security: stop trusting the leftmost x-forwarded-for for rate limits and abuse quotas (FRE-371)

getClientIP (the rate-limit and audit key) took the LEFTMOST x-forwarded-for
hop and read x-real-ip unconditionally. In our topology — client → Cloudflare
→ same-host origin proxy → app — both proxies APPEND, so the leftmost hop is
whatever the sender typed: a rotating X-Forwarded-For minted a fresh rate-limit
bucket per request, and unlimited bug-report quota via the same pattern in
routes/api/the-nook/report.ts. x-real-ip is client-settable too; nothing in
the chain overwrites it. It is no longer read at all.

New trust order (src/server/trusted-client-ip.ts, resolveTrustedClientIp):

  1. a non-loopback socket peer IS the client — its headers are ignored;
  2. cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge; parsed as an
     address or rejected);
  3. x-forwarded-for counted from the RIGHT, discounting one hop for the
     Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended (the topology has
     exactly one trusted proxy below Cloudflare);
  4. "unknown" — callers key stricter shared limits on it, so resolution
     fails closed toward a tighter bucket, never a looser one.

Addresses are never truncated: a /24-truncated key would pool attackers with
the innocents behind them.

Share-vs-copy, stated deliberately: this is a port of the parsing primitives
 FRE-366 reviewed in request-client.ts, NOT an import. resolveClientIp carries
a standing rule (1d9287a) that it never feeds a security decision; lifting
that rule for these callers would couple an access-control change to an
analytics branch under review, and the analytics helper only exposes
truncated prefixes while rate limiting needs the full address. If the two
drift, trusted-client-ip.ts is the one security paths follow. The deploy-side
precondition (origin reachable only via Cloudflare + the same-host proxy) is
documented in the file header; if the app is ever directly internet-reachable
no in-app read can recover the true client.

Tests updated deliberately, not to go green: rate-limit.test.ts now pins the
rightmost-minus-one order, cf-connecting-ip precedence, peer-over-headers,
x-real-ip rejection, and the spoof case (a rotating leftmost hop does not
change the resolved client); report.test.ts pins the quota key stability
under a rotating header. New trusted-client-ip.test.ts covers the helper's
own edges: APIEvent wrapper, loopback forms, unparseable hops failing closed.

marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/copy.md

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 # Remote SSH copy — HELD, do not publish
 
-**Status:** removed from the live site on 2026-10-29 in the FRE-323 correction.
+**Status:** removed from the `freno-dev` source on 2026-10-29 in the FRE-323
+correction, and **not yet off the live site** — the deploy is blocked on a write
+credential to `mikefreno/freno-dev` (card `82d1e1b7`). `nook.freno.me` still
+serves every sentence below until that push or a Vercel deploy lands.
 **Owner:** CMO. **Verified by:** CTO, on the FRE-320/FRE-205 work.
 **Restore only when:** FRE-320/FRE-205 ship a genuinely one-click install, the CTO
 verifies that flow, and a recording shows a remote agent joining the island.

marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/rationale.md

@@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ credential. FRE-315 and FRE-322 §3 correction 4 marked the remote claim
 unverified and demo-gated. The CTO named it the largest launch risk because it
 was already in front of buyers.
 
-So the landing page now says only what the product can back today: local agents,
+So the `freno-dev` source now says only what the product can back today: local
-the card, and the notch. The remote story is not deleted — it is parked here with
+agents, the card, and the notch. That correction is committed locally and is
-the FRE-320/FRE-205 work so it can return the day the one-click install ships and
+**not deployed** — the live page still carries the remote sentences until the
-is recorded.
+push in FRE-323 card `82d1e1b7` lands. The remote story is not deleted — it is
+parked here with the FRE-320/FRE-205 work so it can return the day the one-click
+install ships and is recorded.
 
 ## What has to be true before it returns
 

marketing/positioning.md

@@ -4,13 +4,37 @@ Every drafted asset draws its voice, claims, and constraints from this file. If
 artifact invents its own framing, fix the artifact or fix this file — never both
 silently diverging.
 
-Primary source: `~/Code/the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md`.
+**Reconciled 2026-10-29** against the CTO's verdicts ([FRE-315], [FRE-322],
+[FRE-354]), the Chief of Staff's price decision (2026-10-29 04:01), the Plan B
+launch route ([FRE-346] → [FRE-203] `plan-b`), and `The-Nook` master (app floor is
+**14.2**, not 14.0 — `freno-dev` `881190d`, site merge `134f41e`). The previous
+version of this file named an upstream `the-nook/docs/marketing-strategy.md` that
+no longer exists; the verdicts below are the source of truth it was pointing at.
+
+[FRE-315]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-315
+[FRE-322]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-322
+[FRE-354]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-354
+[FRE-320]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-320
+[FRE-346]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-346
+[FRE-203]: https://paperclip.freno.me/FRE/issues/FRE-203
 
 ## The sentence
 
-> **Your Mac and your agents, under control.** The Nook puts your whole coding-agent
+There is no single approved public sentence yet, and saying otherwise is the one
-> fleet in the notch — thirteen agents — so you see what is running,
+mistake this file exists to prevent. What exists is a **launch claim set** — two
-> unblock it in one tap, and keep the machine from overheating while it works.
+sentences, both from one 15-second take, recorded as the chosen route by the Chief
+of Staff on 2026-10-29 ([FRE-346] `decision` §2–§4):
+
+| Slot | Exact sentence | Status today |
+|---|---|---|
+| Launch line | **"Every agent you're running reports into one notch, and the one waiting on you pins above the rest."** | Verified by code ([FRE-322] §3). Needs the one-Mac take before it is publishable. |
+| Second line, same take | **"Approve an agent's tool call from your Mac's notch, and the agent carries on."** | Needs the demo ([FRE-322] §1). The same take settles it. |
+
+Working line for internal writing, not for publication:
+
+> **Your Mac and your agents, under control.** One notch for the whole fleet: you
+> see what is running, you unblock what is waiting, and the machine stays cool
+> while it works.
 
 ## The wedge
 
@@ -22,15 +46,18 @@ The thing to say over and over, in every channel, in slightly different words:
 It is acute, quantifiable, and true — and it is the demo: a card appears, you tap
 Allow, work resumes. Ten seconds, no explanation needed.
 
-## The bundling reframe
+## The consolidation reframe
 
 Three audiences (agent herders, hardware tinkerers, glanceable-widget users) in one
-$10 app reads like a grab bag. Reframe as consolidation, which is the honest story:
+app reads like a grab bag. Reframe as consolidation, which is the honest story:
 
-> One $10 app instead of a notch toy, a fan utility, a battery limiter, a menu-bar
+> One app instead of a notch toy, a fan utility, a battery limiter, a menu-bar stats
-> stats strip, and a notification hack. Same one-time purchase, no subscription.
+> strip, and a notification hack. One purchase, no subscription.
 
-Price rises to $15 at 1.0 — dated and honest, not a permanent beta.
+**No price, no discount and no future price in copy.** The price is $10, it stays
+$10, and the dated rise to $15 is withdrawn (Chief of Staff, 2026-10-29 04:01). A
+price change is a Chief of Staff + sponsor call; it is never a marketing decision
+and never a launch asset.
 
 ## Hard rules
 
@@ -48,30 +75,49 @@ pages, marketing copy, comparison tables, meta descriptions, emails, FAQs, all o
   community replies written by a human, where quoting what a user said about another
   tool is normal conversation.
 
-### 2. A claim requires a test to exist
+### 2. A claim needs a verdict, not just a test
 
-Copy that says "13 agents" or "no data leaves the device" must have a test backing it.
+Copy that says "every agent", "13 agents", "no data leaves the device" must point at
-If a claim cannot be pointed at code or a test, it does not go in copy.
+both a test **and** a CTO verdict naming the exact sentence. A passing test is not a
+verdict; a verdict is not a recording. If a sentence cannot be traced to a row in the
+tables below, it does not go in copy.
 
 ### 3. Honest privacy scoping
 
-Telemetry and the trial email **do** leave the device. The defensible claim is:
+Telemetry and the licence check **do** leave the device: Sentry runs on **every
+launch, unconditionally** (with the Mac's IP address via `sendDefaultPii`), and the
+trial check sends `IOPlatformUUID` and the device name to `freno.me` ([FRE-322]
+§2.4, corrected by [FRE-354] `(b)`). Never publish, in any wording:
 
-> **No prompt or code content leaves the device.**
+- "no data leaves the device" / "local-only" / "no telemetry" / "no account"
+- "nothing leaves your Mac"
 
-Never "no data leaves the device".
+The one favourable engine sentence — about the **hook and bridge only**, never
+"The Nook" — as corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`: the hook and bridge **are not a cloud
+service**. Do not write "talk to nothing but your Mac" (too absolute: the
+`NOOK_PORTS` fan-out resolves `host.docker.internal` and the default gateway, and
+`defaultGateway()` opens a no-packet UDP socket to `8.8.8.8:80`), and do not narrow
+it to "over SSH" (a tailnet peer dials directly).
+
+It is verified as a code fact ([FRE-322] §2, [FRE-354] `(j)`), and it is still
+**held** until the disclosures land: Sentry gated behind a preference or removed,
+and `/privacy` + `/faq` corrected against the egress inventory (patch on branch
+`faq/from-objections-2026-10-29`, verified by [FRE-354]). A true sentence next to
+false ones is worse than no sentence.
 
 ### 4. Sell what works today
 
-Phone approvals are deferred until a shipped iOS app exists — no "(coming soon)"
+An iPhone + Apple Watch companion **is** in users' hands as a TestFlight beta
-parentheticals. The launch story is the approval card: an agent blocked on a
+(`ios-v0.3.2`, 2026-10-22; [FRE-354] open question). That makes one thing true and
-permission prompt, unblocked from the Mac's notch, and work resumes.
+one thing forbidden: say "TestFlight beta" when the phone exists in a sentence at
+all, and never claim approvals-from-phone as a shipped capability without its own
+CTO verdict — no "(coming soon)" parentheticals either way.
 
-Remote SSH is **held**, not approved. The one-click install has not shipped and
+Remote SSH is **held**, not approved: the one-click install has not
-has not been recorded (FRE-320, FRE-205), and the current path needs hand-edited
+been verified end to end ([FRE-315] §1) and the shipped path needs hand-edited
-`~/.ssh/config` and a one-time `ssh-copy-id` (FRE-320). Its copy is parked in
+`~/.ssh/config` and a one-time `ssh-copy-id` ([FRE-320]). Its copy stays parked in
-`marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` until the CTO verifies the shipping flow and a
+`marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` until the CTO verifies the shipping flow **and** a
-demo exists.
+recording shows a remote agent joining the notch.
 
 ### 5. Humans hold every account
 
@@ -79,28 +125,29 @@ No agent authenticates, posts, upvotes, or DMs. No sock puppets, no self-mention
 without disclosure. `approved/` **is the only thing a human ever publishes from** —
 nothing posts itself.
 
-## Approved claims (each backed by code)
+## Claims: status at 2026-10-29
 
-| Claim | Backing |
+Each row names the evidence, not a feeling. Re-read the verdict before using a row.
-|---|---|
-| Thirteen hooked agents, one glance | `AgentSpec.all` — claude, codex, opencode, pi, omp, muse, hermes, openclaw, zai, gemini, cline, qwen, deepseek |
-| Permission gate answered from a card | awaitPolicyTable + bridge directive path (`hook/normalize.go`, `serialize.go`) |
-| Fan / thermal / charge control | `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext) |
-| One-time purchase, no subscription | $10 → $15 at 1.0; Stripe checkout |
-| macOS 14+ | 27 source files use the `@Observable` framework |
-| No prompt or code content leaves the device | envelope carries session/event/terminal metadata only (see `docs/agent-interface.md`) |
 
-## Held claims (not publishable)
+| Claim | Status | Evidence / next step |
-
-| Claim | Why it is held | What has to be true first |
 |---|---|---|
-| Remote agents over SSH, one click to install | The one-click path is app-UI-only and needs hand-edited `~/.ssh/config` plus a one-time `ssh-copy-id`; no demo exists (FRE-320). FRE-315 and FRE-322 hold it unverified and demo-gated. | FRE-320/FRE-205 ship a genuinely one-click install, the CTO verifies it, and a recording shows a remote agent joining the island. Copy parked in `marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/`. |
+| Approve an agent's tool call from the notch, and it carries on | **Needs demo** — not publishable | [FRE-322] §1. `AgentLiveTurnTests` has never run on a signed-in host; one observed local run settles it. Say "an agent", never "any agent", never "always". |
+| Every agent you're running reports into one notch; the blocked one pins above the rest | **Verified by code, gated on the take** | [FRE-322] §3. Same one-Mac take as above. No count in the sentence. |
+| The hook and bridge are not a cloud service | **Verified code fact, held on disclosure** | [FRE-322] §2, wording corrected by [FRE-354] `(j)`. Held until Sentry is gated/removed and `/privacy` + `/faq` land. Never widen to "The Nook", never "nothing but your Mac". |
+| Fan, thermal and charge control | **No claim verdict yet — do not lead with it** | Backed by `helper/` (privileged helper, SMC, no kext), but no CTO sentence exists for it. Documentary, not launch. |
+| One-time purchase, no subscription | **Publishable fact, price not a launch asset** | $10, held at $10. No dated rise, no discount framing, no pricing copy. |
+| Agent coverage numbers ("thirteen agents", "8 agents", "all your agents") | **Excluded — verdict B, count removed** | [FRE-359] verdict B (2026-10-29): the page's 13 rows are the registry's first 13 of 18, so no number is publishable and `every` / `all` / `the agents The Nook supports` are banned. Removed from `agents.tsx`, the landing island section and the marquee. [FRE-322] §1 matrix for the sets. |
+| macOS 14.2 or later | **Publishable fact** | The app cannot start below 14.2 (`freno-dev` `881190d`, site `134f41e`). "macOS 14+" is false and was fixed on the site. |
+| Remote agents over SSH, one click to install | **Held** | [FRE-315] §1, [FRE-320], [FRE-323]. Needs a verified one-click install plus a recording. |
+| "Nothing leaves your Mac", "no telemetry", "local-only", "no account" | **False today — banned** | Sentry unconditional, licence check with hardware fingerprint ([FRE-322] §2.4). |
+| Approvals from the iPhone or Apple Watch | **No verdict — not a launch claim** | The companion is a TestFlight beta ([FRE-354]); the approval-from-phone claim has no CTO verdict and stays out of launch copy. |
 
 ## Voice
 
-- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives ("thirteen agents",
+- Short, concrete, no hype adjectives. Numbers over adjectives — but no coverage
-  "one tap", "$10 once").
+  counts (see the excluded row above).
-- The notch/island is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
+- The notch is the product's home; agents are the product's point.
 - Never apologize for being a utility. The utility is the point.
 - Banned phrasings: competitor names (see rule 1), "AI-powered", "revolutionary",
-  "game-changer", "seamlessly". Unverifiable superlatives generally.
+  "game-changer", "seamlessly", any unverifiable superlative — and the specific
+  banned sentences in rule 3 and the table above.

src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx

@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ export default function FeatureBreakdowns() {
         title="Your whole fleet, in one pixel strip"
         body="Every session, every agent, one square each. The pill never wraps, never grows — an arriving question flashes the fire and swaps the slot, then hands the notch back."
         bullets={[
-          "13 agents: Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, and more",
+          "Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Pi, Muse, Cursor and more",
           "Custom agents: your own coding agent can wire itself in from the published contract",
           "Slot rankings — you choose which data earns the notch",
           "You don't need a notch — external displays get the same island, floating top-center"

src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx

@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ function LayoutMock() {
 /* ── Marquee ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
 
 const CHIPS_A = [
-  "13 agents",
+  "Agents wired in",
   "Custom agents",
   "Six chiptunes",
   "Focus-aware slots",

src/routes/api/the-nook/report.test.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import { describe, expect, it, mock, beforeEach } from "bun:test";
 
 const sentEmails: { to: string; subject: string; html: string }[] = [];
 const tokenAnswers: { allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number }[] = [];
+/** Every rate-limit key the route derived, in order. */
+const rateKeys: string[] = [];
 
 mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
   default: async (to: string, subject: string, html: string) => {
@@ -19,7 +21,10 @@ mock.module("~/server/email", () => ({
 }));
 
 mock.module("~/server/bug-report-rate-limit", () => ({
-  takeBugReportToken: () => tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true }
+  takeBugReportToken: (key: string) => {
+    rateKeys.push(key);
+    return tokenAnswers.shift() ?? { allowed: true };
+  }
 }));
 
 const { POST } = await import("./report");
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     sentEmails.length = 0;
     tokenAnswers.length = 0;
+    rateKeys.length = 0;
   });
 
   it("emails the owner a report containing the snapshot, escaped", async () => {
@@ -133,10 +139,49 @@ describe("POST /api/the-nook/report", () => {
 
   it("still succeeds when no fingerprint header exists", async () => {
     const res = await POST(
-      request(validPayload, { "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1" })
+      request(validPayload, {
+        "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
+        "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
+      })
     );
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
     expect(sentEmails).toHaveLength(1);
+    // The quota key is the Cloudflare-recorded client, not a header hop the
+    // sender chose.
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
+  });
+
+  it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not mint a fresh quota key", async () => {
+    // FRE-371: the old read keyed on the leftmost hop, which the sender
+    // controls outright — one scripted loop with a rotating header had
+    // unlimited reports. With the same Cloudflare-recorded client and a
+    // different spoofed prefix per request, the key must be stable.
+    for (const spoof of ["1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", "3.3.3.3"]) {
+      const res = await POST(
+        request(validPayload, {
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.9",
+          "x-forwarded-for": `${spoof}, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1`
+        })
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    }
+
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual([
+      "203.0.113.9",
+      "203.0.113.9",
+      "203.0.113.9"
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("keys on the rightmost-minus-one hop when Cloudflare's header is absent", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      request(validPayload, {
+        "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1"
+      })
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    // Never the leftmost (sender-chosen) hop.
+    expect(rateKeys).toEqual(["203.0.113.9"]);
   });
 
   it("delivers the landing page's beta request with only the email", async () => {

src/routes/api/the-nook/report.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { z } from "zod";
 import sendEmail from "~/server/email";
 import { CONTACT_RECIPIENT_EMAIL } from "~/lib/contact-config";
 import { takeBugReportToken } from "~/server/bug-report-rate-limit";
+import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
 import { json, error } from "./_lib";
 
 /**
@@ -103,10 +104,9 @@ export async function POST(event: APIEvent): Promise<Response> {
   )
     .trim()
     .toLowerCase();
-  const forwarded = event.request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
+  // FRE-371: the IP fallback must be the spoof-resistant read — a rotating
-  const rateKey =
+  // leftmost x-forwarded-for used to mint unlimited report quota.
-    fingerprint ||
+  const rateKey = fingerprint || resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
-    (forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim() : "unknown");
   const token = takeBugReportToken(rateKey);
   if (!token.allowed) {
     return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "Too many reports" }), {

src/routes/nook/agents.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /**
- * Regression test for the /agents roster (NOOK-336).
+ * Regression test for the /agents roster (NOOK-336) and its coverage wording
+ * (FRE-359).
  *
  * The page mirrors the app's registry, `AgentSpec.all` in
  * the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentRegistry.swift. When Muse joined
@@ -8,6 +9,12 @@
  * them. The registry lives in another repo, so the expected roster is
  * restated here; when an agent is added there, add it here and on the page.
  *
+ * FRE-359 verdict B: the page no longer states a count or claims coverage
+ * ("all thirteen", "every coding agent The Nook supports"). The page still
+ * lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows — the table is hand-mirrored and its
+ * regeneration is its own ticket — so the roster check here is a subset
+ * check in registry order, not an equality check.
+ *
  * STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as the downloads regressions.
  */
 import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
@@ -16,7 +23,10 @@ import { join } from "node:path";
 
 const SOURCE = readFileSync(join(import.meta.dir, "agents.tsx"), "utf8");
 
-/** AgentSpec.all display names, in registry order. */
+/** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
+const COPY = SOURCE.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, "");
+
+/** AgentSpec.all display names, in registry order (18 rows). @ The-Nook f4258034, 2026-10-29 */
 const REGISTRY = [
   "Claude Code",
   "Codex",
@@ -30,25 +40,59 @@ const REGISTRY = [
   "Gemini CLI",
   "Cline",
   "Qwen Code",
-  "DeepSeek"
+  "DeepSeek",
+  "Kimi",
+  "GitHub Copilot CLI",
+  "Crush",
+  "Cursor",
+  "Amp"
 ];
 
-const NUMBER_WORDS = ["twelve", "thirteen", "fourteen", "fifteen"];
+const NUMBER_WORDS = ["twelve", "thirteen", "fourteen", "fifteen", "sixteen", "seventeen", "eighteen"];
 
 const entries = [...SOURCE.matchAll(/^\s{4}name: "([^"]+)",$/gm)].map((m) => m[1]);
 
+/** The page's rows are a subset of the registry, in registry order. */
+function subsetInOrder(page: string[], registry: string[]): boolean {
+  let cursor = 0;
+  for (const name of page) {
+    const at = registry.indexOf(name, cursor);
+    if (at === -1) return false;
+    cursor = at + 1;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 describe("Nook /agents roster (NOOK-336)", () => {
-  it("lists every registry agent, in registry order", () => {
+  it("lists only registry agents, in registry order", () => {
-    expect(entries).toEqual(REGISTRY);
+    expect(entries.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(subsetInOrder(entries, REGISTRY)).toBe(true);
   });
 
-  it("states the same count everywhere it names one", () => {
+  it("lists each agent at most once", () => {
-    const word = NUMBER_WORDS[entries.length - 12];
+    expect(new Set(entries).size).toBe(entries.length);
-    for (const other of NUMBER_WORDS.filter((w) => w !== word)) {
+  });
-      expect(SOURCE.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(other);
+});
+
+describe("Nook /agents coverage wording (FRE-359)", () => {
+  it("states no agent count anywhere on the page", () => {
+    for (const word of NUMBER_WORDS) {
+      expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(word);
+    }
+    // A bare numeral count ("13 agents", "The 13") is just as precise and just
+    // as unverified; the page must not state one in any form.
+    expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\b\d{1,2} agents\b/);
+    expect(COPY).not.toMatch(/\ball \d{1,2}\b/);
+  });
+
+  it("makes no completeness claim over the agent set", () => {
+    for (const banned of [
+      "every coding agent",
+      "the agents the nook supports",
+      "agents the nook supports",
+      "supported agents"
+    ]) {
+      expect(COPY.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(banned);
     }
-    expect(SOURCE).toContain(`all ${word}`);
-    expect(SOURCE).toContain(`The ${entries.length} agents`);
-    expect(SOURCE).toContain(`watches ${word} coding agents`);
   });
 });

src/routes/nook/agents.tsx

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — supported agents and their event coverage.
+ * `/agents` on the Nook subdomain — the agent roster and each row's event
+ * coverage. It states no agent count and claims no completeness over the
+ * registry (FRE-359 verdict B).
  *
  * The registry below mirrors `AgentSpec.all` in the app
  * (~/Code/the-nook/Sources/NookCore/Agents/AgentSpec.swift) and each agent's
@@ -282,26 +284,25 @@ export default function NookAgentsPage() {
     <>
       <EdgeCacheHeaders maxAge={300} />
       <PageHead
-        title="Supported agents"
+        title="Agent coverage"
-        description="Every coding agent The Nook supports — all thirteen, with each hook's exact event coverage and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
+        description="The coding agents The Nook connects to, with the events each hook reports and what you can do from a card: watch sessions live, answer permission prompts, unblock work."
-        ogTitle="The 13 agents The Nook supports, and what each hook sees"
+        ogTitle="The coding agents The Nook connects to, and what each hook sees"
       />
       <SubdomainHeader />
       <main class="min-h-screen px-[8vw] py-[8vh]">
         <h1 class="text-text mb-3 text-3xl font-bold tracking-tight sm:text-4xl">
-          Supported agents
+          Agent coverage
         </h1>
         <p class="text-subtext0 mb-2 max-w-2xl text-lg">
-          The Nook watches thirteen coding agents in one place — your menu bar and
+          The Nook watches coding agents in one place — your menu bar and notch
-          notch show every session that is running, thinking, or blocked, and a
+          show sessions that are running, thinking, or blocked, and a card can
-          card answers permission prompts without leaving your keyboard.
+          answer a permission prompt without leaving your keyboard.
         </p>
         <p class="text-subtext1 mb-10 max-w-2xl text-sm">
           Each agent reports its own set of events. "Allow / Deny from a card"
           means the agent hands the decision to The Nook while it waits;
           "Observe" means every event still appears live, but the agent keeps
-          its own prompting. Agents can run on this Mac or on remote machines
+          its own prompting.
-          over SSH — remote sessions report into the same grid.
         </p>
 
         <div class="grid gap-4 lg:grid-cols-2">

src/routes/nook/remote-claims.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/**
+ * Regression test for the removed remote / SSH claims and the removed agent
+ * count (FRE-323, FRE-359 verdict B).
+ *
+ * FRE-323 took the remote story off the site because it was unverified and
+ * demo-gated (FRE-315, FRE-320, FRE-322 §3 correction 4): the "one click
+ * installs the nook-hook" flow is app-UI-only, needs a hand-edited
+ * `~/.ssh/config` for any host not already in ssh config or on the tailnet,
+ * needs a one-time `ssh-copy-id` because the app runs ssh with
+ * `BatchMode=yes`, and has no manual fallback for minting the per-host
+ * credential. FRE-359 verdict B removed the coverage count for the same
+ * reason: the /agents table lists 13 of the registry's 18 rows.
+ *
+ * The copy was not thrown away — it is parked in
+ * `marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/` with the restore gate, and this test asserts
+ * it is still there so nobody deletes the parked story as stale. It goes back
+ * on the site only when the one-click install ships and is recorded.
+ *
+ * STATIC SOURCE AUDIT, the same pattern as `agents.test.ts` and
+ * `downloads.test.ts` (SolidJS does not render under `bun:test`).
+ *
+ * Deliberate exceptions, not audited here — both were weighed with the Chief
+ * of Staff at the go/no-go and left in place on purpose:
+ *  - `src/routes/nook/agents.tsx` Muse row: "This Mac only — remote hosts skip
+ *    it" is a limitation disclosure, not a capability claim.
+ *  - `src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx` "Tailscale hosts" chip: adjacent to
+ *    the removed remote story, but tailnet host lookup does exist. Raised on
+ *    FRE-323 rather than widened into this correction.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+const ROOT = join(import.meta.dir, "../../..");
+
+/** Shipped page and component source. Tests and drafts may quote the old copy. */
+const AUDITED = [
+  "src/routes/nook/index.tsx",
+  "src/routes/nook/agents.tsx",
+  "src/routes/nook/faq.tsx",
+  "src/components/nook/FeatureCollage.tsx",
+  "src/components/nook/FeatureBreakdowns.tsx",
+  "src/components/nook/IslandExtras.tsx"
+];
+
+/** Every sentence FRE-323 ordered off the site. */
+const BANNED_REMOTE_CLAIMS = [
+  "Agents on other machines",
+  "one click installs the nook-hook",
+  "Any SSH box",
+  "Works across every hooked agent, local or remote",
+  "Remote sessions are ordinary rows",
+  "One-click SSH setup",
+  "remote machines over SSH",
+  "this Mac or remote machines"
+];
+
+/** FRE-359 verdict B: no count, no coverage claim, in any form. */
+const BANNED_COVERAGE = [
+  "all thirteen",
+  "thirteen coding agents",
+  "13 agents",
+  "every coding agent",
+  "Supported agents"
+];
+
+/** User-facing copy only: comments are not copy and may name the old wording. */
+function copyOf(file: string): string {
+  return readFileSync(join(ROOT, file), "utf8")
+    .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "")
+    .replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, "");
+}
+
+describe("remote claims stay off the site (FRE-323)", () => {
+  for (const file of AUDITED) {
+    it(`${file} does not restore a removed remote sentence`, () => {
+      const copy = copyOf(file);
+      for (const phrase of BANNED_REMOTE_CLAIMS) {
+        expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("/agents no longer offers remote sessions", () => {
+    const copy = copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx");
+    expect(copy).not.toContain("remote sessions report into the same grid");
+    expect(copy).not.toContain("on this Mac or on remote");
+  });
+
+  it("the parked copy still exists, so restoring the story is a revert and not a rewrite", () => {
+    const parked = readFileSync(join(ROOT, "marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/copy.md"), "utf8");
+    for (const phrase of ["Agents on other machines", "Any SSH box, one click away"]) {
+      expect(parked).toContain(phrase);
+    }
+    expect(readFileSync(join(ROOT, "marketing/drafts/remote-ssh/rationale.md"), "utf8")).toContain(
+      "FRE-320"
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("agent coverage count stays off the page (FRE-359 verdict B)", () => {
+  for (const file of AUDITED) {
+    it(`${file} states no coverage count`, () => {
+      const copy = copyOf(file);
+      for (const phrase of BANNED_COVERAGE) {
+        expect(copy.toLowerCase()).not.toContain(phrase.toLowerCase());
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("/agents titles the table Agent coverage", () => {
+    expect(copyOf("src/routes/nook/agents.tsx")).toContain("Agent coverage");
+  });
+});

src/server/security.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { getCookie, setCookie } from "vinxi/http";
 import type { H3Event } from "vinxi/http";
 import { t } from "~/server/api/utils";
 import { logAuditEvent } from "~/server/audit";
+import { resolveTrustedClientIp } from "~/server/trusted-client-ip";
 import { env } from "~/env/server";
 import {
   AUTH_CONFIG,
@@ -328,39 +329,15 @@ async function cleanupExpiredRateLimits(): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 /**
- * Get client IP address from request headers.
+ * Get client IP address for a security decision (rate limiting, audit).
- * Only trusts X-Forwarded-For outside of local development (set by the Vercel
+ *
- * edge network in production; trusted in tests so the header-parsing path is
+ * Thin alias over `resolveTrustedClientIp` (./trusted-client-ip), which owns
- * exercised). In local development, uses the socket address to prevent header
+ * the trust order: the previous leftmost `x-forwarded-for` read was
- * spoofing.
+ * client-spoofable in our append-only proxy topology, and `x-real-ip` was
+ * read unconditionally — both fixed there (FRE-371).
  */
 export function getClientIP(event: H3Event): string {
-  // In production on Vercel, X-Forwarded-For is set by the edge network
+  return resolveTrustedClientIp(event);
-  // and cannot be spoofed by clients. In dev, ignore it.
-  if (env.NODE_ENV !== "development") {
-    const forwarded = getHeaderValue(event, "x-forwarded-for");
-    if (forwarded) {
-      return forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
-    }
-    const realIP = getHeaderValue(event, "x-real-ip");
-    if (realIP) {
-      return realIP;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Fallback: try socket remote address
-  try {
-    const nodeReq = event.node.req;
-    if (nodeReq?.socket?.remoteAddress) {
-      const addr = nodeReq.socket.remoteAddress;
-      // Clean up IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses
-      return addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "");
-    }
-  } catch {
-    // socket access failed
-  }
-
-  return "unknown";
 }
 
 /**

src/server/security/rate-limit.test.ts

@@ -150,29 +150,100 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
   });
 
   describe("getClientIP", () => {
-    it("should extract IP from x-forwarded-for header", () => {
+    // FRE-371: the read is spoof-resistant now. In the pinned topology
+    // (client → Cloudflare → origin proxy → app) both proxies APPEND, so
+    // x-forwarded-for arrives as `<spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and the
+    // leftmost hop is whatever the sender typed. Trust order:
+    // cf-connecting-ip, then x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, then the
+    // socket peer — never the leftmost hop, never x-real-ip.
+
+    it("takes x-forwarded-for rightmost-minus-one, never the leftmost hop", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
-        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1" }
+        headers: {
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
+        }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
       expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.1");
     });
 
-    it("should extract IP from x-real-ip header", () => {
+    it("prefers cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare overwrites it at the edge)", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: {
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
+        }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    });
+
+    it("a rotating leftmost x-forwarded-for does not change the resolved client", () => {
+      // The spoof the old read fell for: same Cloudflare-recorded client,
+      // different sender-chosen prefix per request. The key must be stable,
+      // or each rotation mints a fresh rate-limit bucket.
+      const first = getClientIP(
+        createMockEvent({
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      );
+      const second = getClientIP(
+        createMockEvent({
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "2.2.2.2, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      );
+
+      expect(first).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+      expect(second).toBe(first);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores x-real-ip entirely (client-settable in this topology)", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
         headers: { "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2" }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
-      expect(ip).toBe("192.168.1.2");
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
     });
 
-    it("should prefer x-forwarded-for over x-real-ip", () => {
+    it("ignores a client-supplied single-hop x-forwarded-for with no trusted proxy above it", () => {
+      // One hop only = the sender's own invention; discounting the trusted
+      // hop leaves nothing to believe.
       const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
+    });
+
+    it("a non-loopback socket peer is the client and beats every header", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
         headers: {
-          "x-forwarded-for": "192.168.1.1",
+          "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6",
-          "x-real-ip": "192.168.1.2"
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1",
+          "x-real-ip": "6.6.6.6"
+        }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("198.51.100.23");
+    });
+
+    it("a loopback socket peer lets the forwarded headers speak", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+        headers: {
+          "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.1"
         }
       });
 
@@ -198,13 +269,23 @@ describe("Rate Limiting", () => {
     it("should handle IPv6 addresses", () => {
       const event = createMockEvent({
         headers: {
-          "x-forwarded-for": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334"
+          "x-forwarded-for":
+            "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334, 10.0.0.1"
         }
       });
 
       const ip = getClientIP(event);
       expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
     });
+
+    it("rejects a candidate hop that is not an address", () => {
+      const event = createMockEvent({
+        headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "not-an-ip, 10.0.0.1" }
+      });
+
+      const ip = getClientIP(event);
+      expect(ip).toBe("unknown");
+    });
   });
 
   describe("rateLimitLogin", () => {

src/server/security/test-utils.ts

@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
   cookies?: Record<string, string>;
   method?: string;
   url?: string;
+  /** Socket peer the server observed; omit for a peer-less synthetic event. */
+  remoteAddress?: string;
 }): H3Event {
   const {
     headers = {},
     cookies = {},
     method = "POST",
-    url = "http://localhost:3000/"
+    url = "http://localhost:3000/",
+    remoteAddress
   } = options;
 
   // Build the cookie header string from the cookies object only
@@ -49,7 +52,10 @@ export function createMockEvent(options: {
     headers: headersObj,
     node: {
       req: {
-        headers: allHeaders
+        headers: allHeaders,
+        ...(remoteAddress
+          ? { socket: { remoteAddress } }
+          : {})
       },
       res: {
         cookies: {}

src/server/trusted-client-ip.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
+
+import {
+  resolveTrustedClientIp,
+  isIpAddress,
+  isLoopbackAddress,
+  UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP,
+  type ClientIpEventLike
+} from "./trusted-client-ip";
+
+/**
+ * Unit coverage for the security-path client-IP read (FRE-371). The caller
+ * suites (rate-limit.test.ts, report.test.ts) pin the behaviour through
+ * getClientIP and the route; this file pins the helper's own edges: the peer
+ * forms a real socket can present, the APIEvent wrapper, and failing closed.
+ */
+function event(opts: {
+  headers?: Record<string, string>;
+  remoteAddress?: string;
+  wrapped?: boolean;
+}): ClientIpEventLike {
+  const inner: ClientIpEventLike = {
+    ...(opts.remoteAddress
+      ? { node: { req: { socket: { remoteAddress: opts.remoteAddress } } } }
+      : {}),
+    request: { headers: new Headers(opts.headers ?? {}) }
+  };
+  // An APIEvent wraps its H3Event as `nativeEvent` (routes/api/* shape).
+  return opts.wrapped ? { nativeEvent: inner } : inner;
+}
+
+describe("resolveTrustedClientIp", () => {
+  it("trust order: non-loopback peer, then cf-connecting-ip, then rightmost-minus-one x-forwarded-for", () => {
+    // Peer wins.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "198.51.100.23",
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("198.51.100.23");
+
+    // Loopback peer → Cloudflare's record.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: {
+            "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1"
+          }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+
+    // No CF header → the hop below the trusted proxy.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("reads the wrapped H3Event of an APIEvent-shaped input", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          wrapped: true,
+          remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("never returns a truncated address", () => {
+    // The full /128 is the bucket key; a truncated one would pool attackers
+    // with their neighbours.
+    const ip = resolveTrustedClientIp(
+      event({
+        remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
+        headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334" }
+      })
+    );
+    expect(ip).toBe("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334");
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed to the stricter unknown key", () => {
+    // One hop = the sender's own invention; a non-address hop; nothing at all.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "x-forwarded-for": "6.6.6.6" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-ip" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+    expect(resolveTrustedClientIp(event({}))).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+  });
+
+  it("recognises the loopback forms a real peer presents", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          // IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback from a node socket.
+          remoteAddress: "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "::1",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.7" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+    // A non-loopback peer that merely looks odd is still the client.
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({
+          remoteAddress: "::ffff:203.0.113.7",
+          headers: { "cf-connecting-ip": "6.6.6.6" }
+        })
+      )
+    ).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("never believes x-real-ip", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveTrustedClientIp(
+        event({ headers: { "x-real-ip": "203.0.113.7" } })
+      )
+    ).toBe(UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("address helpers", () => {
+  it("isIpAddress", () => {
+    expect(isIpAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("::ffff:203.0.113.7")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("2001:db8::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isIpAddress("not-an-ip")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress("256.1.1.1")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress("")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isIpAddress(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("isLoopbackAddress", () => {
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("127.255.0.3")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("203.0.113.7")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("::2")).toBe(false);
+    // Unparseable input is not loopback — fails closed.
+    expect(isLoopbackAddress("garbage")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

src/server/trusted-client-ip.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/**
+ * The client address, resolved for security decisions (FRE-371).
+ *
+ * This is the ONLY client-IP read allowed to feed a security decision — rate
+ * limiting, abuse quotas, account lockout, audit trails. It exists separately
+ * from `request-client.ts`'s `resolveClientIp` (the analytics read) on
+ * purpose:
+ *
+ *   - `resolveClientIp` carries a standing rule (FRE-369 review, 1d9287a):
+ *     it never feeds a security decision. Its blast radius is a poisoned
+ *     analytics row; ours is granting or denying access.
+ *   - Rate limiting needs the UN-truncated address; the analytics module only
+ *     ever hands out truncated prefixes.
+ *   - `request-client.ts` ships on FRE-366's branch, which is under review;
+ *     a security fix must not merge-depend on an analytics diff.
+ *
+ * The address-parsing primitives below are therefore a deliberate port of the
+ * reviewed ones, not an import. If the two ever drift, this file's version is
+ * the one security paths follow.
+ *
+ * WHY the old read was spoofable: `security.ts`'s `getClientIP` took the
+ * LEFTMOST `x-forwarded-for` hop, believing the header "cannot be spoofed".
+ * In the pinned topology — client → Cloudflare → same-host origin proxy →
+ * app — both proxies *append*, so the header arrives as
+ * `<client-supplied spoof…>, <true client>, <Cloudflare edge>` and the
+ * leftmost hop is exactly the one the sender chose. Rotating
+ * `X-Forwarded-For: <random>` per request minted a fresh rate-limit bucket
+ * and unlimited bug-report quota. `x-real-ip` was read unconditionally too;
+ * nothing in this topology overwrites it, so it is equally client text and is
+ * no longer read at all.
+ *
+ * Trust order (matches the convention FRE-366 landed after its security
+ * review, re-derived here for security stakes):
+ *
+ *   1. The direct socket peer, when it is a real routable address: it IS the
+ *      client (dev, direct hit), and any forwarded header from it is the
+ *      client describing itself — ignored.
+ *   2. `cf-connecting-ip` — reachable only when the peer is the loopback
+ *      origin proxy (or unreadable, e.g. a synthetic event in tests).
+ *      Cloudflare *overwrites* this header at the edge, so a client-supplied
+ *      value never survives. Must parse as an address.
+ *   3. `x-forwarded-for` counted from the RIGHT: drop the rightmost hop (the
+ *      Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended) and take the hop
+ *      before it. Never the leftmost. Must parse as an address.
+ *   4. "unknown" — callers give unknown-IP keys stricter shared limits, so
+ *      an unresolvable client fails toward a tighter bucket, never a looser
+ *      one.
+ *
+ * Deploy-side precondition this code cannot verify (same as the analytics
+ * read): the origin must be reachable only through Cloudflare and the
+ * same-host proxy. If the app is directly internet-reachable, a client can
+ * set every header read here and no in-app read can recover the truth.
+ */
+
+/** Cloudflare's "who actually connected" header: overwritten at the edge. */
+const CF_CONNECTING_IP = "cf-connecting-ip";
+const X_FORWARDED_FOR = "x-forwarded-for";
+
+/**
+ * Hops discounted from the right of `x-forwarded-for` before the value is
+ * taken: the Cloudflare edge address the origin proxy appended. Pinned to 1
+ * because there is exactly one trusted proxy between Cloudflare and the app;
+ * raise it only if the topology gains a trusted hop.
+ */
+const FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT = 1;
+
+/** Returned when no trustworthy address exists. Callers rate-limit it harder. */
+export const UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP = "unknown";
+
+/**
+ * The shapes this module reads: an H3Event (`security.ts` callers) or a
+ * SolidStart APIEvent (`routes/api/*`), which wraps its H3Event as
+ * `nativeEvent`. Every field is optional because test doubles are minimal;
+ * anything unreadable simply falls through to the next trust step.
+ */
+export interface ClientIpEventLike {
+  request?: { headers?: unknown };
+  headers?: unknown;
+  node?: {
+    req?: {
+      headers?: Record<string, unknown>;
+      socket?: { remoteAddress?: string };
+    };
+  };
+  nativeEvent?: ClientIpEventLike;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The client address for a security decision, per the trust order above.
+ * Never truncated: rate-limit buckets are per-address, and truncating would
+ * let an attacker share a bucket with the innocents behind their /24.
+ */
+export function resolveTrustedClientIp(event: ClientIpEventLike): string {
+  // An APIEvent's socket and (authoritative) headers live on the wrapped
+  // H3Event; a bare APIEvent-shaped double without one is read as-is.
+  const source = event.nativeEvent ?? event;
+
+  const peer = directPeer(source);
+  if (peer && isIpAddress(peer) && !isLoopbackAddress(peer)) return peer;
+
+  // The peer is the loopback origin proxy (or unreadable): forwarded headers
+  // may be believed, in the order above.
+  const connecting = cleanHop(headerValue(source, CF_CONNECTING_IP));
+  if (isIpAddress(connecting)) return connecting;
+
+  const hops = (headerValue(source, X_FORWARDED_FOR) ?? "")
+    .split(",")
+    .map(cleanHop)
+    .filter(Boolean);
+  const index = hops.length - 1 - FORWARDED_HOPS_TO_DISCOUNT;
+  if (index >= 0 && isIpAddress(hops[index])) return hops[index]!;
+
+  return UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP;
+}
+
+/** The socket peer, IPv6-mapped IPv4 flattened (`::ffff:1.2.3.4` → `1.2.3.4`). */
+function directPeer(event: ClientIpEventLike): string | null {
+  try {
+    const addr = event.node?.req?.socket?.remoteAddress;
+    return addr ? addr.replace(/^::ffff:/, "") : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Header read tolerant of every event shape in play: Fetch-style
+ * `request.headers.get`, an h3 `event.headers` (Headers or plain object), and
+ * the raw node request headers. Header names are case-insensitive per HTTP;
+ * the plain-object fallbacks lowercase to match how node and the test doubles
+ * store them.
+ */
+function headerValue(event: ClientIpEventLike, name: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const fromHeaders = (h: unknown): string | null => {
+      if (!h) return null;
+      if (typeof (h as Headers).get === "function") {
+        return (h as Headers).get(name) ?? null;
+      }
+      if (typeof h === "object") {
+        const record = h as Record<string, unknown>;
+        const value = record[name] ?? record[name.toLowerCase()];
+        return typeof value === "string" ? value : null;
+      }
+      return null;
+    };
+
+    return (
+      fromHeaders(event.request?.headers) ??
+      fromHeaders(event.headers) ??
+      fromHeaders(event.node?.req?.headers)
+    );
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function cleanHop(value: string | null | undefined): string {
+  return (value ?? "").trim();
+}
+
+// ── Addresses: parse and validate ───────────────────────────────────────────
+// Ported from the reviewed `request-client.ts` (FRE-366 @ 1d9287a); see the
+// header comment for why this is a copy and not an import.
+
+/** Any address this file understands: a dotted quad or an IPv6 literal. */
+export function isIpAddress(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  return value !== null && value !== undefined && addressBytes(value) !== null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether an address is the loopback the production proxy presents.
+ *
+ * Parses rather than string-matches, so the forms a real peer can present in —
+ * `::ffff:127.0.0.53`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, an IPv4-mapped literal — are all
+ * recognised. An address this does not parse is *not* loopback, which fails
+ * closed: forwarded headers from an unrecognised peer are ignored rather than
+ * believed (a non-loopback peer short-circuits before headers are read).
+ */
+export function isLoopbackAddress(ip: string): boolean {
+  const bytes = addressBytes(ip);
+  if (!bytes) return false;
+  if (bytes.length === 4) return bytes[0] === 127;
+
+  // IPv6 loopback ::1 — and ::ffff:127/8, which is loopback too.
+  const mapped = ipv4FromBytes(bytes);
+  if (mapped) return isLoopbackAddress(mapped);
+  const tail = bytes[15]!;
+  return bytes.slice(0, 15).every((byte) => byte === 0) && tail === 1;
+}
+
+function isIpv4(value: string): boolean {
+  const parts = value.split(".");
+  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
+  return parts.every(
+    (part) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255 && !/^0\d/.test(part)
+  );
+}
+
+/** 4 bytes for IPv4, 16 for IPv6 (including `::ffff:a.b.c.d`), else null. */
+function addressBytes(value: string): number[] | null {
+  const raw = value.trim().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").split("%")[0]!;
+  if (isIpv4(raw)) return raw.split(".").map(Number);
+  if (!raw.includes(":")) return null;
+
+  const halves = raw.split("::");
+  if (halves.length > 2) return null;
+  const compressed = halves.length === 2;
+
+  const head = groupsToBytes(halves[0] ?? "");
+  const tail = groupsToBytes(halves[1] ?? "");
+  if (!head || !tail) return null;
+
+  const total = head.length + tail.length;
+  if (compressed) {
+    if (total > 8) return null;
+    return [...head, ...new Array(8 - total).fill(0), ...tail].flatMap(split16);
+  }
+  if (total !== 8) return null;
+  return [...head, ...tail].flatMap(split16);
+}
+
+/** One side of `::` as 16-bit groups; a trailing `1.2.3.4` counts as two. */
+function groupsToBytes(side: string): number[] | null {
+  if (side === "") return [];
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  for (const part of side.split(":")) {
+    if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}$/.test(part)) {
+      out.push(parseInt(part, 16));
+    } else if (isIpv4(part)) {
+      const o = part.split(".").map(Number);
+      out.push((o[0]! << 8) | o[1]!, (o[2]! << 8) | o[3]!);
+    } else {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function split16(group: number): number[] {
+  return [(group >> 8) & 0xff, group & 0xff];
+}
+
+/** The embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`), else null. */
+function ipv4FromBytes(bytes: number[]): string | null {
+  const prefix = bytes.slice(0, 10).every((byte) => byte === 0);
+  const marker = bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;
+  if (!prefix || !marker) return null;
+  return `${bytes[12]}.${bytes[13]}.${bytes[14]}.${bytes[15]}`;
+}