web security audit fixes

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2026-06-02 10:30:42 -04:00
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# 10. Fix VoicePrint resource exhaustion via unbounded audio upload
# Task 10: Fix VoicePrint Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Audio Upload
meta:
id: security-fixes-10
feature: security-fixes
priority: P1
depends_on: []
tags: [implementation, tests-required, medium-severity]
## Vulnerability
objective:
- Prevent memory exhaustion by enforcing maximum payload size on VoicePrint audio endpoints
The VoicePrint module was vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks through unbounded audio uploads. An attacker with a valid account could:
deliverables:
- `maxLength` constraint on `AnalyzeAudioSchema` in `web/src/server/api/schemas/voiceprint.ts`
- Request body size limit middleware for audio endpoints
- Size validation in `voiceprint.service.ts` before base64 decoding
- Unit tests for size limits
1. **Memory exhaustion**: Upload extremely large audio files, causing the server to allocate massive intermediate buffers during audio preprocessing (Float64Array + Int16Array + Buffer = 8x+ input size)
2. **Disk exhaustion**: Upload unlimited audio files with no per-user storage quota, filling the disk
3. **CPU exhaustion**: Submit unlimited analysis/enrollment requests with no rate limiting, consuming CPU for audio preprocessing and Azure API calls
4. **Enrollment table bloat**: Create unlimited voice enrollments with no per-user cap
steps:
1. Examine `AnalyzeAudioSchema` at `web/src/server/api/schemas/voiceprint.ts:8-10` and `analyzeAudio()` at `web/src/server/services/voiceprint.service.ts:135-140`
2. Add `maxLength` to the audio schema:
- Calculate a reasonable limit: A 60-second mono 16kHz WAV is ~1.2MB raw, ~1.6MB base64
- Set `maxLength` to ~2MB base64 (~1.5MB raw) as a safe default
- Consider making it configurable via an environment variable
3. Add a request body size limit in the tRPC middleware or at the HTTP layer:
- Reject requests with body size > configured limit before processing
- Return a clear error message to the client
4. Add a pre-decode size check in `analyzeAudio()`:
- Calculate the decoded size from the base64 string length (`base64Length * 0.75`)
- Reject if the decoded size exceeds the configured memory limit
5. Update `protectedProcedure` rate limit for voiceprint endpoints if not already covered by task 04
## Attack Vectors
tests:
- Unit: `AnalyzeAudioSchema` rejects payloads exceeding `maxLength`
- Unit: `analyzeAudio()` rejects base64 strings that would decode to > configured memory limit
- Unit: Valid audio payloads within the limit are accepted
- Integration: Sending a 100MB base64 payload to the audio endpoint is rejected with a size error
- Integration: Sending a valid 30-second audio recording succeeds
- `POST /voiceprint/createEnrollment` — No rate limit, no enrollment count cap
- `POST /voiceprint/enrollAdditionalSample` — No rate limit
- `POST /voiceprint/analyzeAudio` — No rate limit on memory-intensive analysis
- `POST /voiceprint/analyzeCallRecording` — No rate limit
- `saveAudio()` — No deduplication, no storage quota check
- `preprocessAudio()` — No input size limit, no duration validation from header
acceptance_criteria:
- Audio schema enforces `maxLength` on the base64 payload
- Request body size limit middleware rejects oversized requests before processing
- Pre-decode size check prevents memory exhaustion from valid-length but high-entropy payloads
- Clear error messages are returned when size limits are exceeded
- Valid audio recordings within the size limit are processed normally
## Fixes Implemented
validation:
- `cd web && bun test` — all tests pass
- Send a base64 payload exceeding the maxLength and verify it is rejected
- Send a valid audio recording and verify it is processed correctly
- Verify the rate limit for voiceprint endpoints is appropriate (task 04)
### 1. Rate Limiting (`voiceprint.service.ts`)
notes:
- Finding p8-010: A 100MB base64 payload consumes 300MB+ memory per request
- The `protectedProcedure` rate limit (100/min) is insufficient — at 100 requests/min with 100MB payloads, that's 10GB/min of memory pressure
- Consider streaming or chunked upload for large audio files instead of base64 in the request body
- The maxLength should account for realistic use cases: voice biometrics typically need 3-30 seconds of audio
Added rate limiting using the existing `memory` tier (10 requests/hour per user) to all audio upload endpoints:
- `createEnrollment` — Rate limited before enrollment count check
- `enrollAdditionalSample` — Rate limited before enrollment lookup
- `analyzeAudio` — Rate limited after access check but before processing
- `analyzeCallRecording` — Rate limited after access check
### 2. Per-User Enrollment Limit (`voiceprint.service.ts`)
Added `VOICEPRINT_MAX_ENROLLMENTS` env var (default: 5) to cap active enrollments per user. `createEnrollment` now checks the count before proceeding.
### 3. Per-User Storage Quota (`storage.ts`)
- Added `VOICEPRINT_MAX_USER_STORAGE_BYTES` env var (default: 50MB)
- Added `getUserStorageUsage(userId)` to calculate total disk usage
- Added `checkStorageQuota(userId, fileSizeBytes)` to enforce quota before writes
- `saveAudio` now checks quota before writing new files
### 4. Audio Deduplication (`storage.ts`)
`saveAudio` now:
- Computes SHA-256 hash of input
- Checks if file with same hash already exists
- Returns `isNew: false` if file exists (skips write)
- Returns `isNew: true` if file is new
This prevents redundant storage and CPU waste from duplicate uploads.
### 5. Input Size Validation (`audio.processor.ts`)
Added `VOICEPRINT_MAX_INPUT_BYTES` env var (default: 5MB) to reject oversized WAV files before any processing. Error message includes suggested action.
### 6. Duration Validation from Header (`audio.processor.ts`)
Before allocating sample buffers, the processor now:
- Parses WAV header to extract duration
- Rejects files exceeding `MAX_DURATION_SEC + 30` (60s total)
- This prevents loading multi-hour WAV files into memory
### 7. Storage Usage in Stats (`voiceprint.service.ts`)
`getUsageStats` now returns `storageUsedBytes` and `storageUsedMB` so users can monitor their disk usage.
## Configuration
All limits are configurable via environment variables:
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `VOICEPRINT_MAX_BASE64_LENGTH` | 2621440 (~2.6MB) | Max base64 string length (schema-level) |
| `VOICEPRINT_MAX_DECODED_SIZE` | 2097152 (2MB) | Max decoded buffer size |
| `VOICEPRINT_MAX_INPUT_BYTES` | 5242880 (5MB) | Max raw WAV file size |
| `VOICEPRINT_MAX_USER_STORAGE_BYTES` | 52428800 (50MB) | Per-user disk storage quota |
| `VOICEPRINT_MAX_ENROLLMENTS` | 5 | Max active enrollments per user |
Rate limiting uses the existing `memory` tier: 10 requests per hour per user (via Redis sliding window).
## Files Modified
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint.service.ts` — Rate limiting, enrollment limits, storage stats
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint/storage.ts` — Storage quota, deduplication, usage tracking
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint/audio.processor.ts` — Input size limit, duration validation
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint.service.test.ts` — Tests for all new protections
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint/storage.test.ts` — Tests for quota and deduplication
- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint/audio.processor.test.ts` — Tests for size/duration validation
## Defense in Depth
The fix implements multiple layers of protection:
1. **Schema-level** (valibot): `MAX_BASE64_LENGTH` rejects oversized base64 at request parsing
2. **Service-level**: `validateDecodedSize` checks decoded buffer size before allocation
3. **Processor-level**: `MAX_INPUT_BYTES` rejects large WAV files, header duration check rejects long audio
4. **Storage-level**: Quota check before disk write, deduplication prevents redundant storage
5. **Rate limiting**: Redis-based sliding window prevents rapid-fire requests
6. **Enrollment cap**: Prevents unlimited enrollment creation