forked from Mike/freno-dev
1d9287a199
The security review of 39d874a (FRE-369) found the address fix recorded
the wrong thing twice. Both are fixed here; the branch is the same one
under review, this commit does not rewrite it.
Q1 — the first x-forwarded-for hop is attacker-chosen text. In
client → Cloudflare → same-host proxy → app, both proxies *append*, so
the header arrives as `<client spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and
`split(",")[0]` took the sender's own invention — the loopback-peer gate
was sound, the hop selection defeated it. Preference is now
`cf-connecting-ip` (Cloudflare overwrites it, so a client value never
survives the edge), then x-forwarded-for counted from the right with one
trusted hop discounted, then the direct peer. Every candidate must parse
as an address. h3's `getRequestIP(…, { xForwardedFor: true })` has the
same leftmost flaw and is documented as not a fix.
Q4 — the table held full client addresses indefinitely. Every analytics
entry now passes through `truncateIpAddress` in `enrichAnalyticsEntry`
(IPv4 /24, IPv6 /56, unparseable dropped), so no writer can persist a
full address by accident. Retention got the schedule it never had:
`/api/analytics/retention` on a daily Vercel cron, Bearer-authenticated
and fail-closed, with the window parameterised (the old
`cleanupOldAnalytics` spliced the number into the SQL). Default 365 days
rather than the review's 90 so enabling the cron is not itself a
destructive event — the tighter window is an operational decision, named
on the task.
Also from the review: the module doc now forbids feeding this helper into
any security decision; `isLoopbackAddress` parses instead of
string-matching (`::ffff:127.9.9.9`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`); and `host` is
normalised (lowercased, port stripped) so `nook.freno.me:443` cannot
silently miss the `host = ?` scope. The weekly loopback caveat matches
the truncated shapes writers produce now, and says plainly that "unique
visitors" counts prefixes.
36 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
36 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
import type { APIEvent } from "@solidjs/start/server";
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import { env } from "~/env/server";
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import { ConnectionFactory } from "~/server/db-connections";
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import { runRetentionCron } from "~/server/analytics-retention";
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/**
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* GET /api/analytics-retention — daily Vercel cron.
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*
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* Deletes `VisitorAnalytics` rows older than the retention window, so visitor
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* data has a bound instead of accumulating forever (FRE-369, finding Q4 — the
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* table's only cleaner used to be a manual admin call, and since FRE-366 the
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* rows carry a truncated but still real client address).
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*
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* Window: `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS`, defaulting to 365 when unset or unusable
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* (see `~/server/analytics-retention` for why the default is conservative
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* rather than the reviewer's 90).
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*
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* Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` where the secret is
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* `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET` or Vercel's `CRON_SECRET`. An unconfigured secret
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* denies every request — an unauthenticated trigger of a bulk delete is the one
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* outcome this endpoint must never have.
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*/
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export async function GET(event: APIEvent) {
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const result = await runRetentionCron({
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authorization: event.request.headers.get("authorization"),
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secret: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_SECRET ?? env.CRON_SECRET,
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configuredDays: env.ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS,
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conn: ConnectionFactory()
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});
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return new Response(JSON.stringify(result.body), {
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status: result.status,
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
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});
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}
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