Security findings from April 30 review were claimed fixed but never committed.
Applied all remediations:
HIGH:
- WebhookHandler: fail fast when DARKWATCH_WEBHOOK_SECRET missing instead of defaulting to hardcoded secret
- field-encryption.service: require PII_ENCRYPTION_KEY at startup instead of defaulting
MEDIUM:
- WebhookHandler: make signature required (was optional, accepted unsigned events)
- WebhookHandler: reject unknown event types instead of silently defaulting to SCAN_TRIGGER
- scheduler.routes + webhook.routes: add ownership checks on /:userId endpoints (IDOR)
LOW:
- webhook.routes: generic error responses, full error logged server-side
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
- Create regex-validation utility with ReDoS detection (nested quantifiers,
overlapping alternations, complexity limits)
- Add @db.VarChar(500) constraint on pattern field in Prisma schema
- Integrate validation in rule-engine at load time and evaluation time
- Add 46 unit tests covering syntax, ReDoS patterns, complexity, edge cases
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
