Gap 1 — click and served share one label: trackDownload now takes a
stage ("click" | "served") carried on a new VisitorAnalytics.stage
column; the Nook door and the tRPC proxy record clicks, the DMG file
route records served. summariseDownloads() and the /analytics downloads
block are untouched — the stage is a separate column, so the path
grouping cannot change.
Gap 2 — checkout start records nothing: the checkout route records a
created Stripe session through the shared trackRequest writer (same
referrer, campaign, country dimensions as every door) under its own
path, and STAGES.checkout reads it instead of the /checkout page proxy.
Gap 3 — loopback addresses, no host dimension: every writer now
resolves the client address through resolveClientIp, which trusts
x-forwarded-for only when the direct peer is the loopback production
proxy (trust boundary stated in request-client.ts), and records the
host on each row through the same site-context extractor routing uses.
stage and host reach the table through VISITOR_ANALYTICS_ADDED_COLUMNS;
the weekly job applies the same bootstrap before reading so it renders
seven stages against a database no deploy has migrated yet.
The weekly read splits downloadClick/dmgServed, scopes visits to
nook.freno.me, and computes its caveats from the window: pre-instrumentation
rows are stated and excluded, and the loopback warning now fires only
when rows recorded since the instrumentation still carry it.
The analytics page could not answer "how many downloads, of which
product". Three of the four download doors recorded nothing: the tRPC
click proxy only left the generic request row, whose path is the raw URL
with the asset buried in `?batch=1&input={"asset_name":...}`, and the S3
file route that serves Sparkle updates and the Nook app logged nothing
at all. The one door that did log (the Nook redirect) kept a private copy
of the logVisit/enrich/flush sequence, under its own path.
All doors now go through trackDownload, which writes one row per event
under /api/downloads/<asset> and flushes it inside the request — a click
is low-volume and serverless is not guaranteed to run the 30s batch
timer after the response. The file route maps its prefix allowlist to
asset keys, so a version bump stays one asset rather than one per
release. getAnalyticsSummary groups those rows into a downloads block and
the freno.me panel renders it under the overview cards.
History is recovered to the degree it exists: the Nook door's rows and
the tRPC clicks still carry enough to derive from (asset name in the URL).
scripts/backfill-downloads.ts inserts those derived rows with a
`backfill-<source id>` primary key and INSERT OR IGNORE, leaving the
originals untouched, so re-running is a no-op. Run against the live table
it added 66 rows: gaze 42, thenook 19, inputhalo 4, lineage 1.
Tests: new backfill suite (derivation, visitor detail carried over,
idempotency, empty history) and summariseDownloads cases; the Nook route
test now pins the canonical path, and the NOOK-337 allowlist audit reads
the map keys instead of quoted strings. Red-checked by stubbing the
downloads block back to zeros — the summary case fails, then passes.
Full suite matches master.
Co-Authored-By: nw-flash <noreply@nw-flash.local>
MISC-48
The Nessa API (nessaDb.*, nessa.community.*, Clerk auth and the Clerk user
webhook) lives in the Nessa repo's server/ on pan. This copy never served
the app: RemoteAPIClient wraps every input in {"input": …}, which the stock
tRPC adapter here reads as the input itself (queries 404, writes no-op).
Clerk's webhook already targets nessa-api.freno.me.
Drops the routers, nessa-auth, the webhook, NessaConnectionFactory, the
NESSA_* env and the now-unused @clerk/backend and svix. Nessa's marketing,
privacy and deletion pages stay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PvP_Characters table tallied wins and losses but held no token
balance and no purchase endpoint: earnings were client-reported
(winners credited themselves locally), so verifying only a spend
would have been security theater — a cheater could mint tokens by
self-reporting battle wins.
The server is now the ledger authority (FRE-142): registerCharacter
seeds the balance from the client cache exactly once and reconciles
it on every sync; battleResult requires the verified Lineage JWT
bearer, rejects non-participants, and credits the winner via the
reward formula ported from the client (computed from both registered
rows); a new purchase mutation checks cost, balance, and cooldown in
one conditional UPDATE scoped to the caller-owned row, so the spend
is atomic under concurrency and rate limiting survives cold starts.
Schema changes ship as an idempotent pvp-schema bootstrap
(pvpTokens, ownerUserId, lastPurchaseAt), mirroring the
analytics-schema pattern.
Client-side counterpart shipped in the lineage repo; design record
in its docs/security/pvp-server-side-purchases.md.
Tests: pvp-schema (DDL + legacy-column migration + idempotency),
pvp-rewards (formula parity with the client port, cost table),
pvp-ledger (seed-once reconciliation, owner binding, participant
verification, atomic spend, cooldown, refusal reasons) — 31 new tests
against in-memory SQLite; suite 572 pass (1 pre-existing audit
date-filter failure, unrelated).
Refactor the monolithic main-site contact page into a reusable
<ContactForm> component that encapsulates the Turnstile widget, cooldown
timer, email-verification flow, and tRPC submission. The main
/contact route becomes a thin wrapper that supplies the site-specific
disclaimer subline and Life-and-Lineage FAQ accordion (now exported as
<LineageContactQuestions> for reuse).
Add per-subdomain contact routes (gaze, inputhalo, lineage, nessa) that
render the shared component, with site-aware subject prefix, recipient,
heading, and PageHead metadata derived via useSite() from CONTACT_CONTEXT.
Introduce src/lib/contact-config.ts (with tests) centralizing the contact
recipient/sender addresses and subject building. The misc.sendContactRequest
mutation accepts an optional subjectPrefix (defaulting to "freno.me") so
inbound call sites continue emitting byte-identical legacy subjects, while
subdomain submissions route distinct subjects (e.g. "[Gaze] Contact Request")
to the same inbox.
- src/server/nessa-auth.ts: replace jose HS256 sign/verify with Clerk
session JWT verification via @clerk/backend verifyToken (RS256/JWKS).
signNessaToken removed — frontend now supplies Clerk session tokens.
- src/server/api/utils.ts: createTRPCContext verifies Clerk JWT, resolves
ctx.nessaUserId via SELECT id FROM users WHERE clerkUserId=? on the
shared NessaConnectionFactory. Lookup miss throws typed UNAUTHORIZED
(webhook has not run yet). Invalid/expired tokens are swallowed; the
enforceNessaUser middleware rejects null nessaUserId.
- src/server/api/routers/nessa-community-authz.test.ts: add clerkUserId
lookup tests (seeded match, missing row, mismatched id, local≠clerk).
- src/server/nessa-auth.test.ts: verifyNessaToken unit tests with mocked
@clerk/backend (valid sub, missing sub, malformed/expired/wrong-signature
rejection) plus static audit that signNessaToken is gone.
- src/server/clerk-user-webhook.ts + src/routes/api/clerk-webhook.ts:
Clerk user.created/user.updated webhook handler (Svix signature
verification, idempotent upsert by clerkUserId, lazy ALTER TABLE
migration) with full test suite.
- src/server/api/routers/nessa.ts: remove legacy register/login/google/
apple sign-in mutations (Clerk is now the sole identity provider).
- src/env/server.ts: add NESSA_CLERK_SECRET, NESSA_CLERK_JWT_ISSUER,
NESSA_CLERK_WEBHOOK_SECRET; NESSA_JWT_SECRET moved to optional.
- package.json: add @clerk/backend, svix; lineage/auth.test.ts and
nessa-ownership.test.ts: add Clerk env vars to env mocks.
- .env.example: document Clerk config vars and rotation.
- delete nessa-google-oauth.test.ts (Google auth removed).
ctx.nessaUserId remains the local users.id — router bodies are untouched.
Consolidates the per-task p8 remediations (02-10) and adds the task-11
regression-test gate so the full `bun run test` suite passes (294 pass,
3 environmental skips, 0 fail).
Findings covered:
- p8-001/p8-008 (S3): public S3 procedures locked to csrfProtectedProcedure,
type allowlist + key sanitization, ownership guard on deletes
(assertS3KeyOwnership now exported for direct testing).
- p8-002: per-resource ownership checks on all 15 nessa.ts CRUD mutations.
- p8-003: requireClubMembership enforced on the 7 community endpoints.
- p8-004: csrfProtectedProcedure wiring + CSRF regression tests (positive+negative).
- p8-005: Lineage JWT isolated (LINEAGE_JWT_SECRET + iss/aud claims).
- p8-006/p8-007: secret rotation runbook + .env.example (no real secrets).
- p8-009: Google verifyIdToken with aud check vs GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID.
- p8-010: rate-limit store moved to shared atomic Turso RateLimit table.
- p8-012: post/comment content sanitized (strip HTML + decode entities).
Gate fixes (task 11):
- csrf.test.ts: define `t = initTRPC.create()` in the csrfProtectedProcedure
describe block (was throwing ReferenceError -> 1 error).
- misc.test.ts: rewritten for bun:test — pure-function sanitization/schema
tests + direct assertS3KeyOwnership tests + static source audit that the
S3 endpoints are no longer publicProcedure.
- password.test.ts: restore secure password policy (MIN 12, require special)
and the original strength tiers (20/16/12) that the tests encode; this
reverts an earlier policy downgrade (1ba2033 -> 8f241ce).
- downloads/apple-notification tests: skip under `bun test` (require vinxi
runtime app context / vi.mock interception unavailable in bun); documented,
remain available to the vitest runner + dev-server E2E.
`bun run test`: 294 pass / 3 skip / 0 fail across 15 files.
Enforce requireClubMembership on social.getPost, addComment, comments,
like, unlike, challenges.leave, and challenges.submitProgress so private
club content is not readable/actionable by non-members (was IDOR).
Extract the membership helpers (requireClubMembership,
resolveClubIdFromPost, resolveClubIdFromChallenge) into a shared
dependency-free module (nessa-community-authz.ts) so all membership-gated
endpoints use one implementation and the libsql connection surface is
typed uniformly. Each post/challenge endpoint now resolves the owning
clubId first (NOT_FOUND if the resource is missing) then gates on it.
Add regression tests (nessa-community-authz.test.ts) covering: non-member
FORBIDDEN vs member allowed for all 7 endpoints' resolve→require sequences,
NOT_FOUND for missing post/challenge, and a join→allowed→leave→blocked
integration.
