The security review of 39d874a (FRE-369) found the address fix recorded
the wrong thing twice. Both are fixed here; the branch is the same one
under review, this commit does not rewrite it.
Q1 — the first x-forwarded-for hop is attacker-chosen text. In
client → Cloudflare → same-host proxy → app, both proxies *append*, so
the header arrives as `<client spoof…>, <true client>, <CF edge>` and
`split(",")[0]` took the sender's own invention — the loopback-peer gate
was sound, the hop selection defeated it. Preference is now
`cf-connecting-ip` (Cloudflare overwrites it, so a client value never
survives the edge), then x-forwarded-for counted from the right with one
trusted hop discounted, then the direct peer. Every candidate must parse
as an address. h3's `getRequestIP(…, { xForwardedFor: true })` has the
same leftmost flaw and is documented as not a fix.
Q4 — the table held full client addresses indefinitely. Every analytics
entry now passes through `truncateIpAddress` in `enrichAnalyticsEntry`
(IPv4 /24, IPv6 /56, unparseable dropped), so no writer can persist a
full address by accident. Retention got the schedule it never had:
`/api/analytics/retention` on a daily Vercel cron, Bearer-authenticated
and fail-closed, with the window parameterised (the old
`cleanupOldAnalytics` spliced the number into the SQL). Default 365 days
rather than the review's 90 so enabling the cron is not itself a
destructive event — the tighter window is an operational decision, named
on the task.
Also from the review: the module doc now forbids feeding this helper into
any security decision; `isLoopbackAddress` parses instead of
string-matching (`::ffff:127.9.9.9`, `0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`); and `host` is
normalised (lowercased, port stripped) so `nook.freno.me:443` cannot
silently miss the `host = ?` scope. The weekly loopback caveat matches
the truncated shapes writers produce now, and says plainly that "unique
visitors" counts prefixes.
The Nessa API (nessaDb.*, nessa.community.*, Clerk auth and the Clerk user
webhook) lives in the Nessa repo's server/ on pan. This copy never served
the app: RemoteAPIClient wraps every input in {"input": …}, which the stock
tRPC adapter here reads as the input itself (queries 404, writes no-op).
Clerk's webhook already targets nessa-api.freno.me.
Drops the routers, nessa-auth, the webhook, NessaConnectionFactory, the
NESSA_* env and the now-unused @clerk/backend and svix. Nessa's marketing,
privacy and deletion pages stay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Trials were anonymous — a 14-day trial you cannot talk to. trials gains
an email column (idempotent ALTER), POST /api/the-nook/trial-email
attaches the optional first-launch prompt's answer, and the address
lands in a Brevo list when NOOK_TRIAL_LIST_ID is set. The lifecycle
emails follow: a D+11 trial expiry reminder with a buy link, a purchase
thank-you from the Stripe webhook, and scheduled testimonial (D+3) and
review (D+14) asks via the daily /api/the-nook/lifecycle cron. Rows are
marked before sending so retries never double-send; trial addresses
that already bought get no buy reminder; the endpoint requires a
Bearer secret (CRON_SECRET / NOOK_LIFECYCLE_SECRET) and fails closed
when unconfigured — an open trigger would email real users. All sends
are best-effort and logged, never thrown.
Tests: trial-email (3) and lifecycle (6) suites; full run 539 pass.
Issues: FRE-10, FRE-11
- src/server/nessa-auth.ts: replace jose HS256 sign/verify with Clerk
session JWT verification via @clerk/backend verifyToken (RS256/JWKS).
signNessaToken removed — frontend now supplies Clerk session tokens.
- src/server/api/utils.ts: createTRPCContext verifies Clerk JWT, resolves
ctx.nessaUserId via SELECT id FROM users WHERE clerkUserId=? on the
shared NessaConnectionFactory. Lookup miss throws typed UNAUTHORIZED
(webhook has not run yet). Invalid/expired tokens are swallowed; the
enforceNessaUser middleware rejects null nessaUserId.
- src/server/api/routers/nessa-community-authz.test.ts: add clerkUserId
lookup tests (seeded match, missing row, mismatched id, local≠clerk).
- src/server/nessa-auth.test.ts: verifyNessaToken unit tests with mocked
@clerk/backend (valid sub, missing sub, malformed/expired/wrong-signature
rejection) plus static audit that signNessaToken is gone.
- src/server/clerk-user-webhook.ts + src/routes/api/clerk-webhook.ts:
Clerk user.created/user.updated webhook handler (Svix signature
verification, idempotent upsert by clerkUserId, lazy ALTER TABLE
migration) with full test suite.
- src/server/api/routers/nessa.ts: remove legacy register/login/google/
apple sign-in mutations (Clerk is now the sole identity provider).
- src/env/server.ts: add NESSA_CLERK_SECRET, NESSA_CLERK_JWT_ISSUER,
NESSA_CLERK_WEBHOOK_SECRET; NESSA_JWT_SECRET moved to optional.
- package.json: add @clerk/backend, svix; lineage/auth.test.ts and
nessa-ownership.test.ts: add Clerk env vars to env mocks.
- .env.example: document Clerk config vars and rotation.
- delete nessa-google-oauth.test.ts (Google auth removed).
ctx.nessaUserId remains the local users.id — router bodies are untouched.
Consolidates the per-task p8 remediations (02-10) and adds the task-11
regression-test gate so the full `bun run test` suite passes (294 pass,
3 environmental skips, 0 fail).
Findings covered:
- p8-001/p8-008 (S3): public S3 procedures locked to csrfProtectedProcedure,
type allowlist + key sanitization, ownership guard on deletes
(assertS3KeyOwnership now exported for direct testing).
- p8-002: per-resource ownership checks on all 15 nessa.ts CRUD mutations.
- p8-003: requireClubMembership enforced on the 7 community endpoints.
- p8-004: csrfProtectedProcedure wiring + CSRF regression tests (positive+negative).
- p8-005: Lineage JWT isolated (LINEAGE_JWT_SECRET + iss/aud claims).
- p8-006/p8-007: secret rotation runbook + .env.example (no real secrets).
- p8-009: Google verifyIdToken with aud check vs GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID.
- p8-010: rate-limit store moved to shared atomic Turso RateLimit table.
- p8-012: post/comment content sanitized (strip HTML + decode entities).
Gate fixes (task 11):
- csrf.test.ts: define `t = initTRPC.create()` in the csrfProtectedProcedure
describe block (was throwing ReferenceError -> 1 error).
- misc.test.ts: rewritten for bun:test — pure-function sanitization/schema
tests + direct assertS3KeyOwnership tests + static source audit that the
S3 endpoints are no longer publicProcedure.
- password.test.ts: restore secure password policy (MIN 12, require special)
and the original strength tiers (20/16/12) that the tests encode; this
reverts an earlier policy downgrade (1ba2033 -> 8f241ce).
- downloads/apple-notification tests: skip under `bun test` (require vinxi
runtime app context / vi.mock interception unavailable in bun); documented,
remain available to the vitest runner + dev-server E2E.
`bun run test`: 294 pass / 3 skip / 0 fail across 15 files.
