privacy: apply the FRE-354 verdict corrections to the /privacy replacement

FRE-354 ruled the page 'verified after corrections — do not apply as it
stands'. This applies all of them, plus the two copy decisions the verdict
delegated to the CMO (fuller iPhone paragraph; full (c) block with the
LAN/tailnet sentence and the matching section-3 clause).

- (b) no macOS username (sendDefaultPii sets the IP only), session pings
  named; still the always-on form: no release tag contains FRE-355's
  opt-in merge (6e74b261; v0.15.0 predates it), so the page stays true on
  the build users run. Contingency swap owed with the first release that
  ships FRE-355.
- (a) device-name sentence corrected (no activations UI exists); fail-open
  scoped to trial/status, activation needs a connection once.
- (c) relay qualified as the default path; relay sees IDs/names/platforms;
  direct LAN/tailnet pairing sentence added.
- (j) 'not a cloud service' instead of two absolutes FRE-322 flagged;
  tailnet path named.
- iPhone companion paragraph added (TestFlight beta is in users' hands,
  same Sentry config, push token disclosed). Push-token evidence row
  recorded for FRE-333's inventory.
- Opening, section heading ('What leaves your devices') and section 3
  ('content', not all traffic) per the verdict; Last Updated bumped.
- Draft evidence table and contingency warning rewritten per the verdict
  (the old warning named a username Sentry never sends).

Suite on this tree: 441 pass / 3 skip / 53 fail / 2 errors — failure and
error sets byte-identical to clean master d44133f (458/3/53/2; the delta
is master's remote-claims.test.ts, 17 passing tests this branch's base
predates). Local only; the push is the sponsor's (card 392a8465).
This commit is contained in:
fixture
2026-11-04 14:50:41 +00:00
parent bb6cf27821
commit 4d6550f0d1
3 changed files with 180 additions and 120 deletions

View File

@@ -6,12 +6,20 @@
* destinations, file:line evidence per row. When the app's egress changes,
* this page changes in the same commit — not later.
*
* The crash-reporting paragraph below describes the build that ships today:
* The crash-reporting paragraph below describes the build users run today:
* Sentry starts unconditionally in `Sources/NookApp/main.swift:272-279`, with
* `sendDefaultPii = true`, and there is no off switch in Settings. If an
* opt-in setting ships, paragraph (b) is replaced by the shorter form held in
* `marketing/drafts/privacy-page.md` §"Contingency" in the same commit that
* makes it true.
* `sendDefaultPii = true`, and there is no off switch in Settings. The opt-in
* build change is merged on The-Nook master (FRE-355, 6e74b261) but no release
* tag carries it yet, so the page must keep the always-on form until the first
* release that contains it — then paragraph (b) is replaced by the shorter
* form held in `marketing/drafts/privacy-page.md` §"Contingency" in the same
* commit that makes it true.
*
* Corrected against the CTO's /privacy verdict (FRE-354): no macOS username
* from Sentry (sendDefaultPii sets the IP only), session pings named, (a)
* fail-open scoped, (c) relay-path qualified with the direct-pair sentence,
* (j) "not a cloud service" with the tailnet path, the iPhone paragraph added
* (TestFlight beta is in users' hands), and section 3 says "content".
*/
import { buildMainSiteUrl } from "~/lib/subdomain-url";
import { PageHead } from "~/components/PageHead";
@@ -29,17 +37,19 @@ export default function NookPrivacyPolicy() {
<SubdomainHeader />
<div class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[10vh]">
<div class="py-4 text-xl">The Nook&apos;s Privacy Policy</div>
<div class="py-2">Last Updated: October 29, 2026</div>
<div class="py-2">Last Updated: November 4, 2026</div>
<div class="py-2">
The Nook runs on your Mac. Your prompts, your code and your agent
sessions are processed on your device. This page lists every
connection the app makes over the network, what each one sends, and
The Nook runs on your Mac, and the iPhone and Apple Watch companion
is in TestFlight beta. Your prompts, your code and your agent
sessions are processed on your own devices. This page lists every
connection the apps make over the internet — and the local-network
and tailnet paths the phone can use — what each one sends, and
whether you can turn it off.
</div>
<ol>
<div class="py-2">
<div class="pb-2 text-lg">
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> What leaves your Mac
<span class="-ml-4 pr-2">1.</span> What leaves your devices
</div>
<div class="pl-4">
<div class="pb-2">
@@ -48,37 +58,44 @@ export default function NookPrivacyPolicy() {
hardware UUID and device name to our licensing server
(freno.me). The UUID enforces the 14-day trial and the 3-device
activation limit and stops a trial being reset by reinstalling
the app; the device name is so you can recognize the Mac among
your activations. While you are on the trial, this is sent at
each launch. Once you are licensed, each launch re-checks only
that your key has not been revoked. Deactivating a Mac sends the
license key and that Mac&apos;s UUID. If you add an email during
the trial, that request carries the email and the UUID, and it
is sent once. All of these calls fail open: with no connection,
the app keeps working, because license verification itself is
offline.
the app; the device name is stored with the activation so the
Mac can be identified in your license records. While you are on
the trial, this is sent at each launch. Once you are licensed,
each launch re-checks only that your key has not been revoked.
Deactivating a Mac sends the license key and that Mac&apos;s
UUID. If you add an email during the trial, that request
carries the email and the UUID, and it is sent once. The trial
and status checks fail open: with no connection, an unexpired
trial or a stored license keeps working, because license
verification itself is offline. Activating a new license needs
a connection once.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(b) Crash and error reporting:</div> Crash
reports, error events, hang reports and performance traces are
sent to Sentry, our crash-reporting processor, and this is on
for every launch in this version — there is no setting that
turns it off. Each report carries the app version, the macOS
version, the Mac model and what the app was doing when it
failed, and Sentry also receives your IP address and your macOS
username. Reports never include your prompts, your code or your
reports, error events, hang reports, session pings, and
performance traces are sent to Sentry, our crash-reporting
processor, and this is on for every launch in this version —
there is no setting that turns it off. Each report carries the
app version, the macOS version, the Mac model and what the app
was doing when it failed, and Sentry also receives your IP
address. Reports never include your prompts, your code or your
session content.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(c) Phone connection:</div> The phone
connection ships off and is yours to enable. When you turn it
on, your Mac registers with our relay (nook-relay.freno.me)
using a random install ID, and a licensed Mac presents its
license key once at registration. Everything your Mac and your
phone then exchange — session updates, approvals, replies — is
encrypted end-to-end: the relay routes it and cannot read it.
The relay can see which devices are connected, when, and how
much traffic they exchange.
connection ships off and is yours to enable. With the default
relay path, turning it on registers your Mac with our relay
(nook-relay.freno.me) using a random install ID, and a licensed
Mac presents its license key once at registration. Everything
your Mac and your phone then exchange — session updates,
approvals, replies — is encrypted end-to-end: the relay routes
it and cannot read it. On the relay path, the relay can see
which devices are connected — their IDs, names and platforms —
when, and how much traffic they exchange.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
You can also pair over your LAN or tailnet instead; those paths
carry the same sealed traffic and do not use the relay.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(d) Weather:</div> If you add the Weather
@@ -131,16 +148,26 @@ export default function NookPrivacyPolicy() {
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">(j) What does not leave your Mac:</div> The
hook and the bridge that connect your agents to The Nook talk to
nothing but your Mac — the hook dials the local bridge socket,
and the bridge only listens. Two paths carry agent data across
the network, and both are switched on by you: if you add a
remote machine, the hook on that machine dials this Mac over
SSH; and if you use the phone connection, the session updates,
approvals and replies described in (c) travel through the relay,
sealed end to end.
The privileged helper that controls fans and charging has no
networking code at all.
hook and the bridge that connect your agents to The Nook are
not a cloud service: the hook dials the bridge on your Mac, and
the bridge only listens. Two paths carry agent data across the
network, and both are switched on by you: if you add a remote
machine, the hook on that machine dials this Mac over SSH or
your tailnet; and if you use the phone connection, the session
updates, approvals and replies described in (c) travel through
the relay, sealed end to end. The privileged helper that
controls fans and charging has no networking code at all.
</div>
<div class="pb-2">
<div class="-ml-6">The iPhone companion.</div> The iPhone and
Apple Watch app is in TestFlight beta. It runs the same Sentry
reporting: the app version, iOS version, iPhone model, session
pings and your IP address, with the same no-off-switch. Those
reports never include your prompts, code or session content.
Its other network traffic is the phone connection in (c) — the
relay, or a direct LAN/tailnet link — plus, if you allow
notifications, the push token it gives the relay so Apple can
deliver them.
</div>
</div>
</div>
@@ -164,10 +191,12 @@ export default function NookPrivacyPolicy() {
</div>
<div class="pb-2 pl-4">
License keys are signed and verified with Ed25519 and stored in
the macOS Keychain. Phone traffic is encrypted end-to-end with
keys your own devices generate at pairing; our relay holds no key
that can read it. Every connection described on this page uses
TLS.
the macOS Keychain. The session content your Mac and phone
exchange is encrypted end-to-end with keys your devices generate
at pairing; our relay holds no key that can read it, though it
can read the routing metadata described in (c). Every internet
connection described on this page uses TLS; the direct
LAN/tailnet paths use the same end-to-end encryption.
</div>
</div>