security sweep

piolium/findings/p8-010-voiceprint-resource-exhaustion/draft.md

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+Phase: 8
+Sequence: 010
+Slug: voiceprint-resource-exhaustion
+Verdict: VALID
+Rationale: VoicePrint audio endpoints accept unbounded base64 payloads with no maximum length; 100/min rate limit allows rapid large uploads that can exhaust server memory and disk
+Severity-Original: medium
+Severity: medium
+PoC-Status: pending
+Pre-FP-Flag: none
+Debate: piolium/attack-surface/balanced-chamber-summary.md
+
+## Summary
+The `voiceprintRouter.analyzeAudio` and `voiceprintRouter.createEnrollment` procedures accept `audioBase64` with only a `minLength(1)` validation. There is no maximum length, no content-type validation, and no size check before decoding. An authenticated attacker can send extremely large base64-encoded payloads that, when decoded, consume significant server memory during base64 decoding, ML preprocessing, and ML inference. The procedures use `protectedProcedure` (100/min default rate limit), providing weak protection against sustained attacks.
+
+## Location
+- `web/src/server/api/schemas/voiceprint.ts` lines 8–10 (schemas)
+- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint.service.ts` lines 135–140 (service)
+- `web/src/server/api/utils.ts` lines 23–28 (protectedProcedure)
+
+## Attacker Control
+An authenticated user can send extremely large base64-encoded audio payloads. A 100MB base64 payload (representing ~75MB of audio data) consumes ~300MB+ memory per request (base64 string + decoded buffer + ML features + model inference + disk write).
+
+## Trust Boundary Crossed
+Resource boundary. Unbounded input exceeds expected resource allocation, affecting all users on the same server.
+
+## Impact
+- **Memory exhaustion**: Single request can consume 300MB+; 100 rapid requests can exhaust server memory (OOM kill)
+- **Disk exhaustion**: Each request writes a ~75MB audio file to disk; rapid uploads fill disk
+- **ML model resource exhaustion**: ML preprocessing and inference are CPU-intensive; large inputs increase processing time
+- **Service disruption**: Memory exhaustion affects all users on the same server
+
+## Evidence
+```typescript
+// Schema — no maximum length
+export const AnalyzeAudioSchema = object({
+  audioBase64: string([minLength(1)]),  // No maxLength
+});
+
+// Service — no size check before decoding
+export async function analyzeAudio(userId: string, audioBase64: string) {
+  const audioBuffer = Buffer.from(audioBase64, "base64");  // No size check
+  // ...
+  const features = await preprocessAudio(audioBuffer);     // ML preprocessing
+  const detection = await detectSynthetic(features);        // ML inference
+}
+
+// Rate limit — 100/min for authenticated users
+const rateLimitTiers = {
+  authenticated: { limit: 100, windowMs: 60_000 },
+};
+```
+
+## Reproduction Steps
+1. Authenticated user sends `voiceprintRouter.analyzeAudio` with 100MB base64 payload
+2. Server decodes base64 → 75MB buffer
+3. ML preprocessing and inference consume additional memory
+4. Audio file written to disk (~75MB)
+5. Repeat 100 times in 1 minute → ~30GB+ memory usage → OOM kill or service disruption
+
+## Defense Search Results
+- valibot `minLength(1)` only sets minimum, no maximum
+- `protectedProcedure` auth check requires authentication
+- Rate limit (authenticated tier) allows 100/min — insufficient for large payloads
+- No content-type validation (no MIME type check)
+- No payload size limit on the HTTP request body
+- No streaming upload support (entire payload loaded into memory)

piolium/findings/p8-010-voiceprint-resource-exhaustion/report.md

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+Phase: 8
+Sequence: 010
+Slug: voiceprint-resource-exhaustion
+Verdict: VALID
+Rationale: VoicePrint audio endpoints accept unbounded base64 payloads with no maximum length; 100/min rate limit allows rapid large uploads that can exhaust server memory and disk
+Severity-Original: medium
+Severity: medium
+PoC-Status: pending
+Pre-FP-Flag: none
+Debate: piolium/attack-surface/balanced-chamber-summary.md
+
+## Summary
+The `voiceprintRouter.analyzeAudio` and `voiceprintRouter.createEnrollment` procedures accept `audioBase64` with only a `minLength(1)` validation. There is no maximum length, no content-type validation, and no size check before decoding. An authenticated attacker can send extremely large base64-encoded payloads that, when decoded, consume significant server memory during base64 decoding, ML preprocessing, and ML inference. The procedures use `protectedProcedure` (100/min default rate limit), providing weak protection against sustained attacks.
+
+## Location
+- `web/src/server/api/schemas/voiceprint.ts` lines 8–10 (schemas)
+- `web/src/server/services/voiceprint.service.ts` lines 135–140 (service)
+- `web/src/server/api/utils.ts` lines 23–28 (protectedProcedure)
+
+## Attacker Control
+An authenticated user can send extremely large base64-encoded audio payloads. A 100MB base64 payload (representing ~75MB of audio data) consumes ~300MB+ memory per request (base64 string + decoded buffer + ML features + model inference + disk write).
+
+## Trust Boundary Crossed
+Resource boundary. Unbounded input exceeds expected resource allocation, affecting all users on the same server.
+
+## Impact
+- **Memory exhaustion**: Single request can consume 300MB+; 100 rapid requests can exhaust server memory (OOM kill)
+- **Disk exhaustion**: Each request writes a ~75MB audio file to disk; rapid uploads fill disk
+- **ML model resource exhaustion**: ML preprocessing and inference are CPU-intensive; large inputs increase processing time
+- **Service disruption**: Memory exhaustion affects all users on the same server
+
+## Evidence
+```typescript
+// Schema — no maximum length
+export const AnalyzeAudioSchema = object({
+  audioBase64: string([minLength(1)]),  // No maxLength
+});
+
+// Service — no size check before decoding
+export async function analyzeAudio(userId: string, audioBase64: string) {
+  const audioBuffer = Buffer.from(audioBase64, "base64");  // No size check
+  // ...
+  const features = await preprocessAudio(audioBuffer);     // ML preprocessing
+  const detection = await detectSynthetic(features);        // ML inference
+}
+
+// Rate limit — 100/min for authenticated users
+const rateLimitTiers = {
+  authenticated: { limit: 100, windowMs: 60_000 },
+};
+```
+
+## Reproduction Steps
+1. Authenticated user sends `voiceprintRouter.analyzeAudio` with 100MB base64 payload
+2. Server decodes base64 → 75MB buffer
+3. ML preprocessing and inference consume additional memory
+4. Audio file written to disk (~75MB)
+5. Repeat 100 times in 1 minute → ~30GB+ memory usage → OOM kill or service disruption
+
+## Defense Search Results
+- valibot `minLength(1)` only sets minimum, no maximum
+- `protectedProcedure` auth check requires authentication
+- Rate limit (authenticated tier) allows 100/min — insufficient for large payloads
+- No content-type validation (no MIME type check)
+- No payload size limit on the HTTP request body
+- No streaming upload support (entire payload loaded into memory)