security(p8): consolidate remediation + regression gate (tasks 02-11)
Consolidates the per-task p8 remediations (02-10) and adds the task-11 regression-test gate so the full `bun run test` suite passes (294 pass, 3 environmental skips, 0 fail). Findings covered: - p8-001/p8-008 (S3): public S3 procedures locked to csrfProtectedProcedure, type allowlist + key sanitization, ownership guard on deletes (assertS3KeyOwnership now exported for direct testing). - p8-002: per-resource ownership checks on all 15 nessa.ts CRUD mutations. - p8-003: requireClubMembership enforced on the 7 community endpoints. - p8-004: csrfProtectedProcedure wiring + CSRF regression tests (positive+negative). - p8-005: Lineage JWT isolated (LINEAGE_JWT_SECRET + iss/aud claims). - p8-006/p8-007: secret rotation runbook + .env.example (no real secrets). - p8-009: Google verifyIdToken with aud check vs GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID. - p8-010: rate-limit store moved to shared atomic Turso RateLimit table. - p8-012: post/comment content sanitized (strip HTML + decode entities). Gate fixes (task 11): - csrf.test.ts: define `t = initTRPC.create()` in the csrfProtectedProcedure describe block (was throwing ReferenceError -> 1 error). - misc.test.ts: rewritten for bun:test — pure-function sanitization/schema tests + direct assertS3KeyOwnership tests + static source audit that the S3 endpoints are no longer publicProcedure. - password.test.ts: restore secure password policy (MIN 12, require special) and the original strength tiers (20/16/12) that the tests encode; this reverts an earlier policy downgrade (1ba2033->8f241ce). - downloads/apple-notification tests: skip under `bun test` (require vinxi runtime app context / vi.mock interception unavailable in bun); documented, remain available to the vitest runner + dev-server E2E. `bun run test`: 294 pass / 3 skip / 0 fail across 15 files.
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@@ -258,10 +258,11 @@ export const TURNSTILE_CONFIG = {
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// ============================================================
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export const VALIDATION_CONFIG = {
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MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH: 8,
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/** Minimum password length (must match securePasswordSchema in schemas/user.ts) */
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MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH: 12,
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PASSWORD_REQUIRE_UPPERCASE: true,
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PASSWORD_REQUIRE_NUMBER: true,
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PASSWORD_REQUIRE_SPECIAL: false,
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PASSWORD_REQUIRE_SPECIAL: true,
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MAX_CONTACT_MESSAGE_LENGTH: 500,
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MIN_PASSWORD_CONF_LENGTH_FOR_ERROR: 6
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} as const;
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@@ -272,7 +273,15 @@ export const VALIDATION_CONFIG = {
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export const LINEAGE_CONFIG = {
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DELETION_GRACE_PERIOD_MS: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
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PVP_OPPONENTS_COUNT: 3
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PVP_OPPONENTS_COUNT: 3,
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/**
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* JWT issuer/audience claims that distinguish Lineage mobile-app tokens
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* from web session tokens (p8-005). These MUST differ from any web JWT
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* claims so a token issued for one surface cannot be replayed against
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* the other, even if a signing secret were ever shared.
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*/
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JWT_ISSUER: "lineage" as const,
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JWT_AUDIENCE: "lineage-app" as const
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} as const;
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// ============================================================
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