting-ip, then x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, then the
// socket peer — never the leftmost hop, never x-real-ip.
it("takes x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, never the leftmost hop", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1" }
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.1");
});
it("should extract IP from x-real-ip header", () => {
it("prefers cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge)", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not change the resolved client", () => {
// The spoof the old read fell for: same Cloudflare-recorded client,
// different sender-chosen prefix per request. The key must be stable,
// or each rotation mints a fresh rate-limit bucket.
const first = getClientIP(
createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
);
const second = getClientIP(
createMockEvent({
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "2.2.2.2, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
);
expect(first).toBe("203.0.113.7");
expect(second).toBe(first);
});
it("ignores x-real-ip entirely (client-settable in this topology)", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.2");
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
});
it("should prefer x-forwarded-for over x-real-ip", () => {
it("ignores a client-supplied single-hop x-forwarded-for with no trusted proxy above it", () => {
// One hop only = the sender's own invention; discounting the trusted
// hop leaves nothing to believe.
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
});
it("a non-loopback socket peer is the client and beats every header", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1",
"x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2"
"cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1",
"x-real-ip": "6.6.6.6"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("198.51.100.23");
});
it("a loopback socket peer lets the forwarded headers speak", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
}
});
@@ -198,13 +269,23 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
it("should handle IPv6 addresses", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334"
"x-forwarded-for":
"2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334, 10.0.0.1"
}
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
});
it("rejects a candidate hop that is not an address", () => {
const event = createMockEvent({
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "not-an-ip, 10.0.0.1" }
});
const ip = getClientIP(event);
expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
});
});
describe("rateLimitLogin", () => {

View File

@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
cookies?: Record<string, string>;
method?: string;
url?: string;
/** Socket peer the server observed; omit for a peer-less synthetic event. */
remoteAddress?: string;
}): H3Event {
const {
headers = {},
cookies = {},
method = "POST",
url = "http://localhost:3000/"
url = "http://localhost:3000/",
remoteAddress
} = options;
// Build the cookie header string from the cookies object only
@@ -49,7 +52,10 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
headers: headersObj,
node: {
req: {
headers: allHeaders
headers: allHeaders,
...(remoteAddress
? { socket: { remoteAddress } }
: {})
},
res: {
cookies: {}

View File

@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ export interface ServerSiteEvent {
* the raw Node request via `event.nativeEvent.node.req.headers`. We try
* both so this works for API route handlers (`APIEvent`), the SSR document
* handler (`PageEvent`), and tRPC procedures operating on the underlying
* `H3Event`.
* `H3Event`. Also used by the analytics writers to record the site dimension
* (`host` column) on every row (FRE-366).
*/
function hostFromEventLike(event: ServerSiteEvent | unknown): string | null {
export function hostFromEventLike(event: ServerSiteEvent | unknown): string | null {
// 1) Web FetchEvent / APIEvent / PageEvent → standard `Request` headers.
try {
const req = (event as { request?: Request } | null)?.request;

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
import { getRequestIP } from "vinxi/http";
import {
logVisit,
enrichAnalyticsEntry,
@@ -7,6 +6,7 @@ import {
} from "~/server/analytics";
import { parseUtm } from "~/server/utm";
import { downloadPath } from "~/lib/download-asset";
import { resolveClientIp, requestHost } from "~/server/request-client";
/**
* Record one download event under the canonical path `/api/downloads/<asset>`.
@@ -15,35 +15,75 @@ import { downloadPath } from "~/lib/download-asset";
* label per asset to group on: the tRPC click proxy, the S3 file route that
* serves Sparkle updates, and the Nook door.
*
* The `stage` is what separates the doors within one asset label: "click"
* for a door the visitor chose (landing button, tRPC proxy), "served" for
* the file route that actually streams the DMG. Until FRE-366 both wrote the
* same unlabelled row, so "download click → DMG served" could not be split —
* one served click wrote two identical rows. `summariseDownloads()` and the
* /analytics downloads block still group on the path alone; the stage is a
* separate column precisely so that grouping cannot change.
*
* Best-effort by design — a failed analytics write must never block a
* download. Flushed rather than merely buffered: a download is low-volume and
* the 30s batch timer is not guaranteed to survive the response on serverless.
*/
export async function trackDownload(
event: APIEvent,
asset: string,
stage: DownloadStage
): Promise<void> {
await trackRequest(event, {
path: downloadPath(asset),
method: "GET",
stage
});
}
export type DownloadStage = "click" | "served";
export interface TrackedRequest {
path: string;
method: string;
/** Funnel stage label; only download rows carry one today. */
stage?: string | null;
}
/**
* Record one server-side request event with the shared visitor dimensions:
* referrer, campaign tags, edge country, real client address and host.
*
* This is the one writer every measured door goes through — download doors
* via `trackDownload`, the checkout door directly — so the dimensions can
* never drift between doors. Same best-effort, flushed-immediately contract
* as `trackDownload`.
*
* `event.request` is expected to be a Fetch `Request` (true for Vinxi route
* handlers and browser tRPC calls). A server-side `createCaller` hands over a
* Node request, whose headers have no `get` — that throw is swallowed below,
* so such a click is not recorded. No server-side caller downloads today.
* so such an event is not recorded. No server-side caller downloads today.
*/
export async function trackDownload(
export async function trackRequest(
event: APIEvent,
asset: string
tracked: TrackedRequest
): Promise<void> {
const { request } = event;
try {
const referrer =
request.headers.get("referer") ?? request.headers.get("referrer");
const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
await logVisit(
enrichAnalyticsEntry({
path: downloadPath(asset),
method: "GET",
path: tracked.path,
method: tracked.method,
stage: tracked.stage ?? null,
referrer,
userAgent: request.headers.get("user-agent"),
ipAddress:
getRequestIP(event.nativeEvent) ??
(forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : null),
// Behind the production proxy the direct peer is loopback; the real
// client address comes from the forwarded header the proxy sets —
// see `~/server/request-client` for the trust boundary.
ipAddress: resolveClientIp(event),
host: requestHost(event),
// The click carries its own tags when a campaign links straight at the
// door; otherwise the landing page's tags ride along in the referer.
...parseUtm(request.url, referrer),
@@ -56,6 +96,6 @@ export async function trackDownload(
);
await flushAnalytics();
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to log download of ${asset}:`, error);
console.error(`Failed to log ${tracked.method} ${tracked.path}:`, error);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import {
resolveTrustedClientIp,
isIpAddress,
isLoopbackAddress,
UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP,
type ClientIpEventLike
} from "./trusted-client-ip";
/**
* Unit coverage for the security-path client-IP read (FRE-371). The caller
* suites (rate-limit.test.ts, report.test.ts) pin the behaviour through
* getClientIP and the route; this file pins the helper's own edges: the peer
* forms a real socket can present, the APIEvent wrapper, and failing closed.
*/
function event(opts: {
headers?: Record<string, string>;
remoteAddress?: string;
wrapped?: boolean;
}): ClientIpEventLike {
const inner: ClientIpEventLike = {
...(opts.remoteAddress
? { node: { req: { socket: { remoteAddress: opts.remoteAddress } } } }
: {}),
request: { headers: new Headers(opts.headers ?? {}) }
};
// An APIEvent wraps its H3Event as `nativeEvent` (routes/api/* shape).
return opts.wrapped ? { nativeEvent: inner } : inner;
}
describe("resolveTrustedClientIp", () => {
it("trust order: non-loopback peer, then cf-connecting-ip, then rightmost-minus-one x-forwarded-for", () => {
// Peer wins.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
)
).toBe("198.51.100.23");
// Loopback peer → Cloudflare's record.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: {
"cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
"x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
}
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
// No CF header → the hop below the trusted proxy.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("reads the wrapped H3Event of an APIEvent-shaped input", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
wrapped: true,
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("never returns a truncated address", () => {
// The full /128 is the bucket key; a truncated one would pool attackers
// with their neighbours.
const ip = resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334" }
})
);
expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
});
it("fails closed to the stricter unknown key", () => {
// One hop = the sender's own invention; a non-address hop; nothing at all.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-ip" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
expect(resolveTrustedClientIp(event({}))).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
});
it("recognises the loopback forms a real peer presents", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
// IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback from a node socket.
remoteAddress: "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "::1",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
// A non-loopback peer that merely looks odd is still the client.
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({
remoteAddress: "::ffff:203.0.113.7",
headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6" }
})
)
).toBe("203.0.113.7");
});
it("never believes x-real-ip", () => {
expect(
resolveTrustedClientIp(
event({ headers: { "x-real-ip": "203.0.113.7" } })
)
).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
});
});
describe("address helpers", () => {
it("isIpAddress", () => {
expect(isIpAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isIpAddress("not-an-ip")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("256.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
expect(isIpAddress(undefined)).toBe(false);
});
it("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.255.0.3")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
expect(isLoopbackAddress("::2")).toBe(false);
// Unparseable input is not loopback — fails closed.
expect(isLoopbackAddress("garbage")).toBe(false);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
/**
* The client address, resolved for security decisions (FRE-371).
*
* This is the ONLY client-IP read allowed to feed a security decision — rate
* limiting, abuse quotas, account lockout, audit trails. It exists separately
* from `request-client.ts`'s `resolveClientIp` (the analytics read) on
* purpose:
*
* - `resolveClientIp` carries a standing rule (FRE-369 review, 1d9287a):
* it never feeds a security decision. Its blast radius is a poisoned
* analytics row; ours is granting or denying access.
* - Rate limiting needs the UN-truncated address; the analytics module only
* ever hands out truncated prefixes.
* - `request-client.ts` ships on FRE-366's branch, which is under review;
* a security fix must not merge-depend on an analytics diff.
*
* The address-parsing primitives below are therefore a deliberate port of the
* reviewed ones, not an import. If the two ever drift, this file's version is
* the one security paths follow.
*
* WHY the old read was spoofable: `security.ts`'s `getClientIP` took the
* LEFTMOST `x-forwarded-for` hop, believing the header "cannot be spoofed".
* In the pinned topology — client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy →
* app — both proxies *append*, so the header arrives as
* `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the
* leftmost hop is exactly the one the sender chose. Rotating
* `X-Forwarded-For: <random>` per request minted a fresh rate-limit bucket
* and unlimited bug-report quota. `x-real-ip` was read unconditionally too;
* nothing in this topology overwrites it, so it is equally client text and is
* no longer read at all.
*
* Trust order (matches the convention FRE-366 landed after its security
* review, re-derived here for security stakes):
*
* 1. The direct socket peer, when it is a real routable address: it IS the
* client (dev, direct hit), and any forwarded header from it is the
* client describing itself — ignored.
* 2. `cf-connecting-ip` — reachable only when the peer is the loopback
* origin proxy (or unreadable, e.g. a synthetic event in tests).
* Cloudflare *overwrites* this header at the edge, so a client-supplied
* value never survives. Must parse as an address.
* 3. `x-forwarded-for` counted from the RIGHT: drop the rightmost hop (the
* Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the hop
* before it. Never the leftmost. Must parse as an address.
* 4. "unknown" — callers give unknown-IP keys stricter shared limits, so
* an unresolvable client fails toward a tighter bucket, never a looser
* one.
*
* Deploy-side precondition this code cannot verify (same as the analytics
* read): the origin must be reachable only through Cloudflare and the
* same-host proxy. If the app is directly internet-reachable, a client can
* set every header read here and no in-app read can recover the truth.
*/
/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
/**
* Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
* taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
* because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
* raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
*/
const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
/** Returned when no trustworthy address exists. Callers rate-limit it harder. */
export const UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP = "unknown";
/**
* The shapes this module reads: an H3Event (`security.ts` callers) or a
* SolidStart APIEvent (`routes/api/*`), which wraps its H3Event as
* `nativeEvent`. Every field is optional because test doubles are minimal;
* anything unreadable simply falls through to the next trust step.
*/
export interface ClientIpEventLike {
request?: { headers?: unknown };
headers?: unknown;
node?: {
req?: {
headers?: Record<string, unknown>;
socket?: { remoteAddress?: string };
};
};
nativeEvent?: ClientIpEventLike;
}
/**
* The client address for a security decision, per the trust order above.
* Never truncated: rate-limit buckets are per-address, and truncating would
* let an attacker share a bucket with the innocents behind their /24.
*/
export function resolveTrustedClientIp(event: ClientIpEventLike): string {
// An APIEvent's socket and (authoritative) headers live on the wrapped
// H3Event; a bare APIEvent-shaped double without one is read as-is.
const source = event.nativeEvent ?? event;
const peer = directPeer(source);
if (peer && isIpAddress(peer) && !isLoopbackAddress(peer)) return peer;
// The peer is the loopback origin proxy (or unreadable): forwarded headers
// may be believed, in the order above.
const connecting = cleanHop(headerValue(source, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
const hops = (headerValue(source, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
.split(",")
.map(cleanHop)
.filter(Boolean);
const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
if (index >= 0 && isIpAddress(hops[index])) return hops[index]!;
return UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP;
}
/** The socket peer, IPv6-mapped IPv4 flattened (`::ffff:1.2.3.4` → `1.2.3.4`). */
function directPeer(event: ClientIpEventLike): string | null {
try {
const addr = event.node?.req?.socket?.remoteAddress;
return addr ? addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "") : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Header read tolerant of every event shape in play: Fetch-style
* `request.headers.get`, an h3 `event.headers` (Headers or plain object), and
* the raw node request headers. Header names are case-insensitive per HTTP;
* the plain-object fallbacks lowercase to match how node and the test doubles
* store them.
*/
function headerValue(event: ClientIpEventLike, name: string): string | null {
try {
const fromHeaders = (h: unknown): string | null => {
if (!h) return null;
if (typeof (h as Headers).get === "function") {
return (h as Headers).get(name) ?? null;
}
if (typeof h === "object") {
const record = h as Record<string, unknown>;
const value = record[name] ?? record[name.toLowerCase()];
return typeof value === "string" ? value : null;
}
return null;
};
return (
fromHeaders(event.request?.headers) ??
fromHeaders(event.headers) ??
fromHeaders(event.node?.req?.headers)
);
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
return (value ?? "").trim();
}
// ── Addresses: parse and validate ───────────────────────────────────────────
// Ported from the reviewed `request-client.ts` (FRE-366 @ 1d9287a); see the
// header comment for why this is a copy and not an import.
/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
}
/**
* Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
*
* Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
* `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
* recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
* closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
* believed (a non-loopback peer short-circuits before headers are read).
*/
export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
if (!bytes) return false;
if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
// IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
const tail = bytes[15]!;
return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
}
function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
const parts = value.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
return parts.every(
(part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
);
}
/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
const halves = raw.split("::");
if (halves.length > 2) return null;
const compressed = halves.length === 2;
const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
if (!head || !tail) return null;
const total = head.length + tail.length;
if (compressed) {
if (total > 8) return null;
return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
if (total !== 8) return null;
return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
}
/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
if (side === "") return [];
const out: number[] = [];
for (const part of side.split(":")) {
if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
} else if (isIpv4(part)) {
const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
} else {
return null;
}
}
return out;
}
function split16(group: number): number[] {
return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
}
/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,520 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT
} from "./analytics-schema";
import {
NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH,
NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
NOOK_HOST,
ensureAnalyticsSchema,
getWeeklyReport,
pickMover,
readCampaigns,
readFunnel,
readTraffic,
renderWeeklyMarkdown,
windowsFor,
type Connections,
type FunnelCounts,
type MetricsConn
} from "./weekly-metrics";
// Same reasoning as the backfill suite: the queries run real SQL, so an
// in-memory SQLite shaped like production is the only honest stand-in. A stub
// that returned canned rows would pass with a column or a label the live table
// does not have.
const NOOK_DDL = [
`CREATE TABLE trials (
fingerprint TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
started_at TEXT NOT NULL,
email TEXT
)`,
`CREATE TABLE licenses (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
key TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
email TEXT NOT NULL,
stripe_session_id TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
)`,
`CREATE TABLE activations (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
license_id TEXT NOT NULL,
device_fingerprint TEXT NOT NULL,
device_name TEXT NOT NULL,
activated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
deactivated_at TEXT
)`
];
function adapter(db: Database): MetricsConn {
return {
async execute(query) {
const args = (query.args ?? []) as never[];
const statement = db.query(query.sql);
if (/^\s*(select|pragma|with)\b/i.test(query.sql)) {
return { rows: statement.all(...args) as unknown[], rowsAffected: 0 };
}
return {
rows: [] as unknown[],
rowsAffected: statement.run(...args).changes
};
}
};
}
let analyticsDb: Database;
let nookDb: Database;
let conns: Connections;
const NOW = new Date("2026-10-29T16:00:00Z");
// A row as the post-FRE-366 writers record it: real client address, the host
// it addressed, and a stage label where the row is a download.
const row = (
overrides: Record<string, unknown>
): Record<string, unknown> => ({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
user_id: null,
path: "/",
method: "GET",
referrer: null,
user_agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh)",
// What the writers store since the FRE-369 privacy floor: a /24 (or /56 for
// IPv6), never the address itself.
ip_address: "203.0.113.0",
country: "GB",
device_type: "desktop",
browser: "safari",
os: "macos",
utm_source: null,
utm_medium: null,
utm_campaign: null,
duration_ms: null,
fcp: null,
lcp: null,
cls: null,
fid: null,
inp: null,
ttfb: null,
dom_load: null,
load_complete: null,
stage: null,
host: NOOK_HOST,
...overrides
});
function insertAnalytics(overrides: Record<string, unknown>): void {
const values = row(overrides);
analyticsDb
.prepare(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT)
.run(...(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.map((column) => values[column]) as never[]));
// `created_at` is not in VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS (it defaults to now), so
// the window each row belongs to has to be set after the insert.
if (values.created_at) {
analyticsDb
.prepare(`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = ? WHERE id = ?`)
.run(values.created_at as string, values.id as string);
}
}
// Inside the current window for NOW - 7 days: 2026-10-22 16:00 → 2026-10-29 16:00.
const THIS_WEEK = "2026-10-27 10:00:00";
// Inside the previous window: 2026-10-15 16:00 → 2026-10-22 16:00.
const LAST_WEEK = "2026-10-18 10:00:00";
beforeEach(() => {
analyticsDb = new Database(":memory:");
analyticsDb.run(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL);
nookDb = new Database(":memory:");
for (const ddl of NOOK_DDL) nookDb.run(ddl);
conns = { analytics: adapter(analyticsDb), nook: adapter(nookDb) };
});
describe("windowsFor", () => {
it("puts the previous window directly before the current one", () => {
const windows = windowsFor(NOW, 7);
expect(windows.current).toEqual({
start: "2026-10-22 16:00:00",
end: "2026-10-29 16:00:00"
});
expect(windows.previous).toEqual({
start: "2026-10-15 16:00:00",
end: "2026-10-22 16:00:00"
});
});
});
describe("readFunnel", () => {
it("counts each stage by its own label inside its window", async () => {
// Page views on the Nook host count; other sites, API calls, legacy
// rows with no host, and the other window do not.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/downloads", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: "freno.me", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: null, created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/api/trpc/anything", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: LAST_WEEK });
// The old checkout proxy: a /checkout page view is a visit, not a
// started checkout.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/checkout", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// The download label splits by stage; a row with no stage predates the
// split and counts in neither.
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "click", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "served", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "served", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: null, created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// A created Stripe session, recorded by the checkout route itself.
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH,
method: "POST",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
// The licence DB stores ISO-8601 with milliseconds.
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-1", "2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z");
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-old", "2026-08-26T19:26:12.791Z");
nookDb
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO licenses (id, key, email, stripe_session_id, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`
)
.run("lic-1", "NOOK-1", "buyer@example.com", "cs_1", "2026-10-25T12:00:00.000Z");
nookDb
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO activations (id, license_id, device_fingerprint, device_name, activated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`
)
.run("act-1", "lic-1", "device-1", "Hermes", "2026-10-25T12:05:00.000Z");
const window = windowsFor(NOW, 7).current;
const funnel = await readFunnel(conns, window);
expect(funnel).toEqual({
visit: 3, // "/", "/downloads" and the "/checkout" page view on the Nook host
downloadClick: 1,
dmgServed: 2,
trial: 1,
checkout: 1,
purchase: 1,
activation: 1
});
});
it("reports zeros against an empty database", async () => {
const window = windowsFor(NOW, 7).current;
expect(await readFunnel(conns, window)).toEqual({
visit: 0,
downloadClick: 0,
dmgServed: 0,
trial: 0,
checkout: 0,
purchase: 0,
activation: 0
});
});
});
describe("readTraffic", () => {
it("separates legacy rows, live loopback and automation from clean traffic", async () => {
// Post-instrumentation rows: host set. Two of them still loopback — in the
// truncated shapes the privacy floor writes — which is the shape the report
// must flag as "the fix is not live".
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "click",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
ip_address: "127.0.0.0",
user_agent: "The Nook/0.13.4 Sparkle/2.9.6",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
ip_address: "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// Pre-instrumentation rows: no host, proxy's address — legacy, never
// counted as "the fix is not live".
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: null,
host: null,
ip_address: "127.0.0.1",
user_agent: "curl/8.7.1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
host: null,
ip_address: "::1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
const traffic = await readTraffic(conns, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(traffic).toEqual({
analyticsRows: 6,
hostRows: 4,
legacyRows: 2,
hostLoopbackRows: 2,
downloadRows: 3,
downloadClickRows: 1,
downloadServedRows: 1,
downloadUnstagedRows: 1,
downloadNonBrowserRows: 2
});
});
});
describe("readCampaigns", () => {
it("groups tagged rows, excludes untagged, and orders by volume", async () => {
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "hn",
utm_medium: "post",
utm_campaign: "launch",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: "r_macapps",
utm_campaign: "week2",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
const campaigns = await readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(campaigns).toEqual([
{ source: "hn", medium: "post", campaign: "launch", count: 2 },
{ source: "r_macapps", medium: null, campaign: "week2", count: 1 }
]);
});
it("caps the list at ten rows", async () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 12; i += 1) {
insertAnalytics({
path: "/",
utm_source: `source-${i}`,
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
}
const campaigns = await readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windowsFor(NOW, 7).current);
expect(campaigns.length).toBe(10);
});
});
describe("ensureAnalyticsSchema", () => {
it("adds the post-hoc columns to a table that predates them, idempotently", async () => {
// The table as production held it before any post-hoc column existed.
// (`created_at` is not in the insert column list — it defaults DB-side —
// so the simulated table has to name it explicitly.)
const oldDb = new Database(":memory:");
const withoutAdded = [
...VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.filter(
(c) => !VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS.some((a) => a.name === c)
),
"created_at"
];
oldDb.run(
`CREATE TABLE VisitorAnalytics (${withoutAdded.map((c) => `${c} TEXT`).join(", ")})`
);
const oldConn = adapter(oldDb);
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(oldConn);
await ensureAnalyticsSchema(oldConn); // a second run is a no-op
// The writers' full INSERT — stage and host included — now works.
const values = row({ stage: "click", path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH });
expect(() =>
oldDb
.prepare(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_INSERT)
.run(
...(VISITOR_ANALYTICS_COLUMNS.map((c) => values[c]) as never[])
)
).not.toThrow();
oldDb
.prepare(`UPDATE VisitorAnalytics SET created_at = ? WHERE id = ?`)
.run(THIS_WEEK, values.id as string);
// And the funnel reads its stage split from the migrated table.
const funnel = await readFunnel(
{ analytics: oldConn, nook: conns.nook },
windowsFor(NOW, 7).current
);
expect(funnel.downloadClick).toBe(1);
});
});
describe("pickMover", () => {
const base: FunnelCounts = {
visit: 0,
downloadClick: 0,
dmgServed: 0,
trial: 0,
checkout: 0,
purchase: 0,
activation: 0
};
it("picks the stage with the largest absolute change", () => {
const mover = pickMover(
{ ...base, visit: 61, dmgServed: 156, trial: 2 },
{ ...base, visit: 56 }
);
expect(mover).toEqual({
key: "dmgServed",
label: "DMG served",
now: 156,
before: 0,
delta: 156
});
});
it("breaks ties toward the earlier stage", () => {
const mover = pickMover(
{ ...base, visit: 5, downloadClick: 5 },
{ ...base, visit: 0, downloadClick: 0 }
);
expect(mover?.key).toBe("visit");
});
it("returns null when nothing moved", () => {
expect(pickMover({ ...base, visit: 3 }, { ...base, visit: 3 })).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("getWeeklyReport / renderWeeklyMarkdown", () => {
it("renders seven distinct stages with no merged-label or proxy caveats", async () => {
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH, stage: "click", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: "served",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
insertAnalytics({ path: NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH, method: "POST", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
nookDb
.prepare(`INSERT INTO trials (fingerprint, started_at) VALUES (?, ?)`)
.run("fp-1", "2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z");
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"Window: **2026-10-22 16:00:00 → 2026-10-29 16:00:00 UTC** (7 days)"
);
expect(markdown).toContain(`| visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views) | 1 | 0 | +1 |`);
expect(markdown).toContain("| download click | 1 | 0 | +1 |");
expect(markdown).toContain("| DMG served | 2 | 0 | +2 |");
expect(markdown).toContain("| checkout started (Stripe session) | 1 | 0 | +1 |");
const order = [
`visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views)`,
"download click",
"DMG served",
"trial started",
"checkout started (Stripe session)",
"purchase (licence issued)",
"activation"
];
for (let i = 1; i < order.length; i += 1) {
expect(markdown.indexOf(order[i - 1]!)).toBeLessThan(
markdown.indexOf(order[i]!)
);
}
// The caveats this issue retired stay retired.
expect(markdown).not.toContain("one label");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("not recorded");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("no host dimension");
expect(markdown).not.toContain("†");
expect(report.mover?.key).toBe("dmgServed");
expect(markdown).toContain("**DMG served: 0 → 2 (+2).**");
});
it("states what pre-instrumentation rows cannot say, computed from the window", async () => {
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
// Legacy rows: no host, proxy's address, no stage label.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", host: null, ip_address: "127.0.0.1", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({
path: NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH,
stage: null,
host: null,
ip_address: "127.0.0.1",
user_agent: "curl/8.7.1",
created_at: THIS_WEEK
});
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"2 of 3 rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation"
);
expect(markdown).toContain("predate the click/served stage label");
// Legacy loopback is not "the fix is not live".
expect(markdown).not.toContain("still carry a loopback address");
});
it("flags loopback only when rows recorded since the instrumentation carry it", async () => {
// Both spellings a live writer can produce: the raw proxy address, and the
// /24 the privacy floor stores instead of it.
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", ip_address: "127.0.0.1", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
insertAnalytics({ path: "/", ip_address: "127.0.53.0", created_at: THIS_WEEK });
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(markdown).toContain(
"2 rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry a loopback address"
);
});
it("says nothing moved rather than inventing a winner", async () => {
const report = await getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 7 });
const markdown = renderWeeklyMarkdown(report);
expect(report.mover).toBeNull();
expect(markdown).toContain("_Nothing moved: every stage held its previous-week value._");
expect(markdown).toContain("_No tagged traffic in the window._");
});
it("rejects a window that is not a positive number of days", async () => {
await expect(getWeeklyReport(conns, { now: NOW, days: 0 })).rejects.toThrow(
"days must be a positive number"
);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
/**
* The weekly funnel reading: `marketing/metrics/weekly.md`'s data half.
*
* The funnel the marketing cluster agreed on is
*
* visit → download click → DMG served → trial started → checkout started
* → purchase → activation
*
* and this module reads it from the two live databases, plus the campaign
* dimension the /analytics page already exposes through
* `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`.
*
* Two properties matter more than the numbers:
*
* - It takes both connections as arguments. `~/server/analytics` imports the
* full server env (Stripe keys, Apple secret, licence key …); the weekly
* job only needs the two databases, and must be runnable from a checkout
* whose `.env` carries nothing else. The SQL here is the same shape as the
* analytics summaries, so the weekly read and the dashboard cannot drift
* into different label sets.
* - Every stage is measured by its own label. FRE-366 gave the funnel that:
* the download door and the DMG file route record distinct `stage` values
* (`click` / `served`), a created Stripe checkout session records its own
* row, and every row carries the real client address and the host it
* addressed, so the visit stage scopes to the Nook. Rows that predate
* that instrumentation are stated next to the numbers, never silently
* counted (see `renderWeeklyMarkdown`).
*
* No `~/env`, no `~/server/database`: the caller owns the connections, the
* tests own an in-memory SQLite, and the script owns the libsql clients.
*/
import { DOWNLOAD_PATH_PREFIX } from "~/lib/download-asset";
import {
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS,
VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL
} from "~/server/analytics-schema";
/** The one asset key the Nook lands under — `downloadPath("thenook")`. */
export const NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH = `${DOWNLOAD_PATH_PREFIX}thenook`;
/** The host the visit stage scopes to. Recorded per row since FRE-366. */
export const NOOK_HOST = "nook.freno.me";
/** The path a created Stripe checkout session records (FRE-366). */
export const NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH = "/api/the-nook/checkout";
/** An `execute`-shaped connection: the libsql client and the test adapter both fit. */
export interface MetricsConn {
execute(query: {
sql: string;
args?: any[];
}): Promise<{ rows: unknown[]; rowsAffected?: number }>;
}
export interface Connections {
/** freno.me Turso DB — VisitorAnalytics. */
analytics: MetricsConn;
/** the-nook Turso DB — trials, licenses, activations. */
nook: MetricsConn;
}
export type StageKey =
| "visit"
| "downloadClick"
| "dmgServed"
| "trial"
| "checkout"
| "purchase"
| "activation";
export interface StageDef {
key: StageKey;
label: string;
}
/**
* The seven agreed stages, each with its own label in the data:
* `downloadClick` and `dmgServed` split what used to be one merged download
* label (the `stage` column, FRE-366), and `checkout` reads created Stripe
* sessions instead of the /checkout page-view proxy.
*/
export const STAGES: StageDef[] = [
{ key: "visit", label: `visit (${NOOK_HOST} page views)` },
{ key: "downloadClick", label: "download click" },
{ key: "dmgServed", label: "DMG served" },
{ key: "trial", label: "trial started" },
{ key: "checkout", label: "checkout started (Stripe session)" },
{ key: "purchase", label: "purchase (licence issued)" },
{ key: "activation", label: "activation" }
];
export interface FunnelCounts {
visit: number;
downloadClick: number;
dmgServed: number;
trial: number;
checkout: number;
purchase: number;
activation: number;
}
export interface CampaignRow {
source: string | null;
medium: string | null;
campaign: string | null;
count: number;
}
/** Traffic-shape facts the report has to state next to the funnel. */
export interface WindowTraffic {
analyticsRows: number;
/** Rows carrying a host — written since the FRE-366 instrumentation. */
hostRows: number;
/** Rows with no host — pre-FRE-366; their address is the proxy's loopback. */
legacyRows: number;
/** Post-instrumentation rows still recording loopback: the fix is not live. */
hostLoopbackRows: number;
downloadRows: number;
downloadClickRows: number;
downloadServedRows: number;
/** Download rows with no stage label — they predate FRE-366 and cannot be split. */
downloadUnstagedRows: number;
downloadNonBrowserRows: number;
}
export interface Mover {
key: StageKey;
label: string;
now: number;
before: number;
delta: number;
}
export interface WeeklyReport {
window: { start: string; end: string; days: number };
previous: { start: string; end: string };
counts: FunnelCounts;
previousCounts: FunnelCounts;
campaigns: CampaignRow[];
taggedRows: number;
traffic: WindowTraffic;
mover: Mover | null;
generatedAt: string;
}
/**
* A recorded address that is not a visitor, in every spelling the column can
* hold: the proxy the request came through (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, an IPv4-mapped
* form) *and* the prefixes the FRE-369 privacy floor writes instead of them
* (`127.0.0.0`, all-zero IPv6). Whole `127/8` because truncation keeps the first
* three octets, so `127.0.53.1` and `127.0.53.0` are the same non-visitor.
*/
const LOOPBACK_SQL = `(ip_address LIKE '127.%'
OR ip_address LIKE '::ffff:127.%'
OR ip_address IN ('::1', '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1', '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0'))`;
/** SQLite's `datetime()` string, UTC: `YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS`. */
export function sqlTime(date: Date): string {
return date.toISOString().slice(0, 19).replace("T", " ");
}
export interface Windows {
current: { start: string; end: string };
previous: { start: string; end: string };
}
/**
* The current window is `[now - days, now)` and the previous one sits directly
* before it, so a weekly read always compares like with like. Boundaries are
* passed as SQL parameters rather than `datetime('now', …)` so the file a run
* writes is reproducible and the two queries cannot straddle a second.
*/
export function windowsFor(now: Date, days: number): Windows {
const span = days * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const end = now;
const start = new Date(end.getTime() - span);
const previousEnd = start;
const previousStart = new Date(previousEnd.getTime() - span);
return {
current: { start: sqlTime(start), end: sqlTime(end) },
previous: { start: sqlTime(previousStart), end: sqlTime(previousEnd) }
};
}
function toNumber(value: unknown): number {
if (typeof value === "number") return value;
if (typeof value === "bigint") return Number(value);
if (typeof value === "string") return Number(value) || 0;
return 0;
}
async function scalar(
conn: MetricsConn,
sql: string,
args: any[]
): Promise<number> {
const result = await conn.execute({ sql, args });
const row = result.rows[0] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (!row) return 0;
return toNumber(Object.values(row)[0]);
}
/**
* Bring the analytics table up to the schema the readers expect, through the
* same idempotent bootstrap path the app server uses (`analytics.ts`): the
* DDL is a no-op against the live table and each post-hoc column is ALTERed
* in only when absent. The weekly job runs against databases the app may not
* have migrated yet — a fresh checkout, a restored backup, or production
* before the next deploy — and must render its seven stages regardless.
*/
export async function ensureAnalyticsSchema(conn: MetricsConn): Promise<void> {
await conn.execute({ sql: VISITOR_ANALYTICS_DDL });
const info = await conn.execute({
sql: `PRAGMA table_info(VisitorAnalytics)`
});
const present = new Set(info.rows.map((row) => String((row as any).name)));
for (const column of VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS) {
if (!present.has(column.name)) {
await conn.execute({ sql: column.ddl });
}
}
}
async function countInWindow(
conn: MetricsConn,
sql: string,
start: string,
end: string
): Promise<number> {
return scalar(conn, sql, [start, end]);
}
/** One window's funnel. Two databases, one call. */
export async function readFunnel(
conns: Connections,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<FunnelCounts> {
const { analytics, nook } = conns;
const { start, end } = window;
// Scoped to the Nook host (FRE-366): before the host column existed, a
// page view of `/` on nook.freno.me was the same row as freno.me's root.
// Pre-instrumentation rows carry no host and are excluded — the traffic
// section states how many.
const visit = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path NOT LIKE '/api/%'
AND host = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_HOST]
);
const downloadClick = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ? AND stage = 'click'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const dmgServed = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ? AND stage = 'served'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
// Created Stripe checkout sessions, recorded by the checkout route itself
// (FRE-366) — not the /checkout page view that used to proxy for them.
const checkout = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND path = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_CHECKOUT_PATH]
);
// The licence DB stores ISO-8601 (`2026-10-28T20:28:46.806Z`); the analytics
// DB stores `YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS`. `datetime()` normalises both sides so a
// boundary seconds apart cannot include or drop a row on string comparison.
const trial = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM trials
WHERE datetime(started_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(started_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
const purchase = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM licenses
WHERE datetime(created_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(created_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
const activation = await scalar(
nook,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM activations
WHERE datetime(activated_at) >= datetime(?) AND datetime(activated_at) < datetime(?)`,
[start, end]
);
return {
visit,
downloadClick,
dmgServed,
trial,
checkout,
purchase,
activation
};
}
/**
* Traffic shape for one window: how much of it predates the FRE-366
* instrumentation (no host, proxy's address), whether rows recorded since
* still see loopback (which would mean the forwarded-header fix is not
* live), and how the download label splits. Without these facts the numbers
* read as demand, which they are not.
*/
export async function readTraffic(
conns: Connections,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<WindowTraffic> {
const { analytics } = conns;
const { start, end } = window;
const analyticsRows = await countInWindow(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?`,
start,
end
);
const hostRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NOT NULL`,
[start, end]
);
const legacyRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NULL`,
[start, end]
);
const hostLoopbackRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND host IS NOT NULL
AND ${LOOPBACK_SQL}`,
[start, end]
);
const downloadRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ?`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadClickRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage = 'click'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadServedRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage = 'served'`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
const downloadUnstagedRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ? AND stage IS NULL`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
// Anything whose UA is not a browser engine: curl, Sparkle's updater,
// link-preview crawlers. A real install click arrives as `Mozilla/5.0 …`.
const downloadNonBrowserRows = await scalar(
analytics,
`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ? AND path = ?
AND (user_agent IS NULL OR user_agent NOT LIKE 'Mozilla/%')`,
[start, end, NOOK_DOWNLOAD_PATH]
);
return {
analyticsRows,
hostRows,
legacyRows,
hostLoopbackRows,
downloadRows,
downloadClickRows,
downloadServedRows,
downloadUnstagedRows,
downloadNonBrowserRows
};
}
/**
* The campaign dimension, grouped exactly as `getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns`
* groups it: top 10 by volume, untagged rows excluded (the untagged bucket is
* a different question and would otherwise swallow the list).
*/
export async function readCampaigns(
analytics: MetricsConn,
window: { start: string; end: string }
): Promise<CampaignRow[]> {
const result = await analytics.execute({
sql: `SELECT utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, COUNT(*) AS count
FROM VisitorAnalytics
WHERE created_at >= ? AND created_at < ?
AND (utm_source IS NOT NULL OR utm_medium IS NOT NULL OR utm_campaign IS NOT NULL)
GROUP BY utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign
ORDER BY count DESC
LIMIT 10`,
args: [window.start, window.end]
});
return result.rows.map((raw) => {
const row = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
return {
source: (row.utm_source as string | null) ?? null,
medium: (row.utm_medium as string | null) ?? null,
campaign: (row.utm_campaign as string | null) ?? null,
count: toNumber(row.count)
};
});
}
/**
* "The one thing that moved": the stage with the largest absolute change
* against the previous window. Ties go to the earlier stage, so a week when
* nothing moved returns null rather than a made-up winner.
*/
export function pickMover(
current: FunnelCounts,
previous: FunnelCounts
): Mover | null {
let best: Mover | null = null;
for (const stage of STAGES) {
const delta = current[stage.key] - previous[stage.key];
if (delta === 0) continue;
if (!best || Math.abs(delta) > Math.abs(best.delta)) {
best = {
key: stage.key,
label: stage.label,
now: current[stage.key],
before: previous[stage.key],
delta
};
}
}
return best;
}
export interface ReportOptions {
/** End of the current window; defaults to the wall clock. */
now?: Date;
/** Window length in days; defaults to 7. */
days?: number;
}
/** Read everything `.md` needs, in one call. */
export async function getWeeklyReport(
conns: Connections,
options: ReportOptions = {}
): Promise<WeeklyReport> {
const days = options.days ?? 7;
if (!Number.isFinite(days) || days <= 0) {
throw new Error(`days must be a positive number, got ${days}`);
}
const now = options.now ?? new Date();
const windows = windowsFor(now, days);
const [counts, previousCounts, traffic, campaigns] = await Promise.all([
readFunnel(conns, windows.current),
readFunnel(conns, windows.previous),
readTraffic(conns, windows.current),
readCampaigns(conns.analytics, windows.current)
]);
return {
window: { ...windows.current, days },
previous: windows.previous,
counts,
previousCounts,
campaigns,
taggedRows: campaigns.reduce((sum, row) => sum + row.count, 0),
traffic,
mover: pickMover(counts, previousCounts),
generatedAt: now.toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, "Z")
};
}
function cell(value: string | null): string {
return value === null || value === "" ? "—" : value;
}
function signed(value: number): string {
if (value === 0) return "0";
return value > 0 ? `+${value}` : `−${Math.abs(value)}`;
}
/**
* Render the weekly file. Interpretation lives in the CMO's read; this renderer
* only states what the data is, what moved, and what the numbers cannot say.
* The Gaps section is not boilerplate: each bullet is computed from the window
* it describes, so it empties itself if the underlying hole is ever fixed.
*/
export function renderWeeklyMarkdown(report: WeeklyReport): string {
const { counts, previousCounts, traffic } = report;
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push("# Weekly funnel snapshot");
lines.push("");
lines.push(
`Window: **${report.window.start} → ${report.window.end} UTC** (${report.window.days} days). ` +
`Previous: ${report.previous.start} → ${report.previous.end} UTC.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push(
"Generated by `bun --env-file=.env scripts/weekly-metrics.ts`; regenerated " +
"weekly, never hand-edited. The analysis is the CMO's."
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Funnel");
lines.push("");
lines.push("| Stage | This week | Last week | Change |");
lines.push("|---|---:|---:|---:|");
for (const stage of STAGES) {
const now = counts[stage.key];
const before = previousCounts[stage.key];
lines.push(`| ${stage.label} | ${now} | ${before} | ${signed(now - before)} |`);
}
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Campaigns");
lines.push("");
if (report.campaigns.length === 0) {
lines.push("_No tagged traffic in the window._");
} else {
lines.push(
"Top 10 by volume, untagged excluded — the same grouping " +
"`getAnalyticsSummary.topCampaigns` returns."
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("| Source | Medium | Campaign | Rows |");
lines.push("|---|---|---|---:|");
for (const row of report.campaigns) {
lines.push(
`| ${cell(row.source)} | ${cell(row.medium)} | ${cell(row.campaign)} | ${row.count} |`
);
}
}
lines.push("");
lines.push(
`${report.taggedRows} of ${traffic.analyticsRows} rows in the window carry ` +
`campaign tags; the rest are untagged and therefore unattributed.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## The one thing that moved");
lines.push("");
if (!report.mover) {
lines.push("_Nothing moved: every stage held its previous-week value._");
} else {
const mover = report.mover;
lines.push(
`**${mover.label}: ${mover.before} → ${mover.now} (${signed(mover.delta)}).**`
);
}
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Before acting on these numbers");
lines.push("");
if (traffic.legacyRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **${traffic.legacyRows} of ${traffic.analyticsRows} rows in the window predate the FRE-366 instrumentation.** ` +
`They carry no host, and their recorded address is the production proxy's loopback ` +
`(127.0.0.1 / ::1) — the writers then recorded the direct peer, not the visitor. ` +
`They are excluded from every host-scoped stage above (visits, and the download ` +
`click/served split), and "unique visitors" over them still collapses to one host. ` +
`Rows recorded since carry the site they addressed and the visitor's address ` +
`truncated to a prefix (/24, or /56 for IPv6 — the FRE-369 privacy floor), so ` +
`"unique visitors" counts networks, not machines.`
);
}
if (traffic.hostLoopbackRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **${traffic.hostLoopbackRows} rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry a ` +
`loopback address** — the forwarded-header fix is not taking effect in production ` +
`(no \`cf-connecting-ip\`, and no usable \`x-forwarded-for\` hop). Do not trust ` +
`per-channel reach until this is zero.`
);
}
if (traffic.downloadRows > 0) {
lines.push(
`- **Download rows are automation-heavy.** Of this window's ${traffic.downloadRows} ` +
`download rows, ${traffic.downloadClickRows} are clicks and ` +
`${traffic.downloadServedRows} are served files` +
(traffic.downloadUnstagedRows > 0
? `; the remaining ${traffic.downloadUnstagedRows} predate the click/served stage ` +
`label and cannot be split, so they count in neither stage`
: "") +
`. ${traffic.downloadNonBrowserRows} of all ${traffic.downloadRows} are not browser ` +
`user agents (curl, Sparkle, link-preview crawlers).`
);
}
lines.push(
`- **No conversion rate before the cohort matures.** Trial→paid belongs to the mature ` +
`Day 28–35 read (FRE-197); a ratio from a partial cohort is not a metric.`
);
lines.push("");
lines.push("## Sources");
lines.push("");
lines.push("- `VisitorAnalytics` (freno.me Turso DB) — visits, downloads, campaigns.");
lines.push("- `trials`, `licenses`, `activations` (the-nook Turso DB) — the paid funnel.");
lines.push(`- Generated ${report.generatedAt}.`);
lines.push("");
return lines.join("\n");
}

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
}
],
"crons": [
{ "path": "/api/analytics-retention", "schedule": "0 12 * * *" },
{ "path": "/api/the-nook/lifecycle", "schedule": "0 13 * * *" }
]
}